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Natural disaster statistics worldwide indicate an upward trend in the number of reported 
disasters. In the year 2000 alone, there were over 500 reported natural disasters, which 
caused at least ten fatalities; affected 100 or more people; and required international 
assistance or called for a state of emergency. According to the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), between 1991 and 2000, an average of 211 
million people was either affected or died from a natural disaster. During that same decade, 
an average of 1,300 people was killed across the world every week. Such natural disasters 
are not only a humanitarian issue, but also an economic one and have a significant impact 
on the US economy. For example, between 2011 and 2013, transportation accounted for 
approximately $14.7 billion in disaster relief spending, ranking fourth highest among 19 
departments. Additionally, Hurricane Sandy’s recovery appropriation amounted to $60 
billion.  
Resilience, the ability of a system to maintain critical functions and prevent catastrophic 
failure during a disruption, and then recover rapidly, is now more than ever at the forefront 
of most critical infrastructure systems’ discussions. A consensus has emerged among 
relevant stakeholders on the need for evolving long-standing planning approaches and 
operational methods into approaches with more resilient outcomes. The primary objective 
of this research is to therefore develop a framework for transportation system resilience 
planning that expands current transport resilience approaches by using a sociotechnical 
systems approach, one that considers human and organizational factors in addition to 
technical factors for system performance.  
 xv
To develop the framework, this research adopts an inductive and multimethod approach.  
Data is systematically gathered and analyzed in two main phases. The first phase begins 
with an in-depth literature review and synthesis of transportation resilience as well as 
resilience theory and its applications to the built environment, social systems, economic 
systems and ecological systems. Next, a survey of selected transportation agencies is 
conducted to study resilience capacity building at transport agencies in order to extract an 
evolving maturity process for handling hazards and building system resilience using 
sociotechnical considerations. The second phase of this research then combines key 
concepts extracted from the resilience literature and the results of the survey to develop the 
sociotechnical transportation resilience conceptual and planning framework. The 
framework is then verified and demonstrated using practitioner reviews.  
Findings from the research show that the concepts of stability at multiple equilibria found 
in ecological resilience present opportunities for expanding the current paradigm of 
transportation resilience thinking, evolving it from one based on single-equilibrium 
stability to multiple equilibria stability. The resultant framework, based on both the 
resilience literature and survey results, characterizes the relative levels of four types of 
transport agency capital (organizational, institutional, technical and financial capital) that 
contribute to sociotechnical system resilience and catalogues attribute-based strategies for 
developing resilience capacity systematically. 
This research contributes to transportation resilience knowledge by extending the current 
paradigm of transportation system resilience planning from that of a single equilibrium 
conceptualization to multiple equilibria conceptualization. The research also characterizes 
different developmental stages of building transport resilience capacity using a 
 xvi
sociotechnical approach. Finally, the resulting framework is a potentially beneficial tool 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Background & Motivation  
The world as we know it still exists because nature has proven to be resilient over the 
millennia (Fisher, 2013). In the study of behavior patterns of ecosystems, it has been 
observed that ecosystems are constantly failing or collapsing, leading to a phase of 
reorganization ensuring survival (Fisher, 2013). In the same way, humans are not immune 
to ecosystem collapse; on the contrary, if recent events are any indication, “we are in the 
midst of an ecosystem collapse” (Fisher, 2013).  
Natural disaster statistics worldwide indicate an upward trend in the number of disasters 
reported as shown in Figure 1.1 (EM-DAT, 2009). In the year 2000 alone, there were over 
500 reported natural disasters, which caused at least ten fatalities; affected 100 or more 
people; required international assistance or called for a state of emergency (EM-DAT, 
2015). According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC), between 1991 and 2000, an average of 211 million people was either affected or 
died from a natural disaster (CRS, 2002). During that same decade, an average of 1,300 
people was killed across the world every week (CRS, 2002).  
Such natural disasters are not only a humanitarian issue, but also an economic one. Natural 
disasters have a significant impact on the U.S. economy, with their costs rising 
progressively as they increase in frequency and intensity. Figure 1.2 shows the number and 
costs (consumer price index adjusted, CPI) of billion-dollar disaster occurrences in the U.S. 
for the last three decades and their associated costs as reported by the National Oceanic 
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Administration (NOAA) (NOAA, 2017). The cost of these disasters to community quality 
of life and transportation infrastructure are also substantial. For example, between 2011 
and 2013, transportation accounted for approximately $14.7 billion in disaster relief 
spending (Center for American Progress, 2013). 
 
Figure 1.1  Global data trends show increase in natural disasters. (Source: EMDAT, 
2017) 
Figure 1.2  Number and costs of billion-dollar disaster event types by year. (Source: 
NOAA, 2017) 
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More specifically, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), by January 2012, had 
received Emergency Relief (ER) funding requests of about $2.9 billion for the repair and 
reconstruction of roads classified as federal highways that were damaged in 2005 during 
hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma (Kirk, 2012). Similarly, the Disaster Relief 
Appropriations Act of 2013 made available $2.02 billion for the FHWA’s emergency relief 
program. Consequently, the FHWA in February 2013 allocated $287 million to the state of 
New York, of which $250 million was meant solely for Hurricane Sandy repair and 
reconstruction (FHWA, 2013). 
Resilience, the ability of a system to maintain critical functions and prevent catastrophic 
failure during a disruption, and then recover rapidly, is now more than ever at the forefront 
of most critical infrastructure system discussions.  A 2013 report by the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB), Critical Issues in Transportation, concluded that “[T]he 
performance of the transportation system is neither reliable nor resilient, yet 
transportation’s role in economic revival and in global economic competition has never 
been more important” (TRB, 2013). This, in addition to the increasing frequency of 
catastrophic events due to extreme weather, aging infrastructure and terrorist attacks 
substantiate the need for evolving long-standing planning approaches and operational 
methods into approaches with more resilient outcomes. 
Considering this formal traction, a consensus has emerged among relevant stakeholders on 
the need for enhanced transport system resilience.  This has resulted in growing emphasis 
on, and sustained efforts in increasing system resilience for transportation and other built 
systems. For example, between 2010 and 2015, the FHWA sponsored 24 departments of 
transportation (DOTs) and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) to conduct climate 
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change resilience projects which mainly sought to assess transport system vulnerabilities 
(Figure 1.3). Similarly, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also funded nine 
agencies in seven different locations to assess their system’s vulnerability to climate 
change in 2011. Although the FHWA framework on which the DOT and MPO assessments 
are based on includes the integration of study results into decision making processes such 
as asset management, planning and project prioritization, many of the studies have not yet 
developed past the final report stage. In addition, the approaches used in these analyses are 
primarily technocentric (i.e. focused heavily on the systems’ physical components), and 




Figure 1.3 FHWA 2010-2011 Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment & 2013-
2015 Climate Resilience Pilots. Source: FHWA (2017) 
 
At the federal level, some policies and legislation have also been enacted with the aim of 
supporting infrastructure protection and resilience, albeit to varying levels of effectiveness. 
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For example, the 2015 national surface transportation legislation: Fixing America’s 
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which formally emphasizes the need for resilience and 
reliability of the transportation system.  Specifically, the planning process identified under 
the “Planning, Performance Measures, and Asset Management” section of the law includes 
a statement about MPO planning to ensure resilience, but fails to say what this constitutes 
(Trombino & Wright, 2016). Consequently, many transportation agencies still lack the 
necessary understanding, means and capabilities needed to begin addressing system 
resilience resulting in inadequate buy-in in many cases.  
 
 Gaps and Opportunities 
Technocentric approaches being used by many transport agencies is seemingly intuitive 
and arises from the concept of engineering resilience. Engineering resilience focuses on a 
system’s ability to resist external disturbances and return to its pre-disturbance state in the 
shortest possible time (Pimm, 1991). The idea is usually described in the literature using 
the resilience triangle shown in Figure 1.4. The size of the resilience triangle shows the 
extent of damage and time to full recovery, therefore, the more resilient the infrastructure 
is, the smaller its resilience triangle. Engineering resilience according to Pimm (1991) is 
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therefore presented as only being stable at a single equilibrium; the system is inflexible to 
changes and fluctuations. 
 
   
However, it is the view of this research work that the concept of a single equilibrium in 
engineering resilience does not suffice for two primary reasons. First, the increasing 
frequency and strength of natural hazards makes it impractical to try to engineer our 
infrastructure out of risk taking into consideration the necessary infrastructure renewal 
needed. Consider the example of the Netherlands. After the North Sea flood of 1953 that 
caused over 1800 fatalities and left over 100,000 residents homeless, the Dutch invested in 
large scale infrastructure that still protect their cities today. However, after the threat of 
another potential disaster in the early nineties caused by extremely high river tides, the 
Dutch realized that infrastructure alone was no longer an adequate solution and therefore 
embraced approaches other than purely combatting water. The country’s approach 
therefore shifted from being only about hydraulic engineering works, to how the entire 
country is managed, “both physically and administratively” (Deltacommissie, 2008). The 
country’s resilience strategy, has shifted from trying to combat water, to “exploring new 
  
Figure 1.4  Resilience triangle showing 50% loss in functionality Source: 
Bruneau et al. (2009) 
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opportunities that may improve the quality of life of residents, and to integrating their flood 
protection with nature, landscape and urban development” (Deltacommissie, 2008).    
Secondly, returning to an original equilibrium state, as engineering resilience in the sense 
of Pimm (1991) proposes, may not always be a desirable outcome for certain populations, 
e.g., vulnerable populations, where original conditions already fall short of desires. For 
example, during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, one of the transport system failures was its 
inadequacy in providing transportation for transit dependent residents. According to 
Murdock (2005), although public officials were aware that approximately 100,000 
residents of the City of New Orleans had no means of personal transportation, evacuation 
plans were inequitably focused on automobile evacuation (New Orleans, 2005). City buses 
set up to transport people to emergency shelters were unreliable, and neither public buses 
from the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA), nor trains were deployed to help 
evacuate transit-dependent residents from the city (Murdock, 2005). Consequently, transit-
dependent members of the community who wanted to leave the city had to pay for 
commercial services – “a major barrier to many low-income residents” (Litman, 2006). In 
these situations, returning the transport system to its original equilibrium does not 
necessarily enhance its resilience.  
This research therefore seeks to propose a shift from thinking about transportation systems 
in the context of single equilibrium systems to multiple equilibria systems and expand the 
transportation resilience approach. The concept of stability at multiple equilibria as seen in 
ecological resilience is based on a system’s ability to change in order to persist. That is, 
ecological systems shift from one stable regime to another after a disturbance is 
experienced to ensure survival. The intent of this work is to show the practical value in 
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adopting a multi-equilibrium approach for transportation resilience by developing different 
stability states (regimes) that agencies can systematically work toward. To do this, the 
transportation system needs to be viewed as sociotechnical in nature, i.e., one that 
“considers human, social and organizational factors, as well as the technical factors in the 
design of organizational systems” (Baxter and Sommerville, 2010). Broadening the 
concept of resilience from purely technical to socio-technical also enables us to explicitly 
address both technical and non-technical factors, processes and outcomes relevant to 
achieving increased system resilience. 
Considering the experience of best practices in infrastructure resilience such as the 
Netherlands, and other system failures in U.S. cities, it can be hypothesized that as agencies 
mature in their dealings with hazards, they naturally move from purely technical to 
sociotechnical approaches. This research therefore seeks understand the extent to which 
agency experiences bear up to this statement by studying the evolution in their resilience 
approaches and extracting an evolving maturity process in handling hazards and building 
system resilience capacity. Consequently, this work proposes the use of an evolutionary 
approach which builds on other sociotechnical approaches found in the literature and also 
on theories from ecological resilience to develop a framework that advocates the joint 
optimization of different agency capital types (specifically, institutional, organizational, 




1.1 Research Objectives & Scope 
Considering these gaps and opportunities, this research seeks to achieve the following 
objectives: 
 Develop a conceptual framework for enhancing transportation system resilience 
using sociotechnical approaches 
 Develop a maturity scale for sociotechnical system resilience through 
characterization of current transportation resilience practices, and identification of 
enhanced practices using the ecological resilience concepts 
 Develop a planning tool based on the maturity scale for building resilience capacity 
in transport agencies using sociotechnical approaches 
 Verify and demonstrate the application of the framework and tool using case studies 
and practitioner feedback  
1.2 Research Methodology  
The research adopts an inductive and multimethod approach in the development of the 
conceptual framework. Thus, data is systematically gathered and analyzed in two main 
phases. The first phase, shown in Figure 1.5, involves an in-depth literature review and 
synthesis, and transportation agency survey. The second phase then proceeds into the 
conceptual framework development, demonstration, review and finalization. 
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Figure 1.5 Research Design 
 
1.2.1 Literature Review & Synthesis 
This stage presents a review of three broad categories of literature: transport system 
resilience, resilience theory and resilience theory applications in fields outside 
transportation. The transport resilience literature includes peer-reviewed literature on 
frameworks for assessing and measuring system resilience, as well as literature on the 
current state of the practice.  A summary and syntheses of the transport resilience literature 
is also presented identifying the main gaps for enhancement. The review of resilience 
theory then discusses its origins, related concepts and applications in ecological system, 
social/socioecological systems, economics and the built environment. Literature on built 
environments resilience captures resilience in physical infrastructure including energy and 
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power systems. The literature review chapter concludes with a summary and synthesis of 
the resilience literature, extracting key characteristics of resilience and resilient systems, 
and identifying key concepts and opportunities for transport system resilience tailored 
toward the dissertation objectives.   
1.2.2 Resilience Planning Survey 
The next stage of the research involves the design and deployment of a transportation 
resilience planning survey. The purpose of the survey is to identify approaches currently 
being used by transportation agencies to address system resilience and to pinpoint major 
changes made in the past two decades to these approaches and the factors that caused them. 
Based on this information, the survey seeks to characterize the nature of transportation 
system resilience at selected agencies, and consequently, identify best practice strategies 
using a SWOT analysis.  The results of this exercise are used to inform the development 
of the sociotechnical transport system resilience framework. 
 Survey Sampling Process and Agency Selection 
The survey uses a type of purposive sampling technique for the agency selection process. 
Purposive sampling represents a group of nonprobability sampling techniques and is also 
known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling (Laerd Dissertation, 2012). 
Generally, nonprobability sampling techniques rely on the judgement of the researcher in 
selecting the units to be studied. Unlike probability sampling techniques where the end 
goal is to make generalizations from the selected sample to a given population based on 
random selection, a purposive sample is “selected based on characteristics of a population 
and the objective of the study” (Crossman, 2016). For this research, the Maximum 
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Variation Sampling (MVS) technique, also known as heterogeneous sampling, is adopted. 
This technique is used to capture “variation in perspectives … [from study units that may] 
exhibit a wide range of attributes, behaviors, experiences, … and so forth [allowing one] 
to gain greater insights into a phenomenon by looking at it from all angles” (Laerd 
Dissertation, 2012).  Figure 1.6 shows MVS as a subset of purposive and nonprobability 
sampling. 
 
Figure 1.6  Sampling Technique Adopted in Research 
 
Given the expected outcomes and objectives of this research, random selection of survey 
recipients would not be practical. Rather, survey recipients are specifically selected to 
represent the diversity of agency experiences encountered in resilience capacity building 
for transportation agencies. The two selection criteria are: (1) geographic location and 
hazard type, and (2) agency experience with disasters. 
Nonprobability 
Sampling
•Does not involve random sample 
selection




•Relies on the judgement of the 
researcher
•Based on characteristics of 
population and objective of study




•Tries to capture a broad range 
of experiences/ perspectives
•Allows researcher to look at 
problem from different angles
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1.2.1.1.1 Hazard Type & Geographic Location 
In general, hazards are either technological (man-made) or natural. Disasters caused by 
technological hazards are those that are “attributed in part or entirely by human intent, 
error, negligence, or involving a failure of a man-made system, resulting in significant 
injuries or deaths” (“Man Made Disaster”, 2017). Natural hazards on the other hand refer 
to any naturally occurring phenomena that can cause harm to humans and built systems 
alike. This research primarily focuses on the latter hazard type. That is, natural hazards 
most likely to affect transportation systems such as climatological (e.g., drought and 
wildfire), geophysical (e.g., earthquake, tsunami, and volcanic activity), hydrological (e.g., 
flood, landslide, and avalanche) and meteorological (e.g., extreme temperatures, 
storm/surge, tornado, winter storm, etc.) and biological (e.g., disease epidemic, infestation) 
(IFRC, n.d.). 
Moreover, geographic location plays a significant role in the hazards and risks 
transportation systems are exposed to (risks refer to the likelihood of hazards 
materializing). For example, many coastal areas are prone to sea level rise (SLR), storm 
surge and flooding from hurricanes while other inland areas more prone to tornadoes and 
flooding from extreme precipitation (including rainfall and winter precipitation). In 
addition, other parts of the country such as the west coast and northwest are prone to 
geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, landslides/mudslides and liquefaction. Table 1.1 
below provides a summary of typical risks associated with the impacts of climate change 
for the different regions across the U.S. Additionally, Figure 1.7 provides a graphical 
representation of four different types of risks faced by areas across the continental U.S. 
Purposefully selecting survey recipients from each region provides the potential to solicit 
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experiences from agencies with different hazard types that may allow transferability to 
agencies in similar regions facing similar hazards types.   
Table 1.1  Typical Risks Associated with Different Regions 
Region  Typical Risks 
Northwest & West Coast Sea level rise, storm surge, erosion, inundation, & 
increasing ocean acidity 
Midwest & Great Plains Extreme heat, & flooding; 
Rising temperatures 
Northeast & Mid Atlantic Heat waves, heavy downpours, & sea level rise 
South & Southwest Sea level rise, extreme heat; Increased heat, drought 
& flooding and erosion in coastal areas 
 
 
Figure 1.7  Map showing earthquake, flood, tornado and hurricane hazards in 
continental United States 
(Source: Alert Systems Group, 2015) 
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1.2.1.1.2 Agency Experience  
The second criterion used in selecting the cases is the relative experience agencies with 
building resilience capacity. Relative experiences of agencies were initially determined 
through a review of the state of practice literature.  This criterion seeks to identify resilience 
approaches used by agencies with various threat levels and previous experience with 
system disruption. Specifically, this criterion seeks to help answer question of whether or 
not agencies that have experienced (or more frequently experience) system disruptions due 
to natural hazards have evolved further towards sociotechnical resilience approaches.  
1.2.3 Framework Development 
The second phase of this research begins with the development of the conceptual 
framework for sociotechnical transportation system resilience. The framework is 
developed by first incorporating key concepts drawn from the literature review to extend 
the current heavily technical practice to socio-technical, as well as input obtained from the 
survey on changes in different types agency capital. Next, a maturity scale for defining the 
resilience capacity for transportation agencies is developed and presented with the intent 
to define different stages of maturity an agency may go through based on its resilience 
capacity as a function of its different types of capital over time. The maturity scale is also 
designed to double as a self-assessment tool that agencies can use to identify where they 
fall on the scale to help them better plan toward higher levels system resilience using clear 
predefined targets. Agencies can therefore use the maturity scale as a tool for 
systematically progressing from one maturity level to the next.   
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1.2.4 Verification and Validation 
The second phase of the research also involves a demonstration and review of the resulting 
tool by transportation industry practitioners. The review and feedback process is used for 
the framework and resulting tool’s verification. The verification process is used to ensure 
that the tool meets the needs of its intended users. Generally, this process involves non-
executable methods such as review. Validation on the other hand is meant to ensure that 
the tool produces the expected outcomes. Thus, validation of the framework and tool can 
only occur after it is adopted and used by transport agencies over an adequate period of 
time. Observations can then be used to evaluate the its effectiveness in producing resilient 
outcomes (i.e., through jointly optimizing agency capital using sociotechnical approaches). 
Considering the timeline of this research, validation falls outside its scope. However, 
verification through practitioner feedback provides the necessary quality assurance/quality 
control for initial adoption.  
The verification process therefore constitutes a review by practitioners from four different 
transportation agencies: Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT), Washington State 
Department of Transportation (WSDOT), New York Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA), and Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC). The first two agencies, 
ADOT and WSDOT, also provide a demonstration of the tool by conducting a self-
assessment of their agencies’ resilience efforts, in addition to reviewing the tool.  
 Output from the verification process are then incorporated into the refinement and 
finalization of the tool. The research then concludes with a set of guidelines for applying 
the conceptual framework and tool.  
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1.3 Organization of Dissertation  
 The rest of the dissertation is presented in the subsequent chapters as follows. Chapter 2 
presents a review and discussion of literature relevant to this research and concludes with 
a synthesis of the literature identifying gaps and key concepts that serve as opportunities 
for meeting those gaps. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the survey participants and 
discusses the structure and organization of the survey questions. The chapter then proceeds 
to present an analysis of the survey responses in case study format. The case studies 
combine the survey responses with information obtained from reviewing agency-specific 
literature to present a synthesis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
associated with different agency capital that influence system resilience capacity. 
Subsequently, the synthesis of the literature and case studies are used a basis for developing 
the conceptual framework for sociotechnical resilience in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 therefore 
presents the foundational concepts for the framework, along with a detailed description of 
the framework and the associated maturity scale (also the planning tool) and concludes 
with a summary. Chapter 5 discusses the verification process, that is, the practitioner 
review and demonstration process. Feedback from the review process are summarized and 
then used to finalize to the tool. The final chapter, Chapter 6, concludes the dissertation 
with a closing discussion on the main findings of the research as they relate to the survey 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction  
The literature review chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents a 
review of transport system resilience literature beginning with a discussion of some 
prevalent threats to transport systems. This literature is then summarized and synthesized. 
The second section of the chapter reviews resilience theory, related concepts and their 
applications to each of the following areas: ecological systems, social/socioecological 
systems, economics, and the built environment. This literature is then summarized and 
synthesized to present (1) a conceptualization of how some resilience concepts apply to 
transportation systems at different geopolitical levels, and (2) a set of pathways for 
operationalizing these concepts from the resilience literature in transportation. The chapter 
concludes by identifying gaps in the transport resilience literature and opportunities for 
addressing them.  
 Transportation Systems Resilience 
 Transportation System Threats 
In general terms, a threat or hazard is anything that could cause harm or danger. In the 
transportation system, a threat is anything that could potentially disrupt system functions. 
These could either be of natural causes like earthquakes, or of man-made causes like 
structural deficiency. Figure 2.1 shows some examples of the range of threats that 
transportation systems face. After the destructive impacts of events such as Hurricane 
Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, natural hazards, especially those related to climate change 
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impacts or extreme weather, have become a critical issue for transport systems. In general, 
transportation engineers design infrastructure based on historical records.  For example, 
culverts may be designed based on a 100-year storm (i.e., probability of occurring once 
every 100 years). However, as the frequency of previously thought high-impact-low 
probability events continues to increase, historical records are in many cases no longer 
sufficient to predict future risk. Climate change poses many significant threats for 
transportation systems including increased extreme precipitation and associated flooding, 
sea level rise (SLR), storm surge, and extreme heat. Some of these threats are briefly 
discussed in the following paragraphs as they affect many transportation systems in the 
U.S.  
 
Figure 2.1 Types and Examples of Threats 
 
 Climate Change Related Threats 
“Climate change is a long-term shift in the statistics of weather (including averages)” 














global sea level rise and more intense and frequent extreme weather events, with exact 
impacts varying across geographic regions. Since the early nineties, transportation agencies 
have worked towards mitigating (i.e. a focus on the causes of climate change such as 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions) the impacts of the transportation system on air quality 
mostly with funding from the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement 
Program (CMAQ) established under the 1991 national surface transportation legislation: 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). Because of recent events 
however, owners and operators of transportation infrastructure have begun to focus on the 
impacts of climate change and extreme weather on their systems.  
 Sea Level Rise (SLR):  
Caused by glacial melting and thermal expansion of oceans, SLR threatens inundation of 
coastal transportation infrastructure. In addition to inundation, SLR can affect coastal 
erosion rates, ground water levels and environmental characteristics that affect material 
durability (Caltrans, 2011). Figure 2.2 shows a map of major Gulf Coast roadways that 
could be flooded by SLR in the next 50 to 100 years.  
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Figure 2.2  Major Gulf Coast roadways that could be flooded by SLR in the next 50 
to 100 years. (Source: USGCRP, 2014) 
 
 Storm Surge, Intense Precipitation & Flooding: 
 Storm surge is “an abnormal rise of water generated by a storm, over and above the 
predicted astronomical tide” (NOAA, n.d.). This is primarily caused by winds associated 
with storms and hurricanes, although the exact level of surge is influence by several factors. 
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (NOAA), the entire 
East coast and all locations along the Gulf coast are vulnerable to storm surge. 
Additionally, there are about 60,000 miles of coastal roads in the U.S. currently exposed 
to flooding from coastal storms and high waves (EPA, 2016). These hazards typically result 
in washed out or damaged roads and bridges, weakened soil under culverts and tunnels, 
and landslides, which result from inability of saturated soils to absorb more precipitation. 
Similarly, the number of extreme one-day precipitation events in the U.S. is on the rise as 
shown by data from NOAA in Figure 2.3. Such events consequently increase the flood 
rates and risk of potential damage to transport infrastructure.  
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Figure 2.3  Extreme One-Day Precipitation events in the contiguous 48 States, 1910-
2015. (Source: NOAA, 2016). 
 
 Extreme Heat  
As a slow stressor, extreme heat can impact transportation systems in a number of ways. 
On roadways for example, high temperatures can lead to the softening and expansion, 
which can in turn cause rutting and potholes. On railroad tracks, buckling from expansion 
due to extreme heat can also lead to train derailments.  Extreme heat can also affect bridge 
joints (TRB, 2008).  Likewise, in a broader sense, extreme heat can potentially lead to 
increased project delays with its associated economic impacts for construction and 
maintenance activities because of limited construction activities, especially in high 
humidity areas (EPA, 2016).  
With this general understanding of common threats faced by transportation systems, the 
next section introduces the state of the practice and research for transportation system 
resilience.  
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 State of the Practice for Transportation System Resilience  
Interest in transport resilience has gradually grown over years with a shift in focus from 
mostly studying the strength and resistance of infrastructure materials (e.g. subgrade and 
pavement materials) in the years prior to 2000, to research on freight and railroad security 
in the early 2000s. In the current state of the practice, transportation resilience is focused 
on assessing the impacts of climate change and extreme weather on transport infrastructure 
and its networks (see FTA, 2011; ICF International, 2013; Meyer et al., 2010; Testa et al., 
2015; Espinet et al., 2015; and Dowds, 2015). Practitioners are consistently working with 
climate scientists to create data that is understandable and usable for infrastructure planning 
and design adaptation purposes. Beginning with the FHWA’s Gulf Coast Study 1 in 2008, 
climate models and downscaling techniques are gradually becoming more accessible for 
regional and project-level adaptation endeavors as can be seen in Figure 2.4 (Choate & 
Bhat 2015). Subsequently, conducting threat, hazard and risk assessments in the 
transportation infrastructure field has also increased over the last few years across the 
country, and in states where such assessments are not being conducted, there is still an 
increased awareness of the possible risks to their systems. Specifically, assessments 
focused on quantifying the impacts of climate change on transportation infrastructure, by 
the use of vulnerability and risk indices, are continually being developed at the state level 
as part of Transportation Asset Management (TAM) (ICF International, 2013).  
Transportation Asset management is “a strategic and systematic process of operating, 
maintaining, upgrading, and expanding physical assets effectively through their life cycle” 
(FHWA, 2015). It focuses on the use of improved and quality data in business and 
engineering practices for better resource allocation and decision making. The systems used 
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in TAM serve as the main platform for climate change vulnerability assessments and 
infrastructure adaptation initiatives in transportation agencies. Specifically, TAM systems 
are being used to integrate climate change risk and/or vulnerability indicators with other 
asset information in databases to understand where the most vulnerable assets as well as 
public risks are located. 
 
For example, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is incorporating 
climate change vulnerability into its asset management system by tagging assets that are 
sensitive to the impacts of climate change and subsequently factors this in resource 
allocation (FTA, 2011; Amekudzi et al., 2014). The MARTA climate change adaptation 
U.S.DOT Gulf Coast Study, 
Phase 1: Regional look at 
potential CC impacts on 
transport infrastructure. 
Purpose was to generally 
understand how the regional 
transport network might be 
vulnerable to CC. 
FHWA Climate Change 
Effects Typology: 
Provided relevant 
projection info at the 
regional scale; climate 
science became more 
accessible to transport 
practitioners. 
FHWA Transport Engr. 
Approaches to Climate 
Resilience:  Project seeks to 
reduce barriers to 
incorporating CC projections 
at the transport project level. 
Intends to develop 
methodologies and guidance to 
help practitioners incorporate 
CC knowledge into project 
design.  
U.S.DOT Gulf Coast Study, 
Phase 2: Climate data 
completed. Detailed 
vulnerability assessment of a 
transport system at a county 
level. Identification of 
climate projection formats 
that are more practical to 
engineers & planners. 
U.S.DOT CMIP Climate Data 
Processing Tool: Downloads & 
processes climate projection data 
into formats relevant to project-
level decisions.     
Climate Resilience Toolkit 
toolkit.climate.gov: Website 
brings multitude of C vulnerability 
tools under one roof, to encourage 
access to resources and 
consistency. 
NCHRP 15-61 Applying & 
Adapting Climate Models to 
Hydraulic Design Procedures: An 
objective of this research will be to 
identify the needed levels of 
precision, accuracy, and confidence 
for climate models to be compatible 
with that of the data used in current 
hydrologic/hydraulic analysis and 
design technique. 
Figure 2.4 Timeline for climate change adaptation initiatives 
Adapted from Choate and Bhat (2015) 
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project was one of seven1 pilot projects funded by the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA) aimed at identifying and addressing climate change impacts on transit infrastructure, 
specifically those related to flooding and extreme precipitation, extreme heat, sea level rise, 
and tropical storms and hurricanes (FTA, 2014).  
Similarly, the FHWA has also funded a number of climate change adaptation pilots. For 
example, the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) has led efforts to assess the 
sensitivity of transportation assets to climate change impacts in the Hampton Roads 
metropolitan region. Asset scope was determined by: traffic volume, elevation relative to 
mean sea level, location on a maintenance priority route, and location on a hurricane 
evacuation route. This data was then used to develop an Excel-based prioritization model 
for climate change considerations. Similarly, the California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) with support from the FHWA conducted a study to analyze the potential 
vulnerabilities of state highways in four counties (as proof of concept) in order to prepare 
for the impacts of climate change, and to identify a range of adaptation options (Caltrans, 
2014). 
Some metropolitan transportation organizations (MPOs) have also begun planning for 
adaptation as part of the FHWA Climate Change Resilience Pilot projects. The 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in the San Francisco Bay Area analyzed 
transportation vulnerability to sea-level where the objective of the project was to provide 
transportation planners in the Bay Area with information for developing effective 
                                                 
1 The other agencies involved in the pilot projects were San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), 
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), Houston Metro, Tampa HART, and Island Transit (Gulf Coast), Los Angeles 
County Metropolitan Transport Authority (LACMTA), Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA), Philadelphia, and Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit), Seattle.    
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adaptation strategies. The other state departments of transportation (DOTs) and MPOs 
involved in FHWA Climate Change Resilience Pilot projects include New Jersey 
DOT/North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, Washington State DOT and the 
Oahu MPO (FHWA, 2015). 
In terms of actual implementation, very few MPOs and DOTs use climate change 
adaptation and/or vulnerability as a factor for decision making. One of the few 
transportation agencies that does so is the Boston Region MPO. The Boston Region MPO 
incorporates resilience into project prioritization and selection by linking its interactive 
natural hazards mapping tool to the MPO’s TIP (Transportation Improvement Program) 
projects database. The tool enables planners to determine projects that are located in areas 
exposed to flooding, storm surge, or sea level rise and factor that into the decision-making 
process (Boston Region MPO, 2013).  
In summary, the current state of practice for developing transportation system resilience is 
to collect data that enables agencies assess the vulnerability and criticality of transport 
infrastructure to climate change. Agencies hope to eventually use the developed 
vulnerability and criticality metrics to inform project prioritization and resource allocation 
for various climate hazards such as storm surge, sea level rise, changing temperatures, 
changing rainfall and other risk factors. In addition, some agencies are also considering the 
use of climate data to understand the future vulnerability of planned projects under multiple 
climate scenarios using various climate models.  
Despite the traction and growing emphasis on transport resilience, opportunities still exist 
to improve the current state of the practice. As mentioned earlier, many transportation 
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agencies have not been able to cross over from the final report stage to actual 
implementation of recommendations although the FHWA framework being used in many 
of the resilience/climate change vulnerability studies includes the integration of study 
results into decision making as a step. In some cases, the infamous transportation trifecta 
(i.e., funding, political will and opportunity) is the cause and this research hopes to present 
some ways to overcome them. Secondly, these approaches are still largely focused on 
physical infrastructure (i.e., technocentric) placing less emphasis on the equally important 
practices, processes and human capital that affect the capacity of systems to produce 
resilient outcomes. 
 Transportation Resiliency Frameworks 
In light of these developments, several researchers have developed various methodologies 
for measuring transport vulnerability and resilience which may be grouped into two broad 
categories. The first category comprises methods that use graph theory or a variation of it 
to assess vulnerability of transport networks based on their topological properties. For 
example, Ash and Newth (2007) use an evolutionary algorithm to evolve complex 
networks that are resilient to cascading failure. After an analysis aimed at finding the source 
of resilience for these networks, the authors reveal that topological regularities such as 
clustering, modularity and long path lengths are all vital in the design of robust networks. 
Ip and Wang (2009) also assess the resilience of transportation networks by using a 
quantificational resilience evaluation approach. This approach is based on the notion that 
survivability of any two nodes depends on the number of independent paths between them. 
Thus, the optimization model used in this work applies the weighted average number of 
passageways between a node and all other nodes in the network as the resiliency measure. 
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Along similar lines, Rosenkrantz et al. (2005) use the maximum number of path failures to 
a node that a network can tolerate as the surrogate resiliency measure for service-oriented 
networks and propose metrics for the quantification of resilience under node and edge 
failures. These metrics are based on both the topological structure of networks and manner 
of service distribution over the network, and also form a framework for determining the 
resilience parameters of a network, and for designing a network with a given degree of 
resilience. Lastly, Taylor and Susilawati (2012) measure changes to accessibility levels at 
different network states to assess network vulnerability. The authors compare levels of 
remoteness of localities within a study region on a basis of the extent or impact of network 
degradation on an accessibility/remoteness index.  
The second category of methods provide a means for considering both the demand and 
supply side of the transport system to comprehensively assess the consequences of 
disruptions to users or society. In this area, Murray-Tuite and Mahmassani (2004) propose 
a bi-level formulation to identify vulnerable transportation links. The vulnerability index, 
a key component of the formulation, accounts for traffic flow, link capacities, travel times 
and availability of alternate routes. The vulnerability indices for all origin-destination pairs 
are aggregated to form a disruption index which is the measure of damage to a network 
that an entity (e.g. terrorist) might use to rank links as targets. Likewise, Scott et al. (2006) 
also present an approach to identify critical links and evaluate network performance by 
considering network flows, link capacity and network topology. This index is defined as 
the increase in user equilibrium travel time incurred because of a link closure. 
Additionally, a number of frameworks for assessing transport system resilience have also 
been published in the literature. Tamvakis and Xenidis (2012) present a framework for 
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assessing the resilience of transport systems utilizing the notion of entropy, i.e., transport 
system resilience is assessed based on the resilience of its component parts which exist at 
two levels - the micro and macro levels. The authors describe the micro level, as shown in 
Figure 2.5, as a level which comprises three segments: i) the physical system  made up of 
infrastructure, vehicles, fuel, power systems, control communications, etc., (ii) the 
‘providing service’ segment consisting of activities such as freight delivery, leisure travel, 
emergency responses, utility repair, commercial travel, etc., and (iii) the information 
system which consists of technological infrastructure that assists in the system’s operation 
and control.  Next, the macro level (Figure 2.6)* is described as comprising the external 
components of the system which include the government, customers, general public, 
competition, financial industry and supply industry. Thus, to evaluate the system’s 
resilience, one must go through a series of processes that consists of first describing the 
system being addressed, evaluating its service level by collecting the appropriate data and 
then identifying its weaknesses. 
                                                 
* R.S. – Resilient System 
Figure 2.5:  Micro level formed by internal components. (Source: Tamvakis and Xenidis, 
2012)   
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In another framework developed by the U.S.DOT’s Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center, resilient transport infrastructure is described as consisting of three main 
attributes – robustness, adaptiveness, and consequence mitigation (Volpe, 2013). On this 
basis, researchers developed the ‘risk-based layered defense’ resiliency framework shown 
in Figure 2.7. This framework focuses on the conventional process for risk assessment, i.e., 
analyzing the likelihood and consequence of a particular threat, coupled with the principles 
of a layered defense. Thus, transport infrastructure becomes robust and fault-tolerant by 
having design-based components that give it a baseline of protection and using asset 
management practices to ensure a continuity of this protection. The infrastructure should 
also be capable of anticipating and preventing risks and limiting hazards by being 
adaptable and resourceful.  
Figure 2.6: Macro level formed by external components. 
(Source: Tamvakis and Xenidis, 2012)   
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Figure 2.7  Risk-based layered defense infrastructure resiliency framework 
In addition, the third element in the framework, critical asset redundancy, requires such an 
infrastructure system to be flexible to allow rapid reorganization, and redundant as means 
of providing spare safeguards and thereby avoiding single point failures. Finally, the 
resilient infrastructure should have response and recovery capability to mitigate the 
consequences of disruptive events. According to the authors, instituting this process will 
lead to a higher likelihood of the system meeting the three resiliency performance criteria: 
efficiency, sustainability, and survivability (Volpe, 2013), where efficiency is defined as 
an infrastructure system performing “its functions in order to meet its specified functional 
requirements at lowest cost”; sustainability is defined as “a resource-use pattern that meets 
today’s needs while protecting resources for future use”; and survivability relates to an 
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infrastructure being “capable of withstanding damages with minimal adverse impacts – lost 
lives, ecological impacts, structural damage – on the people, transportation operations, 
economy, and the environment” (Barami, 2013).  
Also, Leu et al. (2010) present a resilience assessment framework, shown in Figure 2.8, 
that describes the transport system as being made up of three distinct but interweaving 
layers: the physical layer consisting of roads, bridges, ports, equipment, machines, etc.; the 
service layer representing the actual flows in a system such as commute trips; and last, the 
cognitive layer which represents the human contributions to the transportation system. The 
framework presented by Leu et al. (2010) emphasizes the role of people and - through the 
service layer- the characterization of the transport network as part of several supply chains, 
and therefore the importance of measuring change and impact in all three transport layers 
for resilience assessment. In addition to the frameworks described, some other transport 
resilience frameworks proposed in the literature are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.8  Three-layer resilience assessment framework (Source: Leu et al., 2010) 
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Table 2.1:  Summary of work focused on measuring transport system resilience 
Author Proposed Methodology 
Serulle 
(2010) 
Fuzzy systems approach for quantifying resiliency at pre-event conditions using 






Average speed reduction 
Personal transportation cost 
Commercial/industrial cost 
Alternate infrastructure proximity 
Level of intermodality 
Network management 
Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) 
Lane-miles/square-miles 
Hours or minutes 
%below speed limit 
Dollars/mile 
Dollars/mile 
Distance b/n key infrastructures/links 
Linguistic variable (low to high) 
Linguistic Variable (level 1 to level 5) 
Croope et 
al. (2010) 
Improving resiliency by using a conceptual framework for a decision support 
system for critical infrastructure (CIR-DSS) repair, replacement and 
serviceability in a post-disaster environment by using 3 components: 
Component Description 








Infrastructure Management System 
                                                                                         
                     
                                
Management Information System 
Geographic Information System 
(GIS)/HAZUS-MH (FEMA application 
that uses GIS software to map & display 
hazard data and the results of damage & 
economic loss estimates for buildings and 
infrastructure caused by earthquakes, 
hurricane winds, & floods) 
 
FEMA benefit/cost analysis principles: 
net present value, avoided damages, etc. 
for highway asset management 
 
Based on resiliency concepts and 
principles 
 
The CIR-DSS is applied considering: 
 Physical infrastructure conditions (deterioration and maintenance 
dynamics) 
 Functional assessments (practices of estimating life-cycle cost) 
 Vulnerability and damage assessment within specified location 
Measures of resilience and system performance used were measured 
before, during, immediately following event, during recovery and after 
restoration. 
 Capacity in veh/hr/ln 
 Number of available lanes 
 Pavement condition index 
Measures may differ depending on available information  
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 Summary and Synthesis of Transportation Resilience Literature  
Transportation resiliency frameworks in the literature have largely focused on algorithms 
to configure highway networks to be more robust – with characteristics of redundancy, 
modularity, efficiency, rapidity, diversity, etc. They have also focused on how vulnerable 
a system is from the standpoint of providing a sufficient supply of services to meet user 
demands. In addition, resiliency has been characterized as a function of system entropy, as 
a function of system redundancy, cost, and capacity; as a quadruple-layered hierarchy of 
attributes consisting of fault tolerance, adaptive solutions, critical asset redundancy and 
mitigation; and as a three-level layer consisting of interruptions in the physical layer, 
interruptions in the service layer, and interruptions in the cognitive layer. A few 
Author Proposed Methodology 
Cox et 
al.(2010) 
Uses economic resilience approach to examine the contribution of trips to 
the value of goods and services they produce. 
Measures transportation system resiliency using 2 components: 
 Static resiliency: ability of an entity to maintain function, 
measured in % of maximum disruption avoided by resilience 
behaviors.  
Where:  
o Max. Disruption = reduction in pax journeys for the 
attacked mode 
o Resilience behaviors = increase in pax journeys for 
alternate modes 
 Dynamic resilience: capability to recover rapidly to achieve a 
desired state, i.e. Speed of recovery beyond a normal speed 
measured in pax/km 
Table 2.1:  Summary of work focused on measuring transport system resilience 
(continued) 
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frameworks were found that focus on technical, organizational and institutional factors for 
improving transportation system resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003; Tierney & Bruneau, 
2007; Ta et al., 2009; Vugrin et al., 2010). However, the literature shows that the 
implementation of some of these frameworks have still largely focused on the physical 
highway system and how it can be built better to withstand the impacts of major 
disruptions, both in research and in practice. This techno-centric approach to system 
resilience is valuable for learning about specific risk reduction measures; however, there is 
potential value in including the consideration of societal factors of transportation system 
resilience, alongside the technical. The socioeconomic influences and implications of 
transport system failure during catastrophic events, and the fact that many societies are 
largely dependent on the proper functioning of infrastructure systems such as 
transportation, indicates a broader perspective that formally addresses the organizational, 
institutional and financial, alongside the technical elements of transportation system 
resiliency will be more holistic and thus, potentially of incremental value to the status quo 
approaches.  
Although some of the literature reviewed incorporates some of these broader factors, there 
is evidence that points towards unidentified opportunities still to be realized in enhancing 
current approaches. For example, recent FHWA climate resilience pilots show a difficulty 
for transport agencies to implement recommendations from studies conducted leading. It 
also shows little evidence that transportation agencies are proactively using transportation 
resilience performance metrics/factors in planning and decision making. The literature also 
shows that the underlying notion of resilience for current approaches are based on the 
 36
concept of systems exhibiting resilience at a single equilibrium, which is indicative of the 
engineering resilience theory (to be discussed in subsequent sections).  
To that end of tapping into unrealized opportunities, one can first look to the key principles 
from sociotechnical systems theory, which can be summarized in the following two 
statements (Walker et al., 2007):  
 Joint optimization of social and technical factors for successful organizational 
performance 
 Optimizing only one aspect increases the number of unpredictable, un-designed, 
non-linear and injurious relationships to the system’s performance. 
A sociotechnical approach to transportation system resilience is therefore particularly 
timely with the formal adoption of performance-based and risk-based transportation asset 
management in the 2012 national surface transportation law: Moving Ahead for Progress 
in the 21st Century (MAP-21), which is also continued in the 2015 Fixing America’s 
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act. These laws are positioned to potentially promote the 
formal consideration of sociotechnical factors simultaneously with engineering and other 
factors in the planning and decision-making process. 
In the subsequent sections, a review of resilience theory and its applications in social, 
ecological, economic and physical systems is presented, identifying transferable concepts 




 Resilience Theory, Related Concepts & Applications 
One of the earliest mentions of resilience theory is in the study of natural systems’ behavior 
by Holling (1973). Holling’s work, which is situated in ecology and socioecological 
systems, built the foundation for the resilience of complex adaptive systems and related 
concepts. Since then, resilience has been defined and applied in various ways in different 
fields.  For an enriched understanding of resilience, the sections below discuss key 
resilience concepts that originated from ecological theory, and then discuss their 
applications to physical/built systems, economics, and social systems to set the stage for 
developing a more holistic concept of transportation systems resilience. 
 Ecological Systems and Resilience 
Holling (1973) studied the behavior of natural systems by exploring ecological theory and 
different perspectives of the behavior of natural systems. In his work, he describes two 
kinds of ecological behavior: stability and resilience. Stability, represents a system’s ability 
to return to a state of equilibrium after a disturbance. A stable system can therefore be 
characterized by the rapidity with which it returns to equilibrium and the associated levels 
of fluctuation. In addition, a system exhibiting stability has a range of possible movements 
that a disturbance can shift it into; within this range of possible movements the system will 
always return to its equilibrium after it is disturbed. This is its domain of stability or basin 
of attraction, the dimensions of which are defined by the thresholds of a set of controlling 
variables (Ludwig et al., 1997; Folke et al., 2010). Figure 2.9 shows a three-dimensional 
stability landscape for a system (shown as the ball) that has two basins of attraction. The 
number of basins of attraction for a particular ecosystem is defined by different 
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combinations of ecosystem attributes. The dotted lines represent the thresholds, and the 
areas within the dotted lines represent the basins of attraction (a.k.a regime), their 
respective depths corresponding to the amount of perturbation required to shift each system 
from one regime to the other (OTP, 2015). An analogy could be made with the stability of 
a concrete beam. The stability of a concrete beam in a building is defined by a set of 
controlling variables, one of which is tensile stress. Thus, the beam’s tensile strength is one 
of its thresholds, beyond which the beam will crack if it is not reinforced.  
 
Figure 2.9  Three-dimensional stability landscape showing two basins of attraction 
(Source: “Glossary”, 2017) 
 
The second ecological behavior, resilience, is concerned with the level of perturbation or 
disturbance that can be absorbed by a system before it is displaced from one state to another 
(Holling, 1973, 1986, 1992). Holling (1973) defines it as a “measure of the persistence of 
systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state variables”. According to the author, resilient 
systems are still able to thrive in situations of high fluctuation. 
Unlike systems that exhibit only stability which have a single equilibrium, resilient 
ecological systems have multiple points of equilibria thus, a fluctuation in system 
 39
conditions simply causes a shift from one equilibrium state (regime) to another as opposed 
to a single equilibrium system which is pushed to failure. Holling’s concept of multiple-
equilibria systems forms the main difference between ecological resilience and engineering 
resilience in the sense of Pimm (1984; 1991) which stresses stability of a single 
equilibrium. Ludwig et al. (1997) further describe single state equilibrium as being present 
only in linear systems, or in nonlinear systems that are so close to stable equilibrium that a 
linear approximation is valid. Such systems always return to their original equilibria when 
displaced and can be described as globally stable. In contrast, resilience in the sense of 
Holling (1973) refers to nonlinear systems near the boundary of the basin of attraction.  
Such systems have multiple equilibria and exhibit local stability in each equilibrium state 
or regime (Ludwig et al., 1997). Relating this to transportation, we can therefore argue that 
for transport systems, returning to the original state is not always ideal in resilience capacity 
building. Thus, the intent of this work is to shift our thinking and views toward generating 
multiple-equilibria that involve multiple capital (the capital associated with system 
sustainability) rather than single equilibrium largely focused on technical capital.  
 Adaptive Cycles and Panarchy 
The concepts described in the preceding paragraphs explain one of two main building 
blocks of ecological resilience, i.e. ecological systems have multiple stable states that are 
separated by thresholds. These thresholds are levels of certain “slow changing, controlling 
variables” beyond which a system is shifted into a different regime (equilibrium state) 
(Ludwig et al., 1997). The second relates to Holling and Gunderson’s (2002) definition of 
ecosystem resilience: “… the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the 
system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control 
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behavior.” A better understanding of this is that, the system’s resilience is not only related 
to the magnitude of the disturbance, but also, its ability to change in order to persist (i.e., 
adaptability). This very ability of the system to change in order to persist can be considered 
a fundamental criterion for resilient systems. 
The adaptive cycle is a metaphor used to describe how some complex adaptive systems 
behave over time (Ludwig et al., 1997). Per Holling and Gunderson (2002), the adaptive 
cycle represents the waxing and waning of: (1) resource accrual or capital, (2) system 
connectedness, i.e. level of tightness of controlling variables, and (3) resilience. The 
changes to these three factors take place over the four stages of the adaptive cycle. Looking 
at Figure 2.10, the first phase of the adaptive cycle is called the rapid growth or exploitation 
phase. It is represented by the maximum rate of growth –r. During this phase, successful 
“system actors” make use of available resources and exploit all possible niches. The growth 
of the technology industry may be used as an example; with its rapid growth, new 
companies and entrepreneurs alike made use of available resources (whether knowledge, 
financial, etc.) to exploit new niches (e.g., Uber, Lift, zipcar, etc. are all examples of 
technology penetration into the transportation sector). At this stage, the system has weak 
connections, weak internal regulation, and high resilience.  
Figure 2.10: States of the Adaptive Cycle (Source: Holling, 2011) 
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The system then moves into the conservation (K) phase where interconnectedness 
increases, internal regulations are formed and become strong leading to little flexibility in 
the system. Novelty at this stage also starts to decline and leads to lower system resilience 
(Ludwig et al., 1997). The gradual decline creates local stability in the system but 
inadvertently leads to increased rigidity. The buildup of system rigidity through increasing 
interconnectedness leads to a sudden release of resources, a sort of “creative destruction”, 
when some disturbance or shock destabilizes the system, plunging it into the release (Ω) 
phase (Schumpeter, 1943; Curtin and Parker, 2014). This disturbance breaks system 
connections, weakens internal regulations, and leads to the leakage of capital/potential 
from the system. This phase is usually briefer than the others. According to Holling and 
Gunderson (2002), the harshness of the release, depends on the length of the conservation 
phase, i.e. the longer the conservation phase, the harsher the release phase.  The release 
phase is then followed by a period of “reorganization”, also known as the α-phase. At this 
stage, new actors may come into the system; novelty, invention and experimentation also 
thrive.  
The adaptive cycle can exist at different scales, temporally or spatially; the interactive 
dynamics of a system of nested adaptive cycles is known as panarchy (Holling and 
Gunderson, 2002). The adaptive cycle is presented by the authors as a metaphor with which 
hypotheses about a system’s resilience, connectedness and potential/capital may be 
generated (Gotts, 2007; Holling and Gunderson, 2002). Table 2.2 provides a summary of 
some of the important terms introduced in this section.  
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The capacity of actors in a system to influence resilience 
Adaptive cycle 
A heuristic model that portrays an endogenously driven four-phase 
cycle of social-ecological system and other complex adaptive 
systems. The common trajectory is from a phase of rapid growth 
where resources are freely available and there is high resilience (r 
phase), through capital accumulation into a gradually rigidifying 
phase where most resources are locked up and there is little flexibility 
or novelty, and low resilience (K-phase), then via a sudden collapse 
into a release phase of chaotic dynamics in which relationships and 
structures are undone (Ω), into a phase of re-organization where 
novelty can prevail (α). The r-K dynamics reflect a more-or-less 
predictable, relatively slow “foreloop” and the Ω – α dynamics 
represent a chaotic, fast “backloop” that strongly influences the 
nature of the next foreloop. External or higher-scale influences can 
cause a move from any phase to any other phase. 
Panarchy The interactive dynamics of a nested set of adaptive cycles 
Regime The set of system states within a stability landscape 
Regime shift 
A change in a system state from one regime or stability domain to 
another 
Resilience 
The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while 
undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure and feedbacks, and therefore identity, that is, the capacity to 
change in order to maintain the same identity 
Social ecological 
system 
Integrated system of ecosystems and human society with reciprocal 
feedback and interdependence. The concept emphasizes the humans-
in-nature perspective 
Specified resilience 
The resilience “of what, to what”; resilience of some particular part 
of a system, related to a particular control variable, to one or more 
identified kinds of shocks 
Domain of stability 
A domain or basin of attraction of a system, in which the dimensions 
are defined by the set of controlling variables that have threshold 
levels (equivalent to a system regime) 
Stability landscape 
The extent of possible states of a system space, defined by the set of 
control variables in which stability domains are embedded 
Threshold 
A level or amount of a controlling, often slowly changing variable in 
which a change occurs in a critical feedback causing the system to 





 Built/Physical Systems and Resilience 
The resilience of built systems is generally based on the concept of engineering resilience 
which Pimm (1984) defines as a system’s ability to return to a steady state following a 
disturbance or perturbation (also O’Neil et al., 1986; Tilman and Downing, 1994; Tilman, 
1996). Resilience in this context focuses on a system’s ability to withstand 
disturbances and the speed with which it returns to its original state.  A system in this 
context is said to have failed if a deviation from the expected value of external or internal 
influences (i.e., level of disturbance of perturbation) exceeds its absorptive capacity. 
Tamvakis and Xenidis (2012) define resilience as “… the ability of a system to react from 
stresses that challenge its performance”, and Croope et al. (2010) as “the ability of a system 
to withstand or respond to changes”. These definitions reflect the main ideas of resilience 
in physical/built systems: (1) ability to withstand a disturbance, i.e. resistance, and (2) the 
rate at which it recovers, i.e. rapidity of returning to pre-disaster conditions (stability). 
Thus, by controlling either the amount of infrastructure degradation that can occur, or the 
time it takes to reach full functionality after a disruption occurs, an infrastructure’s 
resilience may be increased or lowered.  
Several resilience frameworks have also been introduced in this area. The most 
comprehensive ones are those that are system-based. In earthquake engineering research, 
Bruneau et al. (2003) proposed the TOSE (technical-organizational-social-economic) 
framework for assessing resilience. The technical domain comprises all physical 
components of the system (e.g., highways and bridges). The organizational domain 
comprises the governing bodies or institutions in charge of the system (e.g., state DOTs 
and similar agencies). The social domain represents social groups and communities in 
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contact with and hence, affected by the system. Lastly, the economic domain represents 
both local and foreign economies linked to the system. The TOSE framework has heavily 
influenced the physical/engineering resilience literature and assessment frameworks (e.g., 
Reggiani, 2012; Vugrin et al., 2010; Hughes and Healy, 2014).  Tierney and Bruneau 
(2007) describe a resilient system as one that has robustness, the inherent strength or ability 
to withstand disasters without significant degradation; redundancy, the availability of 
back-up systems or the ability of system units to be substituted to perform other functions 
in order to maintain system functionality; resourcefulness, the extent to which a system 
can initiate solutions to address disruptions; and lastly, rapidity, which is the time it takes 
to restore a system’s. Such an infrastructure system will ultimately have a reduced 
probability of failure, consequences of failure, and time to recovery (Bruneau et al., 2003; 
Reggiani 2012). Tierney and Bruneau’s (2007) work, unlike many others in the area of 
physical and built systems resilience, places an emphasis on the social components of 
system resilience. The authors define resilience as “the ability of social units (e.g., 
organizations, communities, etc.) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when 
they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and 
mitigate the effects of future disasters” (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007).  
Work on freight system resiliency by Ta et al., (2009) introduces three dimensions that 
should be targeted by resilience strategies; the infrastructure, the user and the managing 
organization dimensions. Like the TOSE domains of disaster research, the infrastructure 
dimension represents the physical components of the freight system, that is the nodes 
(warehouses, ports) and links (railroads, bridges, roadways), as well as the information 
infrastructure built into them (Bruneau et al. 2003). The user dimension is made up of the 
 45
individuals and organizations that use the system to transport people and goods. Lastly, the 
managing organization is the body in charge of the construction, maintenance and daily 
functionality of the infrastructure (Ta et al., 2009). 
Vugrin et al. (2010) also present a resilience framework that attempts to expand on the 
TOSE dimensions by including two additional domains: environmental and ecological 
(Figure 2.11). These dimensions serve as channels through which targeted resilience 
strategies may be developed and applied for increasing a system’s resilience. Lastly, 
Nemeth (2008) briefly explores resilience in terms of the linkages and interactions between 
systems and their environments. He extracts recurring themes from the Second Resilience 
Engineering Symposium which took place in France in 2006. Here, Nemeth (2008) 
describes resilience as the “generic ability to cope with unforeseen challenges, and having 
adaptable reserves and flexibility to accommodate those challenges”. According to Nemeth 
(2008) the traits (characteristics) of resilience that emerged from the discussions were 
“experience, intuition, improvising, expecting the unexpected, examining preconceptions, 
thinking outside the box and taking advantage of fortuitous events”.   
 
 
Figure 2.11  Domains for assessing system resilience by Vugrin et al (2010) 
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Now looking at the energy sector, specifically in the areas of electricity delivery and 
reliability, system resilience concepts are continually being applied. Research on defining, 
measuring and analyzing the resilience of energy systems was therefore also reviewed. 
Along these lines, an important consideration found in a report by Sandia National 
Laboratories on energy system resilience emphasizes the distinction between reliability and 
resilience by “constraining the definition of resilience to high-consequence, low-
probability events” (Sandia, 2015). This very distinction is critical even for transportation 
systems where resilience efforts could easily be bloated to include planning for low-
consequence, low probability events (e.g., car crashes and resultant congestion). Authors 
of this report also provide two fundamental concepts that risk-based frameworks should 
adhere to: (1) “resilience is defined with respect to disturbance(s) or threat(s)” and (2) 
“consequences relate to the social effects of system performance in addition to system 
performance itself” (Sandia, 2015). Consequently, a conceptual framework for developing 
resilience metrics for US electricity, oil and gas sectors is proposed as the Resilience 
Analysis Process (RAP). The RAP process outlines seven steps is as follows: 
1) Define resilience goals: Determining a set of high-level goals for the system 
2) Define system and resilience metrics: This determines scope of the analysis 
3) Characterize threats: Includes assessing threat likelihood and intensity 
4) Determine level of disruption: This is the amount of damage that occurs to the 
system 
5) Define and apply system models: develop models that tie system damage to 
service levels 
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6) Calculate consequence: Convert system output levels produced from models into 
resilience metrics defined in Step 2. 
7) Evaluate resilience improvements: Determine required improvements necessary 
for enhanced resilience. This may be a physical, policy or procedural change. 
Summarily, implementation of this framework is meant to focus more on consequences 
(e.g. social welfare) rather than only system impacts. This approach to defining resilience 
metrics, that is, consequence-based rather than attribute-based, is constructive as it places 
the end user at the center of any analysis. 
Another report on measuring the resilience of energy systems by Willis and Lea (2015) 
present a review of 154 resilience metrics used in the electricity, oil and natural gas sectors 
extracted from 58 reports and peer-reviewed papers. The authors first present a logic model 
with which the resilience metrics are organized. The model, shown in Figure 2.12 is 
developed on the premise that no single set of metrics can support decision making at all 
levels; however, when organized and presented using a logic model, decision making 
across levels can be made consistent (Willis and Lea, 2015). As one moves from the 
strategic to operational perspective, types of metrics should also change, moving from 
system inputs, capacities, capabilities, performance and outcomes.  
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Figure 2.12 Logic model for organizing resilience metrics (Source: Willis and Lea, 
2015) 
 
The authors then go on to categorize the 154-identified metrics using three dimensions: 
resolution, type and maturity. The descriptions of the three dimensions are summarized in 
Table 2.3. Table 2.4 is an example of some of the resilience metrics categorized under the 
discussed framework. The framework provided by Willis and Lea (2015) give insight into 
important considerations for selecting resilience metrics and understanding that metrics 
need to be selected to suit specific tasks for different decision-making levels. Similarly, in 
developing resilience metrics for transportation systems, “inputs” and “capacities” should 
first be identified to support the strategic resilience goals of the system. These can then be 
distilled into “facility level” metrics that are more context-sensitive to each unit and enable 
the quantification of system outcomes in terms of social welfare.  
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Resolution   Facility/system level 
 System/region level 
 Region/nation level 
Type  Inputs 
 Capacities 
 Capabilities 
 Performance  
 Outcomes 
Maturity   Low: Metric mentioned in literature, but not consistently defined. 
If collected, sporadically or inconsistently 
 Medium: Well-defined methods for collection, but collected 
sporadically 
 High: Collected using well-defined methods and timescale for 
data collection is suitable 
 
To summarize the literature on built system and physical resilience, many frameworks and 
evaluation methodologies have been developed and used. These applications of resilience 
can be said to be based on the principles of engineering resilience as presented by Pimm 
(1984). These generally seek to restore a system to its previous levels after a disruption in 
the least amount of time possible described by the resilience triangle (previously discussed 
in Chapter 1) (Bruneau et al., 2009). Resilience strategies in such systems are therefore 
designed to focus on particular areas of the disruption cycle, i.e., mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery (Beenhouwer et al. 2003). Insights from this set of literature, 
especially from earthquake resilience (i.e., considerations beyond physical components, 
e.g., TOSE dimensions) and energy sector resilience (developing and categorizing 
Primarily resource allocation purposes 
Primarily planning and evaluation 
purposes 
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metrics), can therefore be combined with concepts from other fields of study to give 
direction on enhancing transportation system resilience. 
 Social/Socio-Ecological Systems and Resilience 
As in most systems, the need for resilience in social and socioecological systems arises 
from vulnerability. Vulnerability may be described simply as the potential for some form 
of loss. Alexander (2000) defines vulnerability as “the potential for causality, destruction, 
damage, disruption, or other forms of loss with respect to a particular element”. 
Vulnerability may be faced by an individual or a community.  Social vulnerability 
describes the situation where certain societal groups are more prone to loss than others as 
a result of characteristics such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, etc. (Blaikie et al, 
1994). The relationship between vulnerability and resilience is one that does not seem to 
show a clear consensus in resilience literature. While resilience is sometimes used as a 
loose antonym for vulnerability (Folke et al., 2002), Lucini (2013) objects to that notion. 
According to Lucini (2013), social vulnerability and social resilience can exist in the same 
time and space. This line of reasoning seems preferable when uncertainties, which are 
always present but cannot be planned for, are considered. This conceptualization of 
vulnerability as being able to coexist with resilience produces an image of a society which 
although vulnerable to the potential negative impacts of known and unknown factors, can 




Table 2.4  Energy resilience metrics for electricity systems at the facility/system level (Source: Willis and Lea, 2015) 
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In the study of societies, social resilience is seen to exist in the form of social capital. Lucini 
(2013) defines resilience from a sociological perspective as “the capacity of people in a 
group (formal and informal) to face up to disaster during the emergency and reconstruction 
time, starting from collective and individual resources made available for all people 
involved having needs to be satisfied through altruistic behavior and shared social 
relationships”. In this work, social capital is “the whole of personal acquaintances, 
attitudes, competencies and skills belonging to a person” (Lucini, 2013). Taking this into 
consideration, we see that an individual’s social capital is not constrained to only those 
skills and relationships possessed as a result of occupation or position in society. In 
addition, this form of social capital is useful both in their daily lives and ultimately in the 
event of a disaster. Lucini’s approach to resilience shows how at a microscale, individuals 
contribute to the resilience of their communities. Along this line of thinking, Adger (2000) 
steps up a level and discusses the social capital of societies and communities, thus, 
presenting social resilience with an institutional context, where “institution” symbolizes 
formal institutions, as well as behaviors, rules and norms that govern a society (Adger, 
2000). This author characterizes social resilience in this context is as “the ability of 
communities to withstand shocks to their social infrastructure”. Adger (2000) proposes 
institutional change and economic structure, as well as demographic change as proxy 
indicators for examining social resilience. Another important feature about Agder’s (2000) 
work is the distinction between resilience and other vulnerability-reducing approaches. 
According to the author, resilience should be viewed as one of the ways of combatting a 
system’s known vulnerabilities; the others are mitigation and adaptation (Adger, 2000). 
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In Lorenz’s (2010) discussion about the contribution of social science to interdisciplinary 
resilience research, he points out the similarities between social and ecological systems: 
“discontinuously changing, complex, multi-stable, self-organizing, and adaptive” (Lorenz, 
2010). However, and most importantly, he also points out the most significant difference 
between social and ecological systems, which is the ability of social systems to self-
organize at a higher level. This ability to self-organize at a higher level may be called the 
symbolic dimension of meaning (Luhmann, 2005), and describes the awareness social 
systems have of their existence in the broader environment, their ability to interpret and 
learn from the past, as well as the capability to be intentional about the future (Young et 
al., 2006). Lorenz (2010) defines social resilience in his work as “the internal ability of 
social systems to prevent and mitigate disastrous change”.  He identifies three components 
of social resilience which are all shaped by the symbolic dimension of meaning. These are 
the (1) adaptive capacity, (2) coping capacity and (3) participative capacity of social 
systems. Per the author, the latter two have mostly been disregarded in the literature in 
favor of adaptive capacity, which he defines as the “social ability of a system to establish 
new structure relationships… that subserve the persistence of the system in the case of 
major environmental change or incompatible system structures” (Lorenz, 2010).  
Adaptive capacity, according to Folke (2006), should be interpreted in terms of both short 
and long term adaptability, i.e. short term response to crises, and long term transformability 
which is “the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, 
or social structures make the existing system untenable” (Walker et al., 2004:5). In 
adaptability (short term), it is the thresholds of driving variables that may change. The 
response to the effects of these variables are altered as a result of using prior knowledge 
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and experience. The system, however, remains in the same basin of attraction (Berkes et 
al., 2003). For social systems, adaptability requires that prior knowledge and experience 
are combined to adjust the response to crises, and continue within the same stability domain 
(Lorenz, 2010; Berkes et al., 2003). Transformability on the other hand, requires a change 
in some of the system’s actual driving variables which in the sense of Lorenz (2010) creates 
new structures of expectation (elaborated on below). The relationship between adaptive 
capacity and resilience is another area in which researchers have different views.  While 
Smit and Wandel (2006) in their work on community adaptation to climate equate the two 
concepts, others such as Gunderson (2000) and Carpenter et al. (2001), as well as Lorenz 
(2010) see adaptation as a component of social resilience.  
The second component of social resilience discussed by Lorenz (2010), coping capacity, is 
essentially “a way of dealing with the failure of expectations in terms of meaning”. This 
draws on the ability of social systems to maintain the continuity of their systems through 
finding meaning in the event of a loss. This abstract concept has the ability, in some cases, 
to completely change the expectations of societies. For example, a community that 
experiences frequent and devastation to certain environmental hazards (e.g., floods, fires, 
etc.) may gradually change their expectation structures, and over time may no longer 
regard such events as disasters, but rather as part of normal life and may develop 
mechanisms to ensure the persistence of that community (e.g. ephemeral cities in parts of 
Asia) (Greg Bankoff, 2007 in Lorenz, 2010).  
Lastly, participative capacity relates to the extent to which a social system makes use of 
adaptive and coping capacities. It describes how different perspectives and expectation 
structures are integrated into solutions to enhance the ability of a whole society to be 
55 
 
adaptive as well as to cope (Lorenz, 2010). According to Lorenz (2010), external beliefs 
and interventions imported into societies thought to be weak, poor, and passive inherently 
reduce the participative capacities of those local societies and subsequently also reduce 
their social resilience. Rather, the author argues that the initial stages of any external 
developmental cooperation or aid to devastated communities, must aim first at improving 
the adaptive and coping capacities.  Lorenz (2010) therefore states that “decreased social 
resilience is nothing other than the blockage, erosion or devaluation of local knowledge 
and coping practices caused by unequal participative capacity”. 
 Economic Systems and Resilience 
The concept and understanding of resilience in economics is diverse. The varying 
perspectives however, provide an opportunity to further enrich our understanding of 
resilience. One of such concepts addresses the core definition of resilience. According to 
Rose (2007), much of the confusion about resilience and the difficulty in operationalizing 
the concept stems from the issue of definition. Authors that have explored the concept have 
been prone to making resilience too broad, and using resilience as an umbrella term to 
cover all the ways of reducing vulnerability or hazard loss; for example, Mileti (1999) 
defines a resilient community as one that “can withstand an extreme event with a tolerable 
level of losses” and “takes mitigation actions consistent with achieving that level of 
protection.” Like Lucini, (2013); Blaikie et al., (1994), and Pelling, (2003), Rose (2007) 
disagrees with the idea that resilience is the opposite of vulnerability and that by reducing 
an entity’s vulnerabilities, its resilience is inherently strengthened. Instead resilience, as 
well as adaptation and mitigation are presented as some of the several ways of reducing an 
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entity’s vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on the distinction between resilience and 
mitigation.  
Rose’s (2007) work places emphasis on the need to understand that resilience is an outcome 
that occurs after a disruption, and not before, without dismissing the importance of 
mitigation, or resilience enhancing behaviors such as flexibility and redundancy. For 
example, Rose (2007) criticizes the choice of terminology in Bruneau et al.’s (2003) 
conceptualization of resilience. According to this author, economic resilience differs from 
the resilient system presented by Bruneau et al. (2003) in terms of the aspects and 
dimensions of such a system. Consistent with the notion that resilience is only active in the 
post disaster environment (i.e., response/recovery/reconstruction), the first aspect of a 
resilient system stipulated by Bruneau et al. (2003) - reduced probability to failures- is 
excluded since it pertains to actions and measures taken before the disruption and should 
therefore be captured by mitigation. However, Rose’s conceptualization (2007) is possibly 
erroneous since reducing the probability of failure does not necessarily focus on preventing 
the disruptive event itself from happening or on reducing the probability of occurrence, but 
rather, the emphasis is placed on engaging in certain ‘resilience-enhancing’ measures that 
can prevent the actual system from failing. Failure here cannot be equated to the occurrence 
of the event, but the inability of the system to absorb it. However, Rose (2007) makes a 
good point where he suggests that resourcefulness and redundancy should be seen as the 
means to the ends of robustness and rapidity as described by Chang and Shinozuka (2004) 
in economic resilience literature.  
Another concept in economic resilience literature is the bifurcation of resilience into static 
and dynamic resilience. Rose (2007) defines static resilience as “the ability of an entity or 
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system to maintain function when shocked”, and maintains that this primarily involves the 
demand-side of the system, i.e. the customers or users. Static resilience, in contrast to 
dynamic resilience, can be achieved without repair or reconstruction of the system, and is 
solely based on the ability of customers to efficiently use available resources. Dynamic 
resilience on the other hand, is “the speed at which an entity or system recovers from a 
severe shock to achieve a desired state”; this requires some level of repair and 
reconstruction from the supply-side (Rose, 2007). Lastly, this author presents three levels 
at which economic resilience can occur:  
 Microeconomic level: This consists of the individual behavior of firms, 
households, or organizations;  
 Mesoeconomic level: This consists of the economic sector, individual market, or 
cooperative group; and  
 Macroeconomic level: This consists of all individual units and markets combined, 
in addition to their interacting effects.  
In contrast to the approach of several authors to economic resilience including Rose (2007), 
Simmie and Martin (2010) completely reject resilience theories based on systems achieving 
equilibrium. The equilibrist versions of resilience propose either the notion of systems 
having (1) a single equilibrium, to which they return to after a disruption as in the case of 
engineering resilience, or (2) of multiple equilibria, in which case the system is displaced 
to a different equilibrium after a disruption (as in the case of ecological resilience).  The 
authors argue instead that regional economies are better characterized using an 
evolutionary approach in which economies are constantly changing and do not have any 
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equilibria2. Despite the obvious contradictory nature of this approach, the authors do agree 
on the need for some stability and admit that regional economies exhibit stability and self-
organization (Martin and Sunley, 2006, 2007; Martin, 2010). Thus, Simmie and Martin 
(2010) propose that the most important attribute that a constantly changing, non-
equilibrium regional economy possesses is its adaptive capacity. A useful insight from this 
approach is the shift in focus from a system’s stability to understanding the actual nature 
of the change being experienced by the system. In seeking to understand the nature of 
changes experienced by regional economies, the authors argue that regional economies 
resemble complex adaptive systems3, and thus, use the ‘adaptive cycles’ model from 
ecology as a framework for describing these changes. From this perspective, resilience is 
presented as an attribute that wanes and waxes, as the system goes through the different 
phases of the adaptive cycle.  
 
 Summary and Synthesis of Resilience Literature 
The summary and synthesis section is presented in two parts: (1) a summary of the 
characteristics that describe resilient systems and an application of some concepts from 
resilience literature, and (2) a list of key themes found in the literature and the implications 
for transport system resilience and this research.  
                                                 
2 A better approach would be to say that regional economies have constantly changing equilibria 
since an entity cannot possibly be stable without an equilibrium. 
3 Key features of complex adaptive systems include: unfixed or pervious boundaries between the 
system and its environment due to constant exchanges; complex feedbacks and self-reinforcing 
interactions among components; and microscale interactions and behaviors, spurring macroscale 
spontaneous structures and dynamics. 
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 Characteristics of Resilient Systems & Other Concepts from the Resilience 
Literature 
The resilience of a system may increase or decrease depending on changes that affect the 
system’s driving variables and should therefore be seen as a system attribute. From the 
literature, resilient systems may also be described as having certain traits. These include 
the need for persistence of the system through flexibility and diversity. Figure 2.13 has 
been developed to illustrate the relationships between three main resilience attributes 
identified (persistence, adaptability and transformability) in the literature and their 
corresponding characteristics. 
 
Figure 2.13  Three main attributes of a resilient system and their supporting 
characteristics 
 
A resilient system also needs some degree of inherent strength to absorb the impacts of 
disturbances/perturbations, and adaptability and resourcefulness to consequently recover 
after a disturbance to either the original equilibrium (engineering resilience) or to a 
different equilibrium state (ecological resilience). This dissertation has an opportunity to 
extend the notions of engineering resilience more toward that of ecological resilience from 
the standpoint of finding a new regime after a disturbance. 
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Resilience differs from resistance (i.e., structural mitigation) which focuses only on the 
robustness of a system.  System robustness is still crucial for resisting the impacts of 
extreme events and increasing the system’s chances of survival. However, when a resilient 
system is overwhelmed by a perturbation and resistance fails, resilience enables the 
system’s functions to decline gracefully avoiding catastrophic consequences. Resilience 
therefore complements mitigation (Wein and Rose, 2011).  
In a sociotechnical system like transportation, the tendency is to focus on the physical 
components of the system without including much of other system elements. While the 
physical components are extremely important, other system elements, especially abstract 
ones such as business processes, social capital (both formal and informal, and including 
collaborative networks), should not be neglected. The resilience of a system is therefore 
characterized by its ability to persist, i.e., maintain critical functions as a result of its 
adaptive capacity in the form of either adaptability or transformation (Olson et al., 2006). 
Adaptability in the transport system can take many forms. It includes modifying physical 
infrastructure in an attempt to control its behavior during an extreme event, as well as 
integrating the impacts of climate change during planning. Adaptability involves devising 
strategies to maintain the current levels of service, and attempting to reduce the impacts of 
adverse events (Olson et al., 2006). In adaptability, the thresholds of certain system drivers 
are changed, thereby increasing or decreasing the system’s basin of attraction. 
Transformation on the other hand would require the creation of new system configurations. 
This occurs when certain factors force changes in the system’s state variables. Such 
changes include the addition of new state variables, or the replacement of some state 
variables. In the socio-ecological context, such transformations are usually the result of: 
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(1) some ecological crises, (2) changes in the system’s social components such as values 
or resources, and (3) economic or political change (Scheffer et al., 2003; Aberbach and 
Christensen, 2001; in Olsen et al., 2006). According to Folke et al. (2010), these 
transformations may be deliberate (initiated by the people involved) or forced (imposed by 
changing environmental or socioeconomic conditions), with forced transformations more 
likely to occur at larger scales and beyond the influence of local actors. Deliberate 
transformations on the other hand, may be initiated at multiple scales and usually lead to 
gradual transformations – such deliberate transformations require resilience thinking.  
Several other concepts identified in the literature may be applied to enhance the scope 
and strength of transportation resilience thinking; from ecological system resilience: 
resilience as a function of adaptive behavior, single-equilibrium versus multiple-
equilibria states; from social system resilience: vulnerability, adaptive capacity and 
participative capacity; and from economic resilience: a multi-scaler approach to 
resilience, and static versus dynamic resilience. Table 2.5 provides examples of how 
these respective concepts may be applied to develop transportation system resilience and 




Table 2.5  Application of Ecological, Social and Economic Resilience Concepts to Building Transportation System 
Resilience Capacity 
Concept Application to Transportation System Resilience Operational Pathway 
Resilience as a function 
of adaptive behavior 
(Ecological systems) 
- Expand choices for improved mobility and 
accessibility to allow for adaptive choices during 
or after a disruption. 
- Create redundancy within system to allow for 
adaptive choices. 
- Expand modes/modal availability (Multimodalism) 






- Conceptualize Transportation System with 
Multiple-Equilibria over time linked to different 
states that afford communities different levels of 
quality of life and infrastructure resilience 
readiness. 
o An understanding that in communities where 
infrastructure resilience readiness is not at a 
relatively high level the general desire will be 
to move to a higher state of equilibrium after 
a disruption (e.g., MTA after SuperStorm 
Sandy) 
 
o An understanding that in communities where 
there are relatively lower infrastructure levels 
of service and community quality of life, 
there is a general desire not to return to the 
former state but to move to a higher state after 
a disruption.  (E.g., New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina) 
- Transportation and other planning and decision 
making must anticipate infrastructure renewal (not 
simply replacement) after disruptions in areas where 
infrastructure resilience readiness has not been 
achieved. 
 
- Transportation and other planning and decision 
making must anticipate infrastructure upgrading (not 
simply replacement) after disruptions in areas where 
minimum infrastructure standards have not been 
achieved. 
 
-  Plan for resiliency based on envisioning of socio-
infrastructure scenarios, states or regimes that are 
likely to result from different kinds of possible 
disruptions. Develop organizational, institutional 
and technical capacity to ensure a minimum standard 
of functionality of the society in those states with 
pathways for returning the socio-infrastructure 
system to its original or a higher state. 
Vulnerability (Social 
Resilience) 
- Consider vulnerability explicitly as related to 
communities to lead to considerations of local and 
system resilience, both of which are needed to 
characterize system-wide resilience – leading to 
minimum resilience standards, spatially and 
temporally. 
- Determine local and system resilience as inputs to 
transportation planning, decision making and the 




Table 2.5  Application of Ecological, Social and Economic Resilience Concepts to Building Transportation System 
Resilience Capacity (continued) 
Concept 
- Application to Transportation System 
Resilience 
- Operational Pathway 
Adaptive Capacity 
(Social Resilience) 
- Identify situations when transformation is a 
better approach to resilience than adaptability 
during development of resilience-enhancing 
policies and strategies.  
- Question past underlying assumptions that have led 
to unfavorable outcomes. 
- Capitalize on windows of opportunity (e.g., 
teaching moments from natural or man-made 
disasters) to redefine driving factors of transport 
systems using transformative laws, policies and 
approaches.   
Participative Capacity 
(Social Resilience) 
- Apply implication of participative capacity that 
community involvement in the transportation 
planning and decision-making process will 
influence community resilience for the better in 
the long run. 
- Determine minimum standard and quality of public 
involvement for various communities within 
jurisdiction, and identify ways to achieve these 
minimum standards in the transportation planning 
and decision making process. 
Static and dynamic 
resilience (Economic 
resilience) 
- Consider transportation resilience as not only 
preventing system failure in event of perturbation, 
but also, if necessary, allowing system to fail in a 
way that is not catastrophic, as well as recover 
rapidly.  
- Focus equally on provision of short-term safeguards 
and resources that prevent catastrophic failure and 
maintain certain service levels for users, as well as 
strategies for long-term recovery of system. 
Adaptive Cycles at 
multiple scales 
(Ecological and 
Economic Resilience)  
- Consider the interactive dynamics of the 
transport system at different spatio-temporal and 
geopolitical scales, and assess factors that 
increase or decrease resilience, capital stocks and 
flexibility.   
- Capture institutional learning from past experiences 
and share lessons learned including effective 
strategies and resources. 
- Determine and make use of federal-level and 
state/regional-level partnerships that promote inter-





Besides these the concepts identified in Table 2.5, other interesting lessons can be gleaned 
from also applying the following concepts to the transportation system: social capital 
(social resilience), deliberate transformations (social resilience), panarchy and hysteresis 
(ecological resilience), which can be used to describe the interactive dynamics of a system 
which exists at multiple scales (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Similarly, transportation 
systems exist at multiple scales. Three of the common geopolitical scales can be described 
with language from Rose’s (2006) work in economic resilience, that is, the macro, meso 
and micro scales.  
The macroscale can be used to describe the highest level of governance in the transportation 
system. For this context, it refers to the federal or national level. System actors at this level 
include decision makers in charge of setting and providing support for strategic national 
direction/agenda. Leadership at this stage is critical as it involves decisions that drive the 
meso- and micro-scales such as those affecting funding, national goal attainments, or inter-
jurisdictional boundaries/barriers (e.g., between DHS/MPOs, DHS/DOTs, DOTs/MPOs, 
etc.).  However, it is fair to state here that leadership executed at the macroscale may also 
be driven by leadership at the mesoscale and microscale. This is because, in many cases, 
decisions resulting in policy or regulation at the macro level are a culmination of existing 
efforts and activity at the two lower levels. Thus, deliberate transformations (social 
resilience) at this level can still have organic roots. As already discussed in the literature, 
transformability can be said to be a fundamental characteristic of resilience. In certain 
situations of policy failure, environmental crises or even fiscal crises for instance, 
transformation, rather than adaptability, is the key approach to ensure resilience (Olsen et 
al., 2006). Unlike adaptability which seeks to maintain a system’s trajectory by improving 
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certain components, transformation requires that the underlying assumptions behind key 
state variables or system drivers be questioned and redefined when needed (Hordijk et al., 
2014).  
Furthermore, the ability to enact radical transformations at the macro level is a tool that is 
sometimes necessary but rarely used. Although this stream of thought may seem difficult 
to adopt, decision makers are likely to be successful when they take advantage of windows 
of opportunity. That is, where “…a problem is recognized, a solution is available, the 
political climate makes the time right for change, and the constraints do not prohibit 
actions” (Kingdon, 1995). Kingdon (1995) argues that the confluence of problems, 
solutions, and politics creates a positive environment for significant changes to occur. 
 
Figure 2.14   Diagrammatic representation of extracted concepts in resilience 




The Netherlands provides an example of a transformative macroscale intervention. The 
country’s new Delta Committee’s4 approach to adaptation has shifted from being only 
about ‘hydraulic engineering works’, to how the entire country is “managed, both 
physically and administratively” and to “present an integrated vision for the Netherlands 
for centuries to come” (Deltacommissie, 2008) that impacts overall community quality of 
life.  Over the decades, there has been a tremendous shift in the program’s strategy – from 
adaptability to transformation. The course of transformation taken up by the Delta 
Committee is seen as the only means of ensuring persistence due to predicted future sea 
level rise and fluctuations in river discharge. Now, instead of focusing only on building 
stronger and higher levees and sea walls to combat the water, the Dutch now embrace the 
water, and are finding means of working with water. They are “exploring new opportunities 
that may improve the quality of life of residents, and integrating their flood protection with 
nature, landscape and urban development” (Deltacommissie, 2008). To learn from the 
Dutch example, decision makers at the macro level (and in some cases, the meso level) 
may need to question assumptions underlying the way in which the transport system is 
planned, designed, operated and maintained.  
The second scale that may be identified comprises the state and regional levels, and is the 
primary focus of this dissertation. The mesoscale includes state and regional agencies such 
as departments of transportation (DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), 
transit agencies, local governments, etc. This level is critical for the implementation of 
adaptability and transformation. Transport agencies serve as the owners and operators of 
transport infrastructure and are thus, the first point of contact for strengthening the system’s 
                                                 
4 The committee that heads the country’s flood protection program 
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infrastructure (which consists of infrastructure, vehicles, energy supply, and command and 
control). In addition to ensuring physical resilience, this level can also initiate deliberate 
transformations in terms of enhancing business processes by exploring answers to the 
following questions: When is a radical transformation a better option than adaptability? 
Have there been missed windows of opportunity in past? What were the consequences? 
What strategies can we use to ensure that future windows of opportunity are fully taken 
advantage of? 
In addition, meso level actors may also work toward taking better advantage of social 
capital: intentionally harnessing social capital can be done through formal networks that 
already exist in such institutions. The response to and recovery from extreme events 
primarily depends on the processes in place and the people that implement them. If the 
social capital in institutions are considered as assets in asset management practice, then 
this capital would be subject to performance measurement and management. This could be 
done through assessing the social network performance at agencies such as DOTs (both 
with respect to internal and external stakeholders), and tracking its performance and 
evolution over time. When this is done, organizational network structures that contribute 
to effectively harnessing social capital, as well as those that inhibit system resilience can 
be identified and improved. Similarly, collaborative networks, whether emergent, self-
organizing or ad-hoc, play an important role in system resilience. Collaborations between 
transport agencies and emergency management groups (local, state & federal), as well as 
local and regional planning entities, etc., foster the environment for effective 
communication by facilitating information flows and sharing. Such an environment also 
allows collaborators to brainstorm creative solutions to problems by bringing together 
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“nodes of expertise of significance” (Olsson et al., 2006). For example, transit agencies can 
work with emergency management agencies to better coordinate the transport of transit 
dependent individuals during evacuations. 
The third and final scale that may be identified is the microscale, which consists of 
communities and stakeholder groups that directly consume services provided by the 
transportation system. The behavior of system actors at this level with respect to transport 
system interactions should guide the design and development of resilience strategies. 
Building social capital using elements of social resilience, that is, adaptive, coping and 
participative capacity, will strengthen the overall system during crises. According to 
Lorenz (2010), each social system (group) is inherently linked to other social 
systems/groups, and thus, enhancing one social group’s participative capacity, inevitably 
diminishes another’s participative capacity. Thus, equity becomes an important factor 
when considering social resilience since power inequalities hinder the achievement of 
social resilience. Lastly, micro level resilience can be enhanced through developing social 
capital within pre-existing groups, communities and individuals. According to the 
literature, this may be accomplished through (1) taking advantage of existing capital within 
networks, and (2) building more capital through interactions/interventions from the macro 
and meso scales (Lucini, 2013; Adger, 2000). 
 Cross-Scale Interactions in Space & Time 
Drawing on the concepts of panarchy and hysteresis, cross-scale interactions within the 
transport system can also be examined. As stated previously, panarchy describes the 
interactive dynamics of a set of hierarchical systems. Hysteresis, as used in economics 
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literature, describes what Setterfield (2010) calls selective memory path dependence, where 
a few selected events in the system’s past, permanently affect the system’s future path and 
output.  Figure 4.1 represents this concept through the interactions between the three levels, 
and asserts that these cross-scale interactions in time and space play a vital role in system 
resilience.   
First, in terms of the influence and impacts across scales, larger scales affect smaller ones 
in ways that are usually lasting (Simme and Martin, 2010). For example, 2012’s MAP-21 
establishes a performance-based framework that transportation agencies at the state, 
metropolitan and local levels are required to adhere to. Second, the smaller scales also 
affect larger ones, and per Simmie and Martin (2010), this is usually during the release 
phase (of the adaptive cycle) i.e., the phase in which a major disruption or event occurs 
that causes network connections and regulations to break down, resources to seep out of 
the system, and resilience to be is truly tested. For instance, a community whose social 
values are gradually shifting in terms of sustainability and environmental preservation, 
through advocacy, may be able to initiate a deliberate transformation at the micro level. 
Although this transformation may be slow, persistent advocacy for more sustainable forms 
of transport, e.g., bike and pedestrian infrastructure, or use of alternative fuels, may affect 
decisions of transport agencies or local governments. This change in values by the system 
users may cause infrastructure owners to also shift towards providing sustainable 
transportation solutions over time.   
Using the concepts of hysteresis and interactions in time, decision makers at all levels can 
strategically identify factors from past events, whether directly or indirectly, that shaped 
the current trajectory (desirable or not) of the system. Perhaps, a past funding crisis may 
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have led to certain tasks in the maintenance program being suspended. As a result, the 
occurrence of an event that should not have caused a catastrophic failure based on the 
system’s prior trajectory resulted in one. Time interactions also mean that decision makers, 
especially at the meso and micro levels, benefit from prioritizing the maintenance and 
management of institutional memory. More likely than not during disasters, standard 
operating procedures are either nonexistent or become difficult to follow. In such cases, in 
addition to the physical resilience of the system, individuals and groups tap into their social 
capital (e.g. skills, knowledge, experience, networks, etc.) to ensure that the system does 
not degrade further and to restore it as rapidly as possible. However, since social capital 
also resides in the individuals or groups of individuals in the organization or agency, the 
resilience of the system may be reduced when such people leave. By understanding that 
system interactions occur in space, as well as in time, agencies can start to work towards 
enhanced strategies for retaining institutional memory. 
 Gaps and Opportunities: Key Concepts and Implications for Transport 
Resilience 
This section identifies gaps in current approaches to transport system resilience and 
opportunities for enhancing the capacity of transport systems to produce more resilient 
outcomes. After reviewing resilience literature in transportation systems as well as systems 
in other fields of study, certain key concepts emerge and their implications for 





 Gaps: Single Equilibrium Resilience No Longer Suffices  
i. The increasing frequency and intensity of natural hazards make it impractical to try 
to engineer ourselves out of risk. The necessary infrastructure renewal needed to 
create improved design standards to address the increasing frequency and strength 
of natural hazards would be nearly impossible to meet. Take the Netherlands for 
example, after the 1953 North Sea Flooding that led to about 1,800 fatalities, the 
country began to greatly enhance their flood defenses (i.e., increasing levee and 
dike heights) and sought to predict and control nature (“North Sea Flood”, 2017). 
However, after another round of devastating floods in the 1990s, a paradigm shift 
in flood protection occurred. This birthed the concept of “room for rivers” where 
the emphasis was no longer placed on constricting water, but rather, learning to live 
with water. Learning from the Dutch example, the intent of this research is to create 
a conceptual framework that shifts our thinking and views from a single equilibrium 
resilience approach toward generating multiple equilibria that involve the multiple 
capital associated with system sustainability. 
ii. For the most vulnerable populations, returning to an original equilibrium state is 
not always the most desirable outcome as the original state in many cases may not 
have met their needs. For example, during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, although 
public officials were aware that approximately 100,000 residents of the City of New 
Orleans had no means of personal transportation, evacuation plans were inequitably 
focused on automobile evacuation (New Orleans, 2005). City buses set up to 
transport people to emergency shelters were unreliable, and neither public buses 
from the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA), nor trains were deployed 
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to help evacuate transit-dependent residents from the city (Murdock, 2005). 
Consequently, transit-dependent members of the community who wanted to leave 
the city had to pay for commercial services – “a major barrier to many low-income 
residents” (Litman, 2006). The transport system failure experienced was a result of 
the homogenous treatment of system users. The disparateness of modal access and 
socioeconomic status of transport system users was overlooked contributing to the 
subsequent transport system failure. Returning to this original state, is therefore not 
desirable.  
 Opportunities: From Single Equilibrium to Multiple Equilibria  
i. Consideration the aforementioned points, this research seeks to explore and identify 
benefits of shifting the current approach to transportation resilience from Pimm 
(1984; 1991) to Holling (1973) thinking. There is practical value in considering and 
adopting a multi-equilibrium approach from ecological resilience thinking with 
shifting regimes; developing step-up regimes that may be accessed either through 
forced or deliberate action (Folke et al., 2010), and planning for such regimes to 
enable them to be accessed at the right time (either forcibly or deliberately).   
ii. The concepts of stability and regimes can be used as a paradigm for a system 
maturing in resiliency where the objective will be to determine what types and 
relative levels of capital (institutional, organizational, financial, technical) can 
constitute maturing regimes for system resiliency and explore strategies for 
attaining these regimes. 
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iii. The concept of the next attainable regime (either proactively/deliberately) with 
some institutional intervention or reactively (forcibly) after some natural or man-
made intervention. 
iii. Considering the experience of international best practices such as the Netherlands, 
and considering system resilience failures in the U.S., we can hypothesize that as 
agencies mature in their dealings with hazards, they will naturally move from 
purely technical to sociotechnical approaches.  Thus, to investigate this, selected 
agencies can be surveyed to explore the extent to which their experiences bear up 
this, and to study their evolution in order to extract an evolving maturity process 
in handling hazards and building transportation system resilience capacity using 
sociotechnical approaches. 
iv. In expanding the engineering resilience approach, the intent is to move toward an 
approach that formally incorporates human/social capital elements together with 
the technical, focusing on organizational, institutional and financial capital.  
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CHAPTER 3. SURVEY RESULTS &ANALYSIS  
 Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of the survey used as the data collection instrument and 
analyzes the results in a case study format. The purpose of the survey, as stated earlier, is 
to collect data on existing resilience efforts being implemented by transportation agencies. 
Data from the survey results will then be drawn from to inform the development of the 
framework premised on the foundational concepts of multiple equilibria, shifting regimes 
and evolution toward sociotechnical resilience capacity building.   
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the agencies surveyed and the survey 
questions used in the research. This is followed by an analysis of the survey results 
combined with data collected from literature searches are then presented in a case study 
format. Finally, the chapter ends with a synthesis of the case studies highlighting strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats to transport resilience efforts being implemented by 
the agencies surveyed. 
 Overview of Agencies 
To determine the critical factors for developing the socio-technical systems resilience 
framework, a case study analysis was conducted. A purposive sample survey was 
conducted to collect information on agency approaches for building resilience capacity. In 
some cases, the survey yielded little information, therefore document reviews were 
conducted to supplement the responses and create a better picture for resilience within the 
state or region. Transportation agencies targeted were departments of transportation 
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(DOTs) and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). In addition, some local 
government agencies and associations of local government agencies were also included to 
provide a holistic view of transportation resilience by including stakeholders that oversee 
planning, providing and maintaining the transportation system.   
Fourteen agencies were contacted to partake in the survey. Out of this number, 11 agencies 
responded (78.5% response rate). The 11 responding agencies are in the following states: 
California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas and 
Oregon (shown in Figure 3.1). The three agencies that could not respond are in New York, 
California and Louisiana. As discussed in Chapter 1, agencies selected to participate were 
chosen to provide a range of experiences across the US’s various geographic regions. Table 
3.1 provides the details of the agency representatives including names, agency names and 
job titles.  




Table 3.1 Details of responding agencies 
State Survey 
Contact 
Agency Job Title 








Association of Bay Area 
Governments (ABAG) 
Resilience Planner 
Colorado Will Johnson Colorado Department of 
Transportation (CDOT) 
Performance and Asset 
Management Branch 
Manager 
Florida  Dennis Smith  
 




James Cromar, Broward MPO Director of Planning 
Iowa Tamara 
Nicholson 
Iowa Department of 
Transportation  










Maryland State Highway 
Authority (MSHA) 
Climate Change Program 
Manager 






Oregon Bruce Johnson  Oregon Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) 
State Bridge Engineer 
Texas Jory Dille North Central Texas Council 




 Overview of Survey Questions  
Survey questions were designed to capture a broad range of resilience planning factors in 
transportation systems based on the literature review. Thus, the survey was categorized 
under four main headings: technical capital (includes built), organizational capital, 
institutional capital and financial capital. The four types of capital were informed by the 
Performance Mosaic developed by Amekudzi-Kennedy (2016) which describes different 
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types of capital that drive performance in infrastructure systems as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The categories are described below. 
 
Figure 3.2  The Performance Mosaic 
 
 Institutional Capital 
Institutions refer to the structures, mechanisms or tools put in place to govern behavior of 
a group of people such as a society or community. In this context therefore, institutional 
capital refers to the laws, policies, regulations, standards or codes put in place to guide the 
provision and management of transportation systems. Having institutional capital that 
promotes resilience is necessary in all stages of an infrastructure’s lifecycle. For example, 
the planning stage may include regulations that guide the steps to be followed (e.g., 
requiring a risk analysis for potential climate change impacts) for new infrastructure 
projects. Other examples include the National Protection Policy Directive (NPPD) signed 
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into law in 2013 by President Obama that calls for owners of critical public infrastructure 
to ensure the safety and resilience of their infrastructure, and the FAST ACT, the 2015 
national surface transportation re-authorization which calls for more effort towards 
enhancing the resilience of transportation infrastructure.  
 Organizational Capital 
In simple terms, organizational capital refers to the processes and practices that enable an 
organization to fulfill its purpose. It is an intangible resource that, when leveraged, provides 
competitive advantage to organizations. That is, such capital ultimately determines the 
quality and extent of service provision by organizations as it “enables both tangible and 
intangible resources … to be productive” (Lev et al., 2016). According to Lev et al., (2016), 
organizational capital comprises four non-mutually exclusive elements: human capital, 
processes and practices, knowledge and expertise, and lastly, values and norms. The 
intangible nature of this type of capital makes it difficult to quantify. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this research, focus is placed on attempting to address the first three elements 
(human capital, processes and practices, and knowledge and expertise) and how they 
influence resilience capacity.       
 Technical Capital  
A subset of organizational capital, this research explicitly pulls out technical capital to refer 
to the technical knowledge and expertise required to enhance the resilience of an agency’s 
portfolio of physical assets. Examples of such knowledge and expertise include the 
technical capabilities agency staff possess to perform risk analyses for system components 
or agency infrastructure monitoring capabilities that enhance emergency response. 
79 
 
 Financial Capital 
Financial capital, in this context, refers to the financial resources available to transportation 
agencies to pursue activities that enhance system resilience. It also includes how existing 
resources are prioritized in order to reform existing practices or pursue new initiatives 
directed toward system resilience. 
 
 Analysis of Survey Responses 
 Colorado DOT 
 Background  
The state of Colorado is the 8th largest state in the US in terms of land area covering 
approximately 103, 718 sq. miles and a 2016 population estimate of about 5.5 million. The 
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) manages over 23,000 total lane miles of 
highway and 3,447 bridges, in addition to overseeing 35 mountain passes and monitoring 
over half the avalanche paths in the state (CDOT, n.d.a). The agency has an annual budget 
of approximately 1.4 billion and also manages federal grants for transit operators and 
airports to the tune of about $11 million and $41 million respectively (CDOT, n.d.a). The 
main transportation planning stakeholders in the state include its 15 Regional Planning 
Commissions (comprising 10 rural Transportation Planning Regions and five Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations), the Transit and Rail Advisory Committee (TRAC), and the 




 Survey Responses 
The Performance and Asset Management Branch Manager answered survey questions for 
the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). With over 10 years of experience at 
the agency, Mr. Johnson is one of two agency employees in charge of resiliency efforts at 
the agency. He has also seen an evolution in the way the agency addresses system resilience 
over the last decade as a result of the impact of a catastrophic event. For Colorado DOT, 
resilience is the ability to withstand. 
3.4.1.2.1 Institutional Capital  
For the agency, the FAST ACT provisions for resilience will hopefully guide its direction 
in future initiatives. Survey answers point toward conducting assessments of transportation 
assets and looking at the role of resilience in project selection and prioritization.   
3.4.1.2.2 Organizational Capital  
The agency does not have strategic objectives or goals specific to resilience; however, it 
has an active Geohazard Management Program. Also through CDOT’s Geohazard 
Management Plan, the agency monitors and reports on program accomplishments. Threats 
identified under this program include landslides, sinkholes, floods and erosion, etc., and 
the program involves corridor risk reduction as well as emergency response and hazard 
management. The plan also uses asset management practices for resource allocation.  
CDOT is also currently undergoing change in the area of decision making. For example, 
the agency is in the process of developing a multi-objective decision analysis process where 
resilience is being looked at as a potential measure. When asked about how the agency 
81 
 
manages institutional learning with regards to disaster/extreme event planning and 
management, Mr. Johnson stated that the agency is in the process of assessing training 
needs.  
In terms of collaborations, the agency helps coordinate the development of the state’s 
Emergency Management Plan. The Colorado Flood Recovery Office and the Office of 
Emergency Management have both been useful partnerships in the agency’s efforts.   
3.4.1.2.3 Financial Capital  
A process is underdevelopment that reflects the desire to build system resilience through 
agency budget allocations. However, CDOT is the only DOT among those reviewed in this 
research to acquire state funding for its resilience assessment. The State’s Transportation 
Commission (11 member governor appointed board of commissioners) approved funding 
for the I-70 pilot project in July 2016. The I-70 pilot project’s goal is to “quantify and 
improve system resilience in advance of future events to better prepare CDOT and reduce 
future losses” (Kemp et al., 2016). The agency hopes that this project will help inform how 
it complies with MAP-21’s mandate, which requires agencies to develop and apply risk-
based asset management processes. This comes in the wake of significant damage of 
CDOT infrastructure from “floods, fire, rockfall and other physical events” (Kemp et al., 
2016).  
Also worth noting is the agency’s new approach to risk and resilience which outlines two 
kinds of replacement of assets damaged during unplanned disruptions including disasters: 
in-kind and betterment replacement. In-kind replacement is expected to be paid for by 
federal funds whereas betterment replacement will have to be funded by the agency. 
82 
 
3.4.1.2.4 Technical Capital 
According to the survey responses, Colorado’s transport system has experienced multiple 
major disasters over the last two decades (more than 10). Threats faced by the state’s 
transportation system include rockfall, flooding, extreme heat/drought, and wildfire. 
However, the agency has not yet conducted any risk or vulnerability assessments, but is 
planning on doing so in the future. CDOT is currently working with Applied Engineering 
Management (AEM) Corporation to develop a new risk and resilience approach to be used 
with the new Federal Emergency Response (ER) Manual.  
As stated earlier, CDOT is working on conducting risk and resiliency assessment pilot on 
its I-70 corridor. The pilot study will utilize a method that was already used on the 
Glenwood Springs rockfall event and was developed as part of the Flood Recovery 
Program. For the Glenwood Springs event, it was used in an analysis of mitigation 
measures that could be potentially implemented on that corridor. The analysis approach, 
developed with Applied Engineering Management (AEM) involves the following steps:  
i. Developing an inventory of assets on the corridor 
ii. Calculating the probability of different threats impacting those selected assets 
iii. Estimating the resulting damage 
iv. Identifying assets most critical to system operations 
v. Developing and recommending improvement strategies which could include 






Colorado DOT seems to have a good foundation for developing mature resilience practices. 
By having an active rockfall hazard management program, the agency is already well 
versed with risk management. Incorporating this into the agency’s broader asset 
management program will be an effective way to begin strategically planning for resilience. 
For example, using rockfall hazards as a starting point, the agency can broadly explore 
what resilience to rockfall hazards means to the entire system. CDOT can identify different 
types of agency capital that can build resilience capacity and help fulfil the program’s goals 
of risk reduction, emergency response and hazard management.  We also see some 
elements of movement toward a sociotechnical approach in that the agency is developing 
a multi-objective decision making method that may incorporate resiliency as a criterion. 
In terms of financial and technical capital, the CDOT approach provides interesting 
information about funding. By identifying the two types of replacement, i.e., in-kind and 
betterment, the agency is better placed to better respond to crises. For example, in a 
situation where system vulnerabilities are well understood, the occurrence of a disaster, say 
a bridge deck failing, provides the opportunity for betterment as long as there has been 
forethought. In the absence of this kind of proactivity, the pressure to replace or repair 
infrastructure in the least amount of time greatly overshadows the need to enhance 
resilience capacity. Thus, in many cases, infrastructure is replaced to its prior state, which 
may not necessarily be the most desirable state. To conclude, CDOT listed three statements 
as failings, shortcomings or ineffective practices to avoid. They are as follows: 
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i. Approaching resilience strictly as a standards and engineering issue - not a 
planning issue.  
ii. Not funding assets based on criticality.  
iii. Not funding redundant corridors. 
 
 Florida DOT & Broward MPO 
 Background 
The State of Florida has the nation’s second longest coastline with low-lying and highly 
developed coastal areas (Cambridge Systematics, 2015). As such, the state’s transportation 
infrastructure has been impacted by repeated flooding from severe storms and storm surge. 
In the last decade alone, Florida has experienced 12 FEMA declared disasters caused by 
hurricanes, severe storms, tropical storms, tornadoes and flooding (FEMA, n.d.).  
 Survey Responses 
Planning, designing, and operating our infrastructure to ensure it is able to withstand 
and bounce back from physical threats – including natural hazards.”  
-Dennis Smith, FDOT 
 
Responses from Florida were provided by the Director of Planning at the Broward MPO 
and the Growth Management Coordinator from the Florida Department of Transportation. 





3.4.2.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital 
Both the MPO and DOT have seen changes in their approaches to resiliency. The evolution 
came about as a result of three factors: (1) impact of a catastrophic event, (2) greater 
awareness of threats, and (3) greater understanding of system resilience. For FDOT, this 
change is reflected in the recent update to the Florida Transportation Plan which now 
includes a goal to support agile, resilient, and quality transportation infrastructure. Florida 
DOT is the only agency represented in the survey to use a clear strategic approach for 
addressing transportation resilience. The plan includes the following objectives: 
 “Adapt transportation infrastructure and technologies to meet changing customer 
needs 
 Increase the resiliency of infrastructure to risks, including extreme weather and 
other environmental conditions” (FDOT, 2015) 
The stated objectives are also accompanied by a set of strategies. Examples of these 
strategies are provided below.   
 Innovation: Retrofitting, adapting or providing more diversity in areas where 
critical infrastructure is located to “reduce vulnerability to extreme weather and 
other environmental conditions” (FDOT, 2015) 
 Collaboration: “Coordinate with local governments when making major 
infrastructure investment and development decisions to consider the risks of 
investing in areas vulnerable to extreme weather, flood risks, and other 
environmental conditions, including consideration of areas identified as priorities 
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for mitigation of risks or adaptation of infrastructure in regional and local plans” 
(FDOT, 2015). 
 Data & Processes: “Implement FDOT’s Transportation Asset Management Plan 
and expand this plan over time to include all modes; Encourage local 
governments and other modal providers to develop asset management plans; 
Incorporate the risks of extreme weather and other environmental conditions into 
long-range planning, project development, design, operations, and asset 
management decisions for all modes” (FDOT, 2015). 
Finally, bridge and pavement condition (and “other infrastructure”) are the selected 
indicators for assessing resilience according to the strategic plan. The FTP’s 
Implementation Group is required to develop benchmarks, which will also include 
resilience benchmarks, to be implemented within a 5-25-year timeframe.  
For Broward MPO, survey responses suggest that strategically planning for resilience may 
become a reality in order to comply with FAST ACT provisions5. This may begin as early 
as 2017 as part of the 2045 Long Range Transportation Plan Update. According to the 
MPO representative, there is currently an attempt to use agency’s long-range planning to 
try to minimize the range of future impacts. The MPO representative also stated that no 
major changes have occurred in decision making, but the new information is expected in 
the upcoming year. 
                                                 
5 The 2015 FAST ACT does not actually require agencies to strategically plan for resilience. It only requires 
agencies to include resilience considerations in planning.  
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Having said that, Broward County developed a Climate Action Plan published in 2015 that 
lists several action items. Among the transportation-related actions is one directed at 
“coordinating transportation-related adaptation policies across jurisdictional boundaries 
and ensuring alignment amongst broader planning and plan implementation efforts” 
(Broward County, 2015). 
A resilient system “has the capacity to accommodate the impacts of extreme 
weather/climatic events and can return to functionality in a timely manner” - James 
Cromar, Broward MPO. 
 
With regards to collaboration and resilience efforts in southeast Florida, partnerships 
between Broward MPO, FDOT and other municipal partners have been helpful in the 
region’s resiliency efforts. Currently, Southeast Florida, being a highly vulnerable area 
may be leading the way for state level efforts. Per the survey responses, FDOT supports 
local government resiliency planning initiatives through its district offices. Broward MPO 
staff also actively pursue opportunities to share the agency’s experiences through peer 
exchanges, webinars, ribbon-cutting ceremonies and technical meetings. According to 
them, spreading the word helps to “expand the network of the informed”.  
When asked about managing institutional learning related to disaster/extreme events, the 
survey respondent referred to FDOT’s in-house Emergency Management Office. The 
office is part of the Florida State Emergency Response Team (SERT) and leads Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) 1 & 3 at the State EOC. The purpose of the emergency support 
function is to “provide, in a coordinated manner, the resources (human, technical, 
equipment, facility, materials and supplies) of member agencies to support emergency 
transportation needs during an emergency or disaster …” (ESF, 2010). According to the 
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FDOT response, exercises and training are offered at the Emergency Management Office 
to support response efforts. As for the MPO, the following quote by the agency 
representative shows how the agency seems to be learning from the experience the 
importance of strengthening organizational capital for resilience efforts.  
“In several cases, the intergovernmental coordination turned out to be based on 
individuals more than on institutions. Specifically, there were agency staff on technical 
committees who participated based on personal interest and not on assigned roles. When 
these individuals moved to new organizations, the agencies they previously represented 
did not consistently assign replacement staff to take their places. This left us in a 
scramble too often.” 
 
3.4.2.2.2 Technical Capital  
Florida’s transport system has been impacted by at least one major disaster in the last 
decade and about four more within the period of 1996-2005 according to the survey 
responses. As a result, two separate studies that included the Broward, Miami-Dade, 
Monroe, and Palm Beach Counties, as well as Hillsborough County. Both studies were 
supported by the FHWA and sought to assess the impact of climate change on the regional 
transport network. Threats identified in the assessment were sea level rise (SLR), storm 
surge, extreme precipitation and related flooding. The assessment covered transportation 
assets only, i.e., highways, railroads, and bridges.  
Both studies used the Sea Level Scenario Sketch Planning Tool developed by University 
of Florida’s GeoPlan Center. The tool uses data on sea level trends and tidal datums from 
NOAA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers methods. Transportation network data from 
FDOT and LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) elevation data were also used.  Results 
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from the assessment provided the study team with relative costs of adaptation for sample 
strategies on the six facilities assessed. 
Broward County plans on conducting a follow up study that will focus on county and local 
roads only. At Hillsborough County, results from the study were incorporated into outreach 
efforts for the region’s 2040 transportation plan update.  
3.4.2.2.3 Financial Capital 
Broward MPO is in the process of discussing how resiliency may become a project 
prioritization criterion along with the more traditional criteria such as safety, congestion, 
mobility, equity, etc. In the event of unplanned disruptions, the MPO finds emergency 
funds which sometimes leads to delays for other projects. 
 Summary  
The Southeast Florida region has already faced many of the dire impacts of climate change. 
Although this has stressed the region’s infrastructure and economy among others, the MPO 
representative stated in the survey that this has resulted in many political conflicts being 
side-stepped and more focus placed on resolving existing issues. Thus, we see a particularly 
strategic approach with the Florida transportation agencies. The first feature that shows an 
evolution towards a sociotechnical approach is FDOT’s incorporation of goals and 
objectives for extreme weather resilience. This approach goes beyond asset specific 
adaptation goals, and more broadly defines what a resilient system looks like for Florida, 
that is a shift from asset-based to system-based resilience. Additionally, objectives and 
strategies developed are broad enough to be implemented across different asset types as 
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well as modes. The use of existing structures (i.e., State Transportation Plan) to articulate 
the agency’s agenda for resilience. In terms of human capital, formation of the FTP 
Implementation Group meant to handle both short and long term implementation of the 
plan shows institutionalization of the resilience thinking at the agency. This is because, the 
group will handle resilience goals and objectives in addition to all goals in the plan. This 
approach also enables the group to strategically plan implementation in a way that 
maximizes the co-benefits of strategies that build resilience capacity and those directed at 
other goals. We still see remnants of the technocentric approach in this case and 
opportunities to further embrace sociotechnical thinking in the selected indicators for 
system resilience. The selected indicators, bridge and pavement condition, are actually 
reliability metrics. Conflating reliability and resilience in itself is a risk. The risk being that, 
improving reliability does not always improve resilience. In addition, reliability 
improvements do not get to the heart of resilience, which focuses on a system’s response 
after a disruption. 
For the MPO, we see systematic progression in building institutional and organizational 
capital for climate change resilience. In the region’s Climate Action Plan, we see an 
objective to coordinate transportation policies across the different jurisdictional boundaries 
to ensure alignment with broader goals. This high-level approach ensures that efforts in 
different sectors are not duplicated, or worse, in opposition to each other. The Broward 
MPO also stated a desire to identify and incorporate resilience capacity considerations into 
its Long-Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) update. The MPO’s experience with building 
resilience capacity also seems to have showed firsthand the importance of institutionalizing 
various processes. Hopefully, the agency can build on the lessons learned and continue to 
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make progress in this area. Finally, the MPO is working towards improved financial capital 
as it is thinking of how best to make project resiliency a prioritization criterion that is not 
viewed as a separate objective, but included in the existing process as part of multiple 
objectives. 
 Iowa DOT 
 Background 
Iowa’s public road system is ranked 13th highest in the U.S. in terms of mileage with over 
114,000 lane miles of roads. The Iowa DOT manages eight percent of the total roads in the 
system, but this number accounted for 62% of all vehicular traffic in 2012. In 2008, Iowa 
suffered from catastrophic floods that resulted in 85 of its 99 counties being designated as 
federal disasters. The flooding resulted in about $19 million in damages to interstates, U.S. 
routes and state routes, and an additional $43 million to county roads in 92 counties (ASCE 
Iowa, 2015). Figures 3.3-3.5 show Iowa DOT photographs of road damage from the 2008 
floods. The year 2008 is not the only calendar year Iowans remember as catastrophic: 1993, 
2010, and 2011 also came with significant catastrophic floods (ASCE Iowa, 2015; EPA, 











Figure 3.4  IA 1 Flood damage by Cedar River. Source: FHWA (2015) 
Figure 3.5  I-80 overtopping at Cedar River. Source: FHWA (2015). 
Figure 3.3  Photograph showing I-80 overtopping caused by floods. Source: FHWA (2015) 
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 Survey Responses 
Tammy Nicholson is the Office Director for Location and Environment at Iowa DOT. Ms. 
Nicholson has been at the agency for over 10 years and heads a team of five that head 
agency initiatives related to resilience in addition to their other responsibilities. According 
to Ms. Nicholson, Iowa DOT is in the early stages of defining what resilience means to the 
agency. At this stage, the agency plans to evaluate the impacts of projects on the climate 
and the impacts of climate change and extreme weather on its projects to identify 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. Currently, the agency is involved in assessing the 
vulnerability of bridge and highway assets to extreme weather events. IDOT plans to 
expand this analysis to other stages of the infrastructure lifecycle from planning through to 
operations. Based on the survey responses, resilience champions are mainly responsible 
for the agency’s current direction. Other factors that also led to this change are (i) impact 
of catastrophic event, (ii) greater awareness of threats and (iii) greater understanding of 
system resilience.   
3.4.3.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital 
Iowa DOT has not yet addressed system resilience in its strategic planning. However, the 
agency is in the process of forming a Resiliency and Sustainability Team to formally 
address resiliency issues. The team, which is currently informal, will also work on 
addressing institutional learning with regards to disaster/extreme event planning and 
management. At the state level, a number of flood mitigation initiatives can be identified. 
In 2012, Iowa’s General Assembly established the Iowa Flood Mitigation Board which is 
responsible for creating the state’s Flood Mitigation Program. The Flood Mitigation 
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Program also serves as a funding source for public entities who wish to pursue flood 
mitigation projects. The state is also one of 12 states nationwide recognized by FEMA to 
have an Enhanced State Mitigation Plan, meaning that the plan is comprehensive enough 
to manage increased funding to reach mitigation goals (State of Iowa, n.d.). 
In terms of collaboration, Iowa DOT is exploring how its efforts can fit into a larger state 
effort by collaborating with agencies such as the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Natural Resources.  
3.4.3.2.2 Technical Capital 
Like other states that participated in FHWA’s resilience pilots, Iowa DOT used a risk-
based approach in its first infrastructure vulnerability assessment. The assessment sought 
to identify extreme precipitation and flooding vulnerabilities to the agency’s bridge and 
highway assets within two river basins in the state (South Skunk River and Cedar River). 
No interdependencies were covered in this study.  Objectives of the analysis were to: 
 “Collect information, monitor, predict, and evaluate the performance of existing 
highway structures and roadway embankments with respect to flood inundation 
during severe rainfall events. 
 Determine relevant precipitation metrics in climate projections for transportation 
infrastructure calculations. 
 Quantify the sensitivity of simulated streamflow to projected precipitation change. 
 Conduct an assessment of bridge vulnerability to simulated streamflow change 




 Provide adaptation strategies for climate change impacts and review design policy 
to incorporate climate change.” (Anderson et al., 2015). 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the agency’s vulnerability assessment methodology along 
with a summary of study’s findings.  
Iowa DOT hopes to integrate findings from its vulnerability study into its BridgeWatch 
Program. The agency also hopes to create real time alerts that maintenance staff can use 
from a combination of the BridgeWatch data, USGS gauge data and Next-Generation 
Radar data. Iowa DOT hopes to conduct further vulnerability analyses on other agency 
assets and explore policy guidelines for bridge scour assessments (for floods with a return 
period of more than 500 years). Lastly, the agency may also explore incorporating climate 
considerations in policy analysis and cost-benefit analysis.   
3.4.3.2.3 Financial Capital  
Iowa DOT is in the process of developing criteria for project prioritization that would 
include project resiliency. Additionally, assets affected by extreme events are repaired or 
renewed using ER funding form FHWA.  
 Summary  
Iowa DOT has suffered significant asset damage and financial loss because of past 
flooding. We also see that the agency’s approach to resilience differs slightly from other 
states, in that, the agency seems to be giving systematic thought to how to build resilience 
capacity and shows evidence of developing in a sociotechnical way. 
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Table 3.2 Summary table showing summary of Iowa DOT vulnerability assessment 
methodology 
Step  Data/Analysis 
Asset Inventory 
 Iowa DOT’s asset database already contains 
information for the following bridge characteristics: 
- “age of the structure, elevation of roads and low 
beams, critical streamflow thresholds, scour 
vulnerability, current plan of action when the bridge 
is threatened by high streamflow, soils information, 
past damage from extreme streamflow, and 
maintenance records” (Anderson et al., 2015).  
 The project team further developed streamflow rating 
curves using data from USGS. 
Climate Data 
 Annual peak flow data – USGS 
 Historic data – NOAA stage IV precipitation analysis, 
historic daily precipitation measurements 
 Streamflow simulation – using downscaled climate 
models at 22,781 grid points for 1960-2100 
Streamflow modeling and 
Future flood estimation 
 CUENCAS hydrological model (river networks 
analysis tool) 
 Calculated % of absorbed rainfall and % of runoff 
 USGS protocol (modified version) used to estimate 
streamflow quantiles 
Credibility analysis 
 Analyzed degree of simulation errors for climate model 
precipitation data 
 Compared streamflow simulation error to climate 
change induced streamflow changed predicted 
Vulnerability and risk 
assessment  
 Assessed vulnerability of bridges to overtopping and 
scour 
 Potential bridge and roadway exposure to high 
streamflow determined qualitatively 
Findings  
 Based on analysis of climate impacts, each pilot 
location’s streamflow exposure exceeds current design 
standards 
 Increased frequency of highway overtopping and bridge 
scour projected  
Identified adaptation 
strategies  
 Grade raise of 2ft to survive a 200-year flood to be 
incorporated into planned work for the identified 
interstate bridges.  
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Beyond conducting a vulnerability study of agency assets, as seems to be the first step with 
most agencies, IDOT is also intentionally addressing human capital needs, moving from 
needing resilience champions to formalizing a team (Resiliency and Sustainability Team) 
to handle resilience-based issues in the agency. The agency is also giving systematic 
thought to how to expand resilience considerations to a larger portion of its infrastructure 
lifecycle, from planning to operations. Thinking about resilience using an infrastructure 
lifecycle approach provides room to strategically identify capacity building strategies in 
other capital areas to support infrastructure resilience. We also see sociotechnical resilience 
thinking in the integrated approach the agency is using by exploring how Iowa DOT’s 
efforts fit into the broader state efforts and thereby working with the Departments of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
 Lastly, IDOT also shows the emerging effective practice in terms of financing resilience 
initiatives (similar to Colorado DOT). In this area, the agency plans to develop a set of 
project prioritization criteria, which will include resilience in addition to other traditional 
focus areas such as safety and cost. This approach to building resilience capacity is possibly 
more financially feasible than identifying alternative sources of funding to “address 
resilience”. This approach is also at a higher level of maturity than efforts to identify 
separate funding for resiliency initiatives, as it has a better chance of being institutionalized 
into existing decision making processes. The examples described show a gradual shift from 
purely an asset adaptation focus to resilience thinking. There is still opportunity for growth. 
As the agency continues to build capacity in these capital areas, a more strategic approach 
that is also reflected in IDOT documents such as the TAMP, LRTP and TIP will provide 
98 
 
guidance and direction on subsequent steps towards meeting resilience goals in a 
systematic way. 
 
 Maryland (MD) DOT 
 Background 
The Maryland Department of Transportation comprises the following: State Highway 
Administration (SHA), MD Transit Administration, Motor Vehicle Administration, MD 
Port Administration, MD Aviation Administration, MD Transportation Authority and The 
Secretary’s Office. The SHA manages about 17,824 miles of roads and over 2,500 bridges 
within the state (MDOT, n.d.; NOAA 2017). The survey responses for MDOT were 
provided by Elizabeth Habic, the Climate Change Program manager at Maryland State 
Highway Administration (SHA). 
 Survey Responses 
3.4.4.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital 
Champion efforts and political will have been the main drivers behind the agency’s 
resiliency initiative. The main initiative being the inclusion of sea level rise mapping for 
project review and some decision making at the planning and design stage. There are also 
ongoing vulnerability assessments aimed at incorporating such considerations into 
planning and asset management. According to the survey response, implementing 
resiliency strategies at the agency has not caused major changes in decision making, but it 
has raised awareness. 
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The agency does not currently have strategic goals or objectives for addressing system 
resilience, however, it believes the FAST Act’s provisions will reinforce the need to 
conduct vulnerability assessment and incorporate findings into project planning and 
design. Passage of Maryland’s House Bill 514 is also a driver for resilience efforts as the 
bill requires annual reporting of agency efforts towards resiliency. Thus, political will and 
champion efforts are seen to be the main drivers for change in the way MDSHA addresses 
system resilience.  
In terms of planning resources, MDSHA develops or helps coordinate the development of 
the Emergency Management Plan, Evacuation Plan, Communication Plan and Recovery 
Plan regarding the state’s highway system. The agency has also collaborated with Silver 
Jackets and the Maryland Commission on Climate Change (MCCC) in its resilience 
building efforts. Silver Jackets is a national organization that “facilitate[s] collaborative 
solutions to state flood risk priorities” (Silverjackets, n.d.). Furthermore, the agency shares 
data and communicates about ongoing efforts with other state and local entities as a way 
of unifying overall resilience efforts. Lastly, MDSHA manages institutional learning 
through mentorship and training.  
3.4.4.2.2 Technical Capital  
According to MDOT responses, the agency has experienced an average of three natural 
disasters each decade from 2016 to 1986. The agency in 2014 conducted vulnerability 
“A system that can handle a certain amount of stress without failure or can bounce back 





assessment for highways and bridges partially funded by the FHWA. System threats 
identified included hurricanes, sea level rise (SLR), extreme precipitation and flooding. 
The assessment also covered agency coordination on dams and water release during an 
extreme event. The study assessed assets in Anne Arundel and Somerset counties and 
hoped to achieve the following two objectives: 
i. “Assess the vulnerability of SHA’s transportation assets to climate variables or 
stressors; 
ii. Review and consider design strategies, best management practices, planning 
standards, and other ways to support the adoption of adaptive management 
solutions to improve the resiliency of Maryland’s highway system.” (FHWA, 
2014) 
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the assessment methodology used in MDSHA’s climate 
resilience study. The agency hopes to eventually integrate such analyses into its asset 








Table 3.3  Summary table showing SHA vulnerability assessment methodology 
Process Step  Data Source/Analysis Type 
Collect asset information 
including historical 
exposure and impacts  
 SHA engineers and planners 
 Asset data warehouses (SHA and national) 
 Road closure information 
 Emergency evacuation route status  
 Drainage asset databases 
 Corresponding GIS data 
Map climate scenarios for 
2050 and 20100  
 
 Partner – Salisbury University Eastern Shore Regional 
GIS Cooperative (ESRGC) 
- Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) elevation 
data incorporated 
- SLR projections 
- Coastal flooding modelling for storms  
- Surge inundation maps 
- Riverine flooding modelling 
Identify asset exposure 
 GIS used for: 
- SLR projections; sea, lake and overland surges 
from hurricanes (SLOSH) models (FEMA 100-
year floodplain boundaries 
Detailed vulnerability 
assessment  
 Bridges – U.S. DOT Vulnerability Assessment 
Scoring Tool (VAST). Provides asset level exposure, 
sensitivity, adaptive capacity, and preliminary 
vulnerability score.  
 Roads – Hazard Vulnerability Index (HVI) by SHA 
and ESRGC. Used to evaluate SLR and flooding 
vulnerability (based on road functional class, 
evacuation route designation, and extent and depth of 
projected flooding). 
 Small culverts and drainage conveyances – unable to 
conduct risk assessments due to lack of data.  
Adjustment of calculated 
scores and identification 
of risk areas 
 VAST Tool indicators ranked (by project team and 
SHA engineers) resulting in weights that better suit 
Maryland 
 VAST and HVI scores mapped to identify high risk 
areas 
Develop site specific 
adaptation measures 
 Further detailed assessments may be need to be carried 
out 
 Evaluation of resiliency, costs and environmental 
impacts of adaptation alternatives 
  
Important Lesson 
 Identifying resiliency issues during NEPA is too late 
to address the problems 
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3.4.4.2.3 Financial Capital  
Like many agencies, MDOT does not have separate funds for resiliency efforts. Any 
recovery work is paid for with FEMA emergency funds. Also worth noting is that the 
survey response reinforces the need for a strategic approach to system resilience. 
According to the agency representative, needs are usually identified too late to incorporate 
resilience. For example, identifying resilience issues during the NEPA (National 
Environmental Policy Act) stage, i.e., environmental assessment, is too late to address 
issues.   
 Summary  
At MDSHA, we see that the agency is in the initial stages in terms of building 
organizational capital for transport system resilience. Progress in efforts have primarily 
been as a result of champion efforts. This has also led to raised awareness within the 
agency. This is necessary but not sufficient when compared with Iowa DOT’s approach of 
instituting a formal team. Also, although state-level legislation exists that requires annual 
reporting of climate resilience efforts, not having agency-specific resilience goals or 
objectives hinders the agency’s ability to address some of the problems identified such as 
where in the transportation planning process resilience needs should be addressed. As 
correctly indicated on the survey, an ad-hoc approach to resilience often results in 
resilience needs being identified too late in the project lifecycle for such needs to be 
incorporated. From previous responses, we see that utilizing existing agency structures 
(e.g., planning documents) allows the agency to articulate its vision for system resilience 
and systematically work towards it. However, the survey responses from MSHA show 
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signs of the agency possibly incorporating the risk-based approach used in its vulnerability 
and risk analysis to its asset management plan and other project planning. If this is done, 
resilience thinking can be institutionalized within the agency. 
A second sign that shows progress towards a more sociotechnical approach is found in an 
objective that guided the agency’s vulnerability study: “review and consider design 
strategies, best management practices, planning standards, and other ways to support the 
adoption of adaptive management solutions to improve the resiliency of Maryland’s 
highway system” (FHWA, 2014). This objective provides an excellent example of looking 
beyond an asset’s strength to include other types of agency capital that can support 
resilience (e.g. management practices, planning standards). 
 
 Massachusetts DOT 
 Background 
The Massachusetts DOT oversees the state’s highway, transit, aeronautics, and motor 
vehicle registration. This includes 5,000 bridges and 9,500 lanes miles of state highways 
maintained by MassDOT, 19 rail lines and 170 bus routes operated by MBTA 
(Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority), and 15 regional transit agencies among others 
(MassDOT, 2016).  
In the Massachusetts, coastal communities are most vulnerable to the state’s main hazards 
which include intense precipitation, flooding, erosion and sea level rise. Table 3.4 below 
shows future relative sea level rise estimates for Boston, MA using 2003 as the beginning 
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year of analysis. Values were calculated by adjusting global sea level rise scenarios to 
better reflect conditions in Boston, which includes adjusting for local vertical land 
movement (subsidence).  
Table 3.4  Relative sea level rise estimates for Boston, MA. Source: CZM (2013) 
 
The state has also been impacted by catastrophic hurricanes in the past with the three worst 
being (1) Hurricane Bob in 1991 (causing about $39 million in damages to the state), (2) 
Hurricanes Carol and Edna in 1954 (sustained winds of 80-100 mph and storm surge of 
over 14 feet in some areas), and (3) the Great New England Hurricane in 1938 (18-25 foot 
tides in some areas and strongest wind speed of 121 mph) (Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, 2017).  
With such recorded events in the state’s past and recent, although less devastating, floods 
in the state, Massachusetts is working towards creating more resilient communities. The 
survey for MassDOT was filled out by Steven Miller. Steven Miller has worked at 
MassDOT for over 10 years and is currently the Supervisor for the Office of Environmental 




 Survey Responses 
3.4.5.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital  
 
Resilience is “the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions, 
and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions.”  
– Steven Miller, MassDOT 
 
For MassDOT, political will has played a positive role in the agency’s approach toward 
climate change. Political capital at the state level led to the Massachusetts Global Warming 
Solutions Act and Massachusetts Executive Order (EO) 569. Similar capital at the agency 
has driven work to enhance its resilience capacity. Other factors that influenced the 
evolution in the agency’s resilience approach are champion efforts, impacts of catastrophic 
event and a greater awareness of threats.  
Two agency level policies promote agency actions and form the institutional capital 
required to drive resilience improvement. Firstly, MassDOT has a series of initiatives, 
some which involve collaborating with other MA agencies, aimed at informing asset 
management, to “better understand inland and coastal flooding, and to reassess resources” 
(Miller, 2016). Secondly, the agency has a strategic objective to identify flood-prone 
locations and use such information to support project design and maintenance activities. 
According to Mr. Miller, the MassDOT Highway uses an “initiative tracking sheet” to 
monitor and report progress in this area.  
In terms of transportation planning, the agency representative believes that FAST ACT 
provisions will promote climate change consideration in project planning. At the moment, 
MassDOT does not yet explicitly address transport resilience in its planning documents; 
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however, progress in this area is being made. The agency also collaborates with external 
partners on its resilience initiatives. These partners include: FHWA, NOAA, US EPA 
Region 1, USGS, Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), MA Energy and Environmental 
Affairs (EOEEA), MA Office of Coastal Zone Management (CZM), MA EPA, Boston 
Harbor (now known as The Boston Harbor Association), City of Cambridge, City of 
Boston, MA GIS, MassPort, MA Water Resources Authority (MWRA), MA Department 
of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Boston 
Water and Sewer, and the MA Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA).  
In addition to these efforts, progress is being made toward learning about different tools 
used to develop future climate scenarios for planning. According to Mr. Miller, the process 
of translating future climate scenarios into inputs for emergency planning and management 
is somewhat difficult.    
3.4.5.2.2 Technical Capital  
Massachusetts experiences regular disruptions in the transportation system, as results from 
the survey indicate. MassDOT conducted a risk assessment as part of FHWA’s climate 
resilience pilots. Partners included NOAA, EPA, USGS, ACOE as well as other state and 
local agencies and NGOs. The study assessed the impacts of sea level rise and extreme 
storm events on the on the I-93 Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T). The study sought to do the 
following: 
i. Create an inventory of assets on the I-93 CA/T 
ii. Conduct vulnerability assessment of CA/T to sea level rise and extreme storms  
iii. Identify adaptation strategies to reduce vulnerabilities 
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MassDOT learned some lessons from the study that can inform future analyses. First, the 
study team encountered some GIS-related challenges. This ranged from data 
incompatibility to finding staff with sufficient GIS expertise (FHWA, 2017). The study 
team also found that site visits used to supplement digital datasets yielded more robust data 
for the analysis, and buy-in from a range of MassDOT staff. Lastly, the team used asset 
identifiers that were consistent with MassDOT’s asset management database. This will 
enable the team integrate results from the vulnerability assessment to the agency’s asset 
management database, providing useful information for future investment decisions 
(FHWA, 2017).  
Next steps for the agency include reviewing and sharing the assessment’s findings with 
some MassDOT district staff and the City of Boston, and assessing engineering feasibility 
of the identified adaptation strategies. The team also intends to update emergency response 
procedures for the CA/T. According to the survey response, conducting the vulnerability 
study is causing a gradual change in the agency’s general decision-making approach.  
3.4.5.2.3 Financial Capital  
At MassDOT, there is no specific budget for resilience enhancement. Funding resilience 
strategies are currently done on a case-by-case basis. That is, resilience considerations are 
either considered during design or when a specific need arises. Consequently, the agency 
uses a risk-based approach during project prioritization to ensure resilience. The two 
factors currently in use are (1) proximity to coast and (2) locations that routinely flood.  
Repairs, renewal and recovery of assets affected during disruptive events are funded by 
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disaster declarations. Lastly, Mr. Miller stated that insurance underwriters are currently 
interested in how assets can be protected from damage.  
 Summary  
MassDOT shows several examples of what it looks like to institutionalize resilience 
thinking in an agency and evolution towards a sociotechnical approach. Firstly, champion 
efforts and political will at the agency seem to provide an environment where resilience 
enhancing strategies can be developed. For example, the agency is progressively working 
to understand how inland and coastal flooding can inform its asset management program. 
The agency already flags flood prone locations for design considerations and maintenance 
activities. We also see progress in resilience thinking as the agency is learning about ways 
it can harness various types of tools for climate planning. Although, resilience 
considerations are not yet explicitly addressed in planning documents, progress in this area 
seems to only be a factor of time. Next, by using asset identifiers that are consistent with 
the agency’s current asset management database in conducting the agency’s climate 
vulnerability assessment, the study team created the means for the study results to be 
integrated into management practices. The intentionality of this approach shows a higher 
likelihood of using such risk-based approaches to inform future investment decisions. 
Lastly, MassDOT seems to have moved more rapidly to incorporate resilience 
considerations in their existing decision-making process by assessing flooding risk and 
SLR risk. As indicated in the survey, these efforts have been the result of the agency having 




With the practical examples of moving towards institutionalizing resilience thinking in the 
agency, MassDOT could further move this progress along by starting to incorporate such 
actions into planning documents. Using existing processes such as the long range plan, 
asset management plan, and the transportation improvement plan can help the agency to 
strategically address different types of capital in its resilience capacity building and rely 
less on efforts of resilience champions within the agency. 
 
 Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and the Association of Bay 
Area Governments (ABAG) 
 Background 
Located in northern California, the San Francisco Bay Area is a nine-county region with a 
population of over 7 million projected to grow to 9 million by 2040. The combined 
economy of the Bay Area (i.e., Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San 
Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano and Sonoma counties) is about $300 billion making it the 21st 
largest economy in the world (MTC, 2013). Correspondingly, the area encompasses the 
major metropolitan areas San Jose, San Francisco and Oakland.  
The Bay Area’s roadway system consists of 620 miles of freeways, 800 miles of state 
highways, and 1900 centerline miles of local roadways that are maintained by the local 
governments. A history of seismic activity and a long coastline are both factors that have 
influenced the Bay Area’s posture towards transport system resilience. Main stakeholders 
involved in initiatives that focus on identifying vulnerabilities and planning for system 
risks include the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), the Metropolitan 
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Transportation Commission (MTC), the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), 
the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), and the San 
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART). These agencies collaborate at different levels 
by sharing ideas, resources and expertise to build system resilience.  
Similar to other parts of the state, the Bay Area is prone to a combination of geophysical, 
climatological and meteorological hazards. Earthquakes that have occurred in the Bay Area 
have resulted in perhaps the nation’s most destructive impacts in terms of seismic activity. 
The region has seven main fault lines, namely, the San Andreas, Calaveras, Concord-Green 
Valley, Greenville, Hayward, Rodgers Creek, and Sand Gregorio Faults. Historically, 
seismic activity in the region has followed what closely resembles a cycle of some sort. 
For example, the second half of the 19th century saw frequent earthquakes with magnitudes 
of 6.0 or higher occurring at a rate of once every four years (USGS, 2016). This was 
followed by period of low activity right after the destructive 1906 San Francisco (7.8 
magnitude) earthquake which damaged about 80% of the city and caused at least 3000 
fatalities. The Loma Prieta earthquake (6.9 magnitude) then followed this period of low 
activity about 83 years later causing 63 fatalities and about 3,000 injuries (Morrison, 2014). 
Although the frequency of seismic activity in the Bay Area has not returned to that of the 
latter 1800s, scientists believe that the stresses that continue to build could lead to more 
frequent and intense earthquakes in the future (USGS, 2016).  
The Bay Area is also prone to seal level rise. According to National Research Council 
projections, the Bay Area’s sea level could rise by 12-14 inches by 2050; and by as much 
as 36-66 inches by the end of the century (BCDC, 2016).  
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 Survey Responses. 
“Urban resilience is the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, 
and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic 
stresses and acute shocks they experience”. 
–Michael Germeraad (Rockefeller Foundation Definition) 
 
Michael Germeraad, a Resilience Planner from ABAG6, the council of regional 
governments, and Stefanie Hom, a Transportation Planner from the regional MPO, MTC, 
answered questionnaires for the Bay Area online and by phone respectively. The two 
representatives have a combined average experience of 9.5 years working with the agencies 
and while Ms. Hom’s role is not exclusively dedicated to resilience planning, Mr. 
Germeraad’s is a dedicated position. The details of their roles and position are provided in 
Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5  Details of agency representatives 
 
3.4.6.2.1 Institutional Capital 
Both respondents did not identify agency level institutional capital that affects 
transportation resilience. However, state level policies affect both agencies. The State of 
                                                 
6 ABAG is not a transportation agency and does not own transport assets. It acts a convening 
body, technical hub, and research body that supports individual and coordinated local government 
action.  
Survey Question Michael Germeraad Stefanie Hom 
Position, Agency Resilience Planner, ABAG Transportation Planner, MTC 
Years at Agency 2-5 years 6 years 
Dedicated Position  Yes No, additional responsibilities 





California has taken strategic steps over the last few years to address resilience. Executive 
Order S-13-08, which was signed in November 2008 by Governor Schwarzenegger, 
directed state agencies to develop the state’s first strategy that would identify and prepare 
for climate change impacts (CNRA, n.d.). The Executive Order also requested that a 
committee be formed by the National Research Council (NRC) to assess sea-level rise to 
assist state efforts. Also under this Executive Order, a stipulation requires a range of sea 
level rise scenarios to be used during the planning phase for all construction projects in 
areas considered to be vulnerable to sea level rise (Executive Order, 2010).   
A second initiative that has shaped California’s planning landscape is Senate Bill 375. The 
legislation became law in January 2009 with the aim of reducing GHG emissions that result 
from cars and light trucks. The legislation requires an integration of transportation, land-
use and housing planning to provide more efficient communities, reduce single-occupant-
vehicle (SOV) travel and eventually reduce GHG emissions (SCAG, n.d.). California’s 
work on emissions reductions and development of the Climate Adaptation Strategy are 
coordinated by the state’s Climate Action Team. The team’s membership comprises 
secretaries of state agencies, heads of agency boards and departments, and is led by the 
California EPA Secretary. 
3.4.6.2.2 Organizational Capital 
Questions in this section sought to understand the agencies’ general approaches to building 
resilience covering the human capital available as well as business processes and practices. 
Michael Germeraad is part of a team which grew from having one member to five over the 
past five years. Mr. Germeraad’s position is solely dedicated to resilience planning, but his 
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teammates have additional responsibilities at the agency. According to the survey 
responses, the resilience team’s growth has legitimized resilience efforts to an extent, 
making it “become more integrated into the overall agency decision making process.” 
(Germeraad, 2016). This has also provided more exposure and resources from the senior 
leadership within the agency.  
In addition to growth in human capital (i.e., the resilience team), ABAG’s approach to 
system resilience has also seen an evolution because of a greater understanding of system 
resilience. According to Mr. Germeraad, the program was best described as a hazard 
mitigation program that focused on addressing acute shocks. However, over the last five 
years, the program has become more integrated by building various partnerships. This has 
provided greater connectivity within regional business lines and allowed them to better 
address urban resilience, i.e., housing affordability, equity, sustainability, and economic 
development, among others.   
 
For us being resilient means being able to better respond to acute shocks and chronic 
stresses and to transform following a disruption. People should be able to still get where 
they need to go – Stefanie Hom, MTC 
 
At the MTC7, initiatives related to system resilience are carried out by transportation 
planners. This is not uncommon. As with several other transportation agencies, there is no 
dedicated role for resilience planning. According to Ms. Hom, resilience initiatives at MTC 
started gaining traction about 3-4 years ago, with the start of the climate initiative program. 
                                                 
7 The MTC is currently in the process of merging with ABAG, therefore questions remain about 
MTC’s future role in resilience. At the same time, due to maturity of the resilience topic within 
ABAG, the new merged agency structure will be influenced. 
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This mainly involved mitigation initiatives such as demand management, car sharing, and 
shuttle services that were aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
Currently, neither of the two agencies have direct policies, regulations, or strategic 
objectives that promote transport system resilience. Even so, ABAG is working towards 
strategically addressing resilience and has begun with the agency mission statement: "The 
ABAG Planning and Research Department works with local governments and stakeholders 
to develop and implement innovative solutions for issues involving land use planning, 
housing, transportation, environmental climate change, earthquakes and disaster 
resilience, and economic equity." In addition, a significant portion of ABAG’s work relates 
to policy dissemination at the local level. The agency therefore tracks jurisdictions that 
adopt resilience related policies. Despite the lack of strategic planning documents for 
resilience at ABAG and the MTC, California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) has 
begun to strategically plan for resilience. A survey response from Caltrans was not 
received; however, a literature search revealed information about Caltrans’ strategic 
approach to resilience.  
The Caltrans Strategic Management Plan for 2015-2020 has a strategic objective to 
“improve economic prosperity of the State and local communities through a resilient and 
integrated transportation system” (Caltrans, 2015). One of the stated performance 
measures for this objective is a Resiliency Score which is to be developed and adopted by 
the December 2017. The score comprises three components:  
 Climate change resiliency (e.g., sea level rise and flood vulnerability) 
 System resiliency (e.g., adaptability during emergencies and disasters) 
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 Financial resiliency (e.g., “ensure funding considering maintenance, operations, 
modernization, disasters, financial stability, etc.”) (Caltrans, 2015). 
The Caltrans plan is another example that shows how transportation agencies are giving 
systematic thought to how transport resilience can be viewed using a multidimensional 
perspective. 
In terms of collaboration, both ABAG and the MTC have collaborated to different extents 
with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX, U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS), Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) and others. In 
addition, ABAG has a strategic partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 
Resilience Cities, an initiative to “help cities around the world become more resilient to 
the physical, social, and economic challenges that are a growing part of the 21st century” 
(“100 Resilient Cities”, 2017). 
3.4.6.2.3 Financial Capital 
Current system resilience efforts at ABAG are funded almost entirely by grants. The team 
actively searches for grants to fund regional work. They also provide resources for partner 
cities that need to make the case to decision makers for funding. Similarly, MTC’s 
initiatives are also grant funded with sources included the BCDC, Caltrans, FHWA and a 
local regional fund.   
3.4.6.2.4 Technical Capital 
According to the survey results, the Bay Area has experienced at least eight natural 
disasters in the last three decades that resulted in at least one of the following: ten or more 
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people were reported killed, 100 or more were people affected, a declaration of a state of 
emergency or a call for international assistance was issued. At least one of these events 
happened within the last decade (2006-2016) and three in the decade before that (i.e. 1996-
2005). In light of this, some risk/vulnerability assessment have been conducted to assess 
climate change related impacts. Both ABAG and the MTC have worked with strategic 
partners including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the California 
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), 
and the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) to consider highway, railway 
and bridge assets. The region was a part of FHWA’s 2010-2011Climate Change 
Vulnerability Assessment Pilot Project and the 2013-2015 Climate Resilience Pilot 
Program. The MTC was among the first round of vulnerability assessment pilots conducted 
by FHWA because of the Adapting to Rising Tides (ART) initiative already being 
conducted in the region by the BCDC and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Coastal Services Center. The MTC, CalTrans, and BCDC then 
joined FHWA’s efforts to conduct a vulnerability and risk assessment as part of ART.  
The project was conducted in Alameda County, one of the region’s eight counties with an 
objective to “enable the Bay Area’s transportation planners to craft effective adaptation 
strategies based on improved vulnerability and risk assessment practices, and to deploy and 
test the FHWA conceptual model and provide FHWA with recommendations for evolving 
the model” (FHWA, n.d.). The study followed the following methodology: 
i. Refine asset inventory & sensitivity assessment  
ii. Conduct seismic vulnerability assessment  
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iii. Develop inundation maps 
iv. Assess vulnerability 
v. Assess risk 
vi. Develop risk profiles 
vii. Review adaptation options 
In terms of considering interdependencies in the studies conducted, ABAG leveraged 
resources from a report on the San Francisco’s lifeline infrastructure. This report, created 
for earthquake resilience, qualitatively discusses the connections between 11 infrastructure 
systems: water and wastewater, electric power, natural gas, telecommunications, highways 
and roads, ports and waterways, transit systems and railroads (Barkley, 2009).  
The vulnerability assessment produced some lessons for the agencies involved. First, the 
study team had problems identifying relevant data and deciding on the most useful formats 
for analyses. The team also encountered problems with data disparities between study sites. 
While some areas had enough data, other less studied areas did not and resulted in less in-
depth analyses along various stages of the project (Caltrans, 2014). Another useful lesson 
learned was that the study did not produce any surprises in terms of asset vulnerabilities. 
The results mostly matched information gathered from maintenance staff and other 
stakeholders. Therefore, for areas where vulnerabilities are well understood, more value 
may be obtained from conducting site specific or asset specific assessments. Lastly, the 
entire study involved significant public engagement, especially for identifying possible 
adaptation strategies. This was necessary to cater to the various stakeholders affected by 




The Bay Area agencies are an example of how resiliency efforts within an agency evolve 
over time as a result of increase in institutional capital. The survey responses explicitly 
highlight the role of SB 375 in spurring action towards climate change mitigation. At MTC, 
the travel demand mitigation program focused on emissions reduction directly evolved to 
include sea level rise adaptation efforts. At ABAG, work previously solely focused on 
hazard mitigation (specifically, earthquake hazards) evolved over time to become an 
integrated resilience program. For ABAG, this was a result of a greater understanding of 
system resilience. We see here that also this led to greater investments into resilience 
capacity building as the agency increased its resilience staff over the five-year period.  
Now, although Caltrans was not included in the survey responses, the brief agency review 
shows the use of a strategic approach (i.e., identifying objectives and associated 
performance measures) in its resilience efforts. Also, the collaboration between ABAG, 
MTC and Caltrans (including FHWA, BCDC, etc.) to conduct vulnerability studies within 
the San Francisco Bay Area show resulted in interesting insights. Specifically, the use of 
public and stakeholder engagement to identify adaptation strategies for the vulnerabilities 
identified shows a commitment to understand how adapting vulnerable infrastructure will 
affect the surrounding communities. 
Considering the number of major transport system disruptions indicated in the survey 
response, California’s history with catastrophic earthquakes, as well as the growing 
understanding of potential climate change impacts in the region, the level of organizational 
and institutional capital developed alongside progress in technical capital among the 
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California agencies supports the notion that agencies with more experience dealing with 
hazards evolve towards sociotechnical approaches.  
 
 New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (NORPC) 
 Background 
The City of New Orleans has a 2014 population of 384,320 forming 83% of its pre-Katrina 
population (City of New Orleans, 2015). Current identified threats include floods, storm 
surge coastal erosion, subsidence, winter storms, extreme temperatures, tornadoes, and 
tropical cyclones among others. In addition, New Orleans is vulnerable to sea level rise of 
as much as 4.3 feet by the year 2100, the highest estimate anywhere in the world (City of 
New Orleans, 2015). 
 Survey Responses 
 
“I think of a system that can bounce back from acute disasters (hurricanes) and that can 
deal with gradual stresses (sea level rise)” – Meredith Soniat, NORPC 
 
Meredith Soniat responded to the survey for the New Orleans region. She is a Sustainability 
Planner at the New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (NORPC), the MPO for the 
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Tammany and Tangipahoa parishes. 
Hurricane Katrina was a landmark disaster that the City of New Orleans is still trying to 
learn from. One important fact is that the recovery process changed the way the agency 
addresses system resilience. According to Ms. Soniat, it caused the agency to become better 
aware of threats to the city and propelled a greater understanding of system resilience.  
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3.4.7.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital 
Meredith Soniat has been at the agency for more than five years and is currently part of a 
team of two that leads resiliency efforts at the agency. They however have additional 
responsibilities at the agency. At the moment, NORPC does not have any strategic goals 
or objectives for enhancing system resilience.  When asked about agency policies that 
promote resilience, the agency representative referred to the agency’s complete streets 
policy. The policy requires projects to be evaluated for the inclusion of bicycle and 
pedestrian facilities, and also to be evaluated for the incorporation of green infrastructure. 
Furthermore, Ms. Soniat stated that the FAST Act’s provisions for resilience in general 
transportation planning may encourage a broader incorporation of green infrastructure 
projects. In terms of project prioritization, a “yes” or “no” classification for environmental 
sustainability is used for projects included in the agency’s plans. Furthermore, anecdotal 
evidence of resilience consideration during project prioritization alluded to a case-by-case 
consideration for projects. For example, when the city’s Interstate 10 highway flooded after 
an extreme event, roadway elevation became a priority for that segment of highway.  
Next, the survey also sought to understand how the agency’s resilience efforts fit into state 
level efforts. According to the survey response, NORPC directly works with cities for 
policy implementation. Once a policy is successful, the agency can recommend it to be 
incorporated into state-level plans. For example, the City of New Orleans recently 
developed a draft green infrastructure toolkit, including typical details for certain green 
infrastructure treatments. The agency representative is now working to share those details 
with the state and to receive feedback for next steps. In terms of collaboration, the New 
Orleans Water Collaborative has been a helpful partner in the NORPC’s resilience building 
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efforts. The agency also participates in the development of a FEMA Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. 
3.4.7.2.2 Technical Capital  
Based on the survey responses, NORPC has not yet been involved in any assessments 
involving vulnerability or risk of the transportation system. However, there is a focus on 
combining green and gray infrastructure in storm water management as a means of 
accommodating changing weather patterns. According to the survey responses, “living 
with water” is now a common jargon in discussing storm water issues.  
Again, the City of New Orleans is a participant in the Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient 
Cities initiative, which has conducted a preliminary resilience assessment of the city. As 
part of this assessment, a high-level overview of the region’s critical transport components 
is presented including rail, ports and bridges. Similarly, the New Orleans Hazard 
Mitigation Plan mainly focuses on the transport of hazardous materials and how to mitigate 
consequences of accidents. Neither plans discuss in-depth transport system vulnerabilities 
and strategies for enhancing transport resilience.  
3.4.7.2.3 Financial Capital   
The NORPC is a planning agency and therefore does not own any assets. However, like 
other agencies, funding programs or initiatives specifically directed at building resilience 
are an issue currently being overcome by coordinating with agencies such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP), and the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA).  
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The HMGP is a grant program run from the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security & 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) which funds hazard mitigation measures proposed 
by Local Governments, Tribal Agency, State Agencies, Private Nonprofits and individuals. 
However, individuals must submit applications through a local agency. Applications for 
HMGP funds can only be submitted within 12 months of a Presidentially declared disaster 
and funding is dependent on the total amount of assistance to be made available by FEMA 
for disaster recovery (GOHSEP, 2017).  
Unlike HMGP, CPRA is a not a grant program. it is a state entity established as the only 
agency with the “mandate to develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive coastal 
protection and restoration Master Plan” for Louisiana’s coast. The agency collaborates with 
both the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) and the Department of 
Natural Resources among others to work on an integrated approach to coastal restoration 
and hurricane protection (CPRA, 2013).  
 Summary  
In summary, the New Orleans region has suffered from the devastating impacts of 
hurricanes in the past and is working towards resilience. From this review however, the 
focus of transportation planning initiatives seem focused on sustainability initiatives. 
Although such efforts contribute to resilience capacity building, more strategic efforts 
towards building the system’s resilience capacity could be beneficial. More collaboration 
between the MPO and the numerous ongoing efforts in other sectors such as housing, and 
business development, could lead to the development of strategies with co-benefits in 
multiple sectors.    
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Other insights gleaned from the survey responses relate to identification of measures of 
effectiveness and harnessing existing agency technology. Currently, the agency seems to 
implicitly measure resilience using rapidity factors. That is, the survey response stated that 
resilience is addressed by how quickly roads can be reopened or electricity turned back on. 
Since the two factors have been identified, officially recognizing them as measures of 
effectiveness and getting them into standard operating procedures is key. This may prevent 
reliance on common sense judgement during disruptions. Next, the benefits of existing 
agency technology can be harnessed for preliminary transport resilience planning. After 
Hurricane Katrina, GIS was used to identify signal locations and overlay them with 
information of city locations that were inundated enabling the agency to focus efforts on 
restoring power and function to signals in unflooded areas. This example shows that 
capability exists to conduct preliminary vulnerability assessments of the city’s transport 
infrastructure. The key would be to identify and partner with entities that can provide 
technical support for modelling various system threats.    
 
 North Central Texas Council of Governments (NCTCOG) 
 Background 
The NCTCOG serves as the MPO for a 16-county region that includes Dallas and Fort-
Worth, the main urban centers. The region’s population is 6.5 million and is expected to 
grow to 10 million by 2035 (NCTCOG, 2016). To set the transportation policy for the 
region, the MPO has an independent body called the Regional Transportation Council 
(RTC). Some of the RTC’s primary duties include developing transportation plans and 
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programs as well as allocating federal, state and regional transportation funds (“Regional 
Transportation Council”, 2016). 
 Survey responses 
 
A resilient system is one that “has the ability to function efficiently when dealing with 
extreme events.”- Jory Dille, NCTCOG 
 
Survey responses were filled Jory Dille, a Senior Transportation Planner at the North 
Central Texas Council of Governments (NCTCOG). Mr. Dille has been at the agency 
between five to ten years and works with three other employees as part of a team that work 
on resiliency efforts in addition to other responsibilities. According to the survey response, 
the agency has become better aware of threats facing their system and have also developed 
a greater understanding of system resilience. Over the last decade, the agency has 
experienced a change in the way it addresses resilience; there is now more focus on asset 
management.  
3.4.8.2.1 Institutional and Organizational Capital  
According to the survey results, NCTCOG does not have policies or regulations that 
promote transport resilience; nonetheless, the agency responses indicate a strategic 
objective for addressing resilience. Although a specific resilience objective for the 
NCTCOG was not stated in the survey response and could not be identified through a 
review of the agency’s current long range plan or strategic plan, evidence of some 
resilience capacity building was present was found. In an early effort to evaluate the MPO’s 
planning efforts NCTCOG used the Infrastructure Voluntary Evaluation Sustainability 
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Tool (INVEST) developed by FHWA to score one of its former long-range plans, Mobility 
2035. This produced results highlighting opportunities for growth in areas including asset 
management and infrastructure resilience. The current transportation plan, Mobility 2040, 
acknowledges these opportunities and alludes to progress in resilience building, but no 
explicit evidence of this is found in the plan (progress in asset management is clearly 
identified) (NCTCOG, 2016).  
Lastly, with regard to the FAST Act, the agency hopes that the law’s provisions for 
resilience will prompt agencies to use a more performance based approach to planning.   
3.4.8.2.2 Technical Capital 
In reviewing literature NCTCOG literature, three attributes stood out in terms of technical 
capital that can enhance system resilience. First, NCTCOG has been making systematic 
progress towards adopting asset management principles in its project planning. The 
agency’s Capital/Operations Asset Management (Cap-Main) program combines these 
principles with a strategic design and performance-oriented approach for planning corridor 
improvements (NCTCOG, 2016). As of now, there’s no evidence of resilience 
considerations in this process, but its presence can enhance the agency’s capacity towards 
developing a data-driven approach for resilience planning. 
Secondly, NCTCOG has well developed Geographic Information Systems (GIS) program 
that promotes the cooperation of GIS professional within its jurisdiction. The agency 
organizes bi-annual meetings that bring major stakeholders (e.g., universities, local 
governments) within the region and GIS market together (e.g., data vendors). The 
collaboration also enables interested parties within the region to pool funds for purchasing 
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high-quality data. Access to this kind of technical expertise and data both within the agency 
and through its collaborators creates many opportunities for the agency to incorporate risk 
data (e.g., downscaled climate projections) into project planning.     
Finally, NCTCOG conducted a vulnerability study that concluded in 2015 with funding 
from the FHWA and support from the City of Dallas, Fort Worth Transportation Authority 
and the University of Texas at Arlington. The study the vulnerability of regional 
transportation assets (roads, passenger rail, airports) to extreme heat, rainfall and flooding, 
drought, and the urban heat island effect. The objectives of the study were to: 
 “Assess and categorize vulnerabilities of vital transportation assets. 
 Determine potential effects of impacted segments or facilities on asset 
performance, mobility, economy, and quality of life. 
 Develop and pilot an assessment process that can be replicated throughout the 
NCTCOG region, Texas, and in other Great Plains States that experience similar 
climatic, geologic, and hydrologic conditions” (FHWA, 2016a). 
The main findings from the study showed the potential of road, rail and airport assets to 
damage from extreme heat and flooding. These includes an increase in mean August 
temperatures to highs of 94 degrees Fahrenheit and daily extremes that could exceed 120 
degrees Fahrenheit. The study also revealed an increase of about 40% in severe 
thunderstorms occurring in the spring. The resulting potential transportation impacts 
include inundation of 636 miles of roadway by a 100-year flood, with 17 of those miles 
classified as critical and estimated to reach 44 miles by 2035 (FHWA, 2016a).  
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Following this study, the agency hopes to integrate the findings into its planning process. 
Specifically, to incorporate vulnerability into project development and prioritization to 
inform subsequent transportation plans. It also plans using such climate projects to inform 
asset management (FHWA, 2016a).  
3.4.8.2.3 Financial Capital  
The survey results yielded little information about the financial processes involved with 
resilience capacity building. Similar to many other agencies, NCTCOG has not yet 
identified a systematic way of funding resilience strategies. Consequently, resilience is not 
considered in project prioritization or selection.  
3.4.8.2.4 Summary  
NCTCOG is in the early stages building sociotechnical transport resilience. The survey 
responses show much room for growth in all four capital areas. However, in the short term, 
the low hanging fruit for enhancing resilience capacity is to take advantage of the agency’s 
existing technical capital and to work outwards from there. In particular, NCTCOG has an 
opportunity to build on its Cap-Main and GIS programs. Although system risks (such as 
those resulting from extreme weather or climate change) are not explicitly incorporated 
into NCTGOC’s Cap-Main process, the systematic nature of the process combined with 
the use of good data for corridor planning, provides a ripe opportunity for extension to 
include resilience considerations. Furthermore, the agency’s strength in GIS applications 




 Oregon DOT 
 Background 
Oregon DOT owns and maintains over 8,044 miles of state highway and about 2,666 
bridges. The agency also supports and provides funding to transit agencies, and oversees 
(to a limited extent) the state’s railroads (Oregon DOT, 2009). In the last decade, ODOT 
has experienced two major disasters and at least eight in the preceding two decades (1986 
- 1996) before that.  
The survey for ODOT was filled by Bruce Johnson, a State Bridge Engineer, who has 
worked at the agency for over 10 years. According to Mr. Johnson, the most significant 
change at the agency that affects system resilience is in seismic functional design for 
bridges. 
 Survey Responses 
3.4.9.2.1  Institutional and Organizational Capital 
 
“Resilience means the transportation system would be usable by emergency responders 
and the public within 72 hours after a major event.” – Bruce Johnson, ODOT 
 
In April 2011, the State of Oregon adopted House Resolution 3. This directed the Oregon 
Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC) to “to lead and coordinate 
preparation of an Oregon Resilience Plan that reviews policy options … and makes 
recommendations on policy direction to protect lives and keep commerce flowing during 
and after a Cascadia earthquake and tsunami” (“Oregon Resilience”, 2013a). The decision 
led the OSSPAC to set up eight task groups focused on assessing the infrastructure impacts 
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of a 9.0 Cascadia earthquake, defining acceptable timeframes for service restoration, and 
recommending strategies (to be implemented within the next 50 years), including policy 
options, required to achieve those resilience targets. The eight task groups cover 
transportation, water and waste water, energy, critical/essential buildings, information and 
communications, business and work force continuity, coastal communities, and a 
magnitude 9.0 earthquake/tsunami scenario review group. The final plan released in 2013 
was a result of 169 volunteers, no extra funding and a one-year schedule.  
The Transportation Task Group for the Oregon Resilience Plan was led by Mr. Bruce 
Johnson from Oregon DOT. The established resilience goal for the transportation network 
is to “facilitate immediate emergency response, including permitting personnel to access 
critical areas and allowing the delivery of supplies, and … to restore general mobility 
within specified time periods for various areas of the state” (“Oregon Resilience”, 2013b). 
The Group, tasked with assessing the resilience levels for highways, rail, airport, water 
ports and transit, followed the set objectives from the OSSPAC.  
In terms of ODOT specific capital, the agency has a design policy that contributes towards 
overall capacity. This is the Seismic Functional Design Criteria, which focuses on the 
physical robustness of the agency’s infrastructure. ODOT also coordinates the 
development of an Emergency Management Plan for the state. With regard to other 
organizational capital, ODOT does not have specific strategic objectives for addressing 
system resilience; however, since the DOT oversees the setting of the state’s highway 
resilience policy, progress in this area may be reviewed to an extent by following updates 
on the Oregon Resilience Plan. ODOT may benefit from formally integrating its State 
Resilience Plan involvement with its agency strategic plan. This will allow for better 
130 
 
monitoring and accountability of progress. Lastly, the agency collaborates with the state’s 
Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI). 
3.4.9.2.2 Technical Capital 
As stated earlier, Bruce Johnson from Oregon DOT led the Transportation Task Group, 
which conducted vulnerability studies for the Oregon Resilience Plan. Analyses that 
covered highway and bridge assets provided more details on impacts of earthquakes and 
land/mudslides than it did for other modes such as rail, airports and water ports. The 
assessment also looked at interdependencies between transportation, liquid fuel and 
communication. Partners for this study included USCG, Department of Aviation, local 
agencies, consultants and the state rail/transit division.  
The vulnerability assessments conducted were based on technical studies where possible. 
In the absence of such information, analyses were based on engineering judgement based 
on factors including construction year, seismic code at time of design and construction, 
conditions assessment and a resilience performance comparison of similar facilities in other 
areas (or parts of the world) (“Oregon Resilience”, 2013b). For the highway network, a 
detailed assessment of the state’s highway network was conducted, highlighting potential 
earthquake impacts to critical corridors and road segments. The group also established 
resilience targets at three levels and prioritized facilities into tiers. Figure 3.6 shows the 
highway priority levels and overall resilience targets used in the vulnerability assessments.  
A detailed analysis for the rail network has not yet been conducted and securing funding 
for a possible analysis in the future would be problematic because the rail lines are privately 
owned. The study team therefore made generalizations about possible impacts based on 
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experiences from other regions. At the end of the state-led effort however, the Task Group 
recommended that detailed vulnerability studies and gap analyses be conducted for rail and 
air transportation, and river and coastal ports. Figure 3.7 shows part of the results section 
from Oregon DOT’s vulnerability assessment. 
 
Figure 3.6  Oregon Resilience Plan Transportation Targets 
Oregon DOT also conducted a second regional vulnerability assessment and adaptation 
options study of climate change and extreme weather impacts on certain highway corridors. 
Hazards included in the assessment included landslides, coastal erosion, and storm surge. 
The study was partly funded by the FHWA. Other partners included the following: 
 Oregon State University (OSU)  
 Oregon Climate Change Research Institute 
 Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI)  
 Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD)  
 Other local partners and stakeholder  
Highway Priority
•Tier 1 - Backbone system, i.e., access to 
vulnerable regions, major population 
centersm vital areas for rescue & recovery 
operations
•Tier 2 - Larger network, i.e., access to most 
urban areas & major commercial operations 
•Tier 3 - More complete transport network
Resilience Targets
•Minimal - for use by emergency responders, 
repair crews, vehicles transporting food & 
critical supplies
•Functional - Not yet full capacity, some 
restrictions, but enables economic services, 
e.g., some freight traffic
•Operational - up to 90% capactiy restored, 
level of service fully restored, allows school 
and work trips 
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Like other FHWA funded vulnerability studies, the assessment was guided by FHWA’s 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework. The study involved about 300 miles of highway and 
proceeded using the following steps:  
 “Analysis of projected climate changes and sea level rise 
 Qualitative assessment of vulnerabilities and risks from climate impacts, 
 Baseline data collection and adaptation strategies developed for high-risk sites, 
 Benefit-cost analysis, and, 
 Review of regulatory constraints” (FHWA, 2014). 
 
By the end of the study, assessment results showed that nearly all ODOT routes identified 
as vital for emergency response and economic activity, i.e., Lifeline Routes, are vulnerable 
to projected climate change impacts (FHWA, 2014). The study team also identified 
regulatory constraints (e.g., standards and permit applications with multiple agencies) that 
would make adapting coastal infrastructure difficult. The main risk identified is the 
possibility of ODOT taking the path of least resistance, which may not always be the best 





Figure 3.7  Sample output from Oregon DOT vulnerability assessment. (Source: 
“Oregon Resilience”, 2013b) 
 
3.4.9.2.3 Financial Capital 
Currently, the agency does not have funding to promote resilience initiatives; however, a 
long-term funding plan for resilience considerations has been prepared and is waiting on 
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approval from the legislature. As stated earlier, the earthquake vulnerability study was 
conducted using volunteer hours, and the climate change impacts study was funded by 
FHWA.  
 Summary 
In summary, we see that the nature and type of threats faced by Oregon has created a 
general sense of awareness resulting in state-led resilience efforts. We also see that this 
awareness as well as previous disruptive events have caused ODOT to make actual changes 
in its functional and operational seismic design standards. The agency has also taken steps 
outside state-led efforts to conduct a vulnerability and risk analysis of climate impacts to 
its system. This study went beyond only identifying impacts and subsequent adaptation 
strategies by also identifying possible regulatory constraints that may be encountered 
during the implementation of physical adaptation features to coastal infrastructure. This 
feature shows a movement towards strategically identifying factors beyond those that 
directly affect physical infrastructure and hence show evidence of movement toward a 
sociotechnical approach. 
 
 Synthesis of Case Studies: Summary of Strengths, Weaknesses, Threats and 
Opportunities  
 Institutional Capital 
From the analysis of the survey results, we form a picture of practices and approaches being 
used at some specific agencies. Two categories emerge that may be used to describe the 
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posture of cases analyzed. Agencies in the first category of cases have a proactive posture. 
Such agencies have some form of institutional capital, whether at the state, regional or local 
level, to promote resilience. The second category have a reactive posture. Particularly, 
these agencies try to take advantage of crises to make changes that increase resilience 
capacity. According to Kingdon (1995), Windows of opportunity become available when 
“... a problem is recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes the time 
right for change, and the constraints do not prohibit actions”. From the results of the survey, 
all but three agencies (Maryland, Texas, and California) referred to an impact of a 
catastrophic event as the main reason for the change in their agency’s approach to 
resilience.   
 Maryland’s Executive Orders and Legislation 
Of the three agencies that did not cite the “impact of a catastrophic event” as a reason for 
the agency’s current trajectory in terms of resilience capacity building, two have some form 
of state-level institutional capital directed at greater system resilience. The State of 
Maryland in May 2015 passed a House Bill 514 which expanded the Maryland 
Commission on Climate Change (MDCCC) and further solidified its role as a state entity. 
The legislation was not born overnight. On the contrary, it a result of Maryland’s steady 
and consistent action in response to climate change mitigation and adaptation. The 
commission was first established in 2007 by Governor O’Malley to develop the state’s 
Climate Action Plan that would provide advice on climate change mitigation and adaption. 
This was followed by an Executive Order (EO) in 2012 that directed state agencies to 
consider the risks of coastal flooding and sea level rise in the design of capital projects. 
Specifically, the EO calls for the Department of General Services (DGS) to update 
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architectural and engineering that govern state structure (both new and rebuilt structures). 
The DGS’ order is prescriptive and requires state structures to be two or more feet above 
the 100-year base flood level (Georgetown Climate Center, 2013). In addition, the 2012 
mandate calls for the Department of Natural Resources in collaboration with the MDCCC, 
local governments and other agencies to develop citing and construction guidelines for new 
and rebuilt state structures including public infrastructure improvements such as roads, 
bridges, and sewer systems (Georgetown Climate Center, 2013). Later in 2014, Governor 
O’Malley issued another EO which strengthened the MDCCC and subsequently led to the 
2015 legislation (Executive Order 01.01.2014.14, n.d.). The bill requires annual reporting 
of climate change resilience. It also requires state agencies to review planning, regulatory, 
and fiscal programs in order to identify strategies that enable integration of greenhouse gas 
goals and climate change impacts including sea level rise, storm surge, and flooding, 
increased precipitation and temperature, and extreme weather events. Thus, the Maryland 
State Highway Administration’s (and Maryland DOT) work towards increasing 
transportation system resilience was born out of state-level institutional capital. It should 
however, be noted that the legislation does not provide any funding towards the State 
Highway Administration’s initiatives. Agencies are expected to work within their current 




Figure 3.8  Timeline highlighting the development of Maryland's institutional 
capital for climate change resilience 
 
 California’s Executive Orders 
Similar to Maryland, California’s progress has been marked by consistent efforts in 
building state-level institutional capital. California has a number of Executive Orders 
related to climate change albeit focused on mitigation. The two Executive Orders that go 
beyond GHG mitigation are EO s-3-05 (in 2005) and EO s- 13-08 (in 2008), both signed 
by Governor Schwarzenegger (California Climate Change, 2011). The earlier EO signed 
in 2005 focuses more on emissions reduction by setting GHG targets although it also calls 
for the preparation of a plan that addresses mitigation and adaptation strategies for impacts 
on public health, water supply, agriculture, coastline, forestry, etc. It does not specifically 
call out transportation infrastructure.  
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The second EO that incorporates adaptation signed in 2008 more specifically calls out 
transportation infrastructure by requiring the preparation of a report that outlines sea level 
rise (SLR) vulnerability and an adaptation strategy to those impacts. It also calls for 
guidance on land-use planning for SLR and other climate change impacts. Furthermore, 
the EO more broadly requires all state agencies to consider infrastructure vulnerability to 
SLR, assess and attempt to reduce expected risks, and increase resilience during the 
planning phase for construction projects being planned in areas vulnerable to SLR. It is 
worth noting though that provisions are made in Executive Order s-13-08 for projects with 
Notices of Preparation already filed, routine maintenance projects, or those that were 
already programmed for construction funding for the five years following the Order 
(California Climate Change, 2011). California Climate Adaptation Strategy was finalized 
in 2009 and a subsequent update was released in 2014.  
 Massachusetts’ Executive Order  
Incidentally, Massachusetts is a state that both selected “impact of catastrophic event” as 
the reason for the DOT’s current work in resilience, and also has a state Executive Order 
for establishing a climate change strategy. Executive Order 569, signed in September 2016 
by Governor Baker, has many similarities to those of California and Maryland. In addition, 
however, it calls for proactive efforts by state agencies/authorities, municipalities, and 
regional planning agencies to use adaptation and resiliency measures to address the impacts 
of climate change. This includes providing guidance for changes needed in current plans, 
by-laws, regulations and policies (Executive Order 569, 2016). Furthermore, the EO 
requires that efforts towards this end define “clear goals, expected outcomes, and a path to 
achieving results” (Executive Order 569, 2016). The final distinguishing element of 
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Massachusetts’ EO as compared to the others is that the EO requires a Climate Change 
Coordinator to be designated by each Executive Office Secretary. This individual is to be 
an existing employee of the secretariat and is to serve as the point of contact for all 
mitigation, adaptation and resiliency efforts. The Coordinator is to assist in the 
development of the state’s Climate Adaptation Plan; conduct a vulnerability assessment of 
assets to climate change and extreme weather for the respective Executive Office and for 
each agency within that Executive Office (within two years of the Order); identify 
adaptation strategies; and finally, incorporate those results into “existing policies and plans 
for the Executive Office and its agencies” (Executive Order 569, 2016). 
The strength of this EO is in its prescriptive nature. By requiring a designated role, stated 
goals, outcomes and strategies, and specifying a timeline for some of the required activities, 
state agencies are provided with a clear direction of steps to follow in the process. 
Nonetheless, the Order still provides agencies ample room for creativity and innovation 
during implementation.  
 Linkages between Windows of Opportunity and Deliberate Transformations 
The three states, Maryland, California, and Massachusetts provide examples of how 
deliberate transformations in the form of state-level institutional capital can serve as a 
driver for transportation agencies to initiate proactive efforts for enhancing system 
resilience. This is not meant to detract from the fact that connections exist between and 
among states that have experienced some major disruptive events (reactive posture) and 
those that have taken proactive action towards increasing resilience (e.g., Massachusetts). 
Connections exist, but some states are still more proactive than others (e.g. Louisiana vs. 
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Massachusetts). Using the adoption of climate action plans by states as another example, 
it can be inferred from current progress that coastal states are more likely than others to 
have finalized and adopted state-level adaptation plans (Figure 3.9). While understanding 
the detailed extent of this relationship is beyond the scope of this research, it is safe to say 
that progress towards enhancing system resilience is spurred by states becoming more 
aware of threats to their systems, their vulnerabilities and the consequences of inaction. As 
can also be seen from Figure 3.98, not all states that have experienced catastrophic/major 
disruptive events have adopted adaptation plans9 (e.g., Texas, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina). Finally, although system resilience goes beyond climate change 
mitigation/emissions reduction initiatives, what these three states show is that places that 
have the existing groundwork may more readily/easily evolve into holistic resilience 
efforts/programs. 
                                                 
8 Alaska has adopted a state-level adaptation plan. Hawaii’s adaptation plan is to be completed by the end 
of 2017, however, local/regional plans exist 
9 It should also be noted that not all states that have adopted adaptation plans are successfully following 





 Organizational Capital 
Another important theme extracted from the survey results relates to the human capital, 
policies and processes within agencies for matters regarding system resilience. Firstly, with 
regards to human capital, it is understandable that not all agencies may have the necessary 
resources to have dedicated personnel. However, having an individual or group responsible 
for coordinating resilience efforts is essential during the initial stages of “resilience 
maturity” at agencies. As the resilience initiatives at agencies continue to grow, roles and 
responsibilities become institutionalized and would no longer rely on championing efforts 
by a few interested employees. A quote from the Broward MPO further explains this: “In 
several cases, the intergovernmental coordination turned out to be based on individuals 
more than on institutions. Specifically, there were agency staff on technical committees 
Figure 3.9  Map showing states in continental US that have finalized and adopted 
adaptation plans. (Source: Georgetown Climate Center, n.d.) 
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who participated based on personal interest and not on assigned roles. When these 
individuals moved to new organizations, the agencies they previously represented did not 
consistently assign replacement staff to take their places. This left us in a scramble too 
often.” In addition, practices are more easily assimilated into standard operating procedures 
when institutional learning is prioritized, which assigning roles and responsibilities does.  
Of the agencies surveyed, ABAG is the only one to have dedicated personnel for 
coordinating resilience issues. The MD SHA has a Climate Change Program Manager that 
coordinates the agency’s resiliency efforts, but this individual also has additional 
responsibilities. Iowa DOT is also in the process of forming a Resiliency and Sustainability 
Team that will formally address system resilience within the agency.  Table 3.6 sheds light 
on the various job titles for the agency personnel in charge of coordinating resilience 
efforts.      
Table 3.6  Agency titles for personnel designated to coordinate resilience efforts 
Agency Resilience Designee  
CDOT  Performance and Asset Management Branch Manager 
FDOT Growth Management Coordinator 
Iowa DOT Office Director for Location and Environment   
MDSHA Climate Change Program Manager 
MassDOT Environmental Management and Sustainability, Supervisor 
Oregon DOT State Bridge Engineer 
ABAG Resilience Planner 
MTC Transportation Planner 
NCTCOG Transportation Planner 
New Orleans  Sustainability Planner 
 
Similar to the impacts that state-level legislation and Executive Orders have on resilience 
building, is the institutional capital that agencies have in the form of policies, standards or 
regulations for agency-wide operations. Few of these were identified from the survey 
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results although some agencies had other important attributes. Strategically addressing 
resilience may provide the initial impetus for some work in this area. The survey sought to 
identify which agencies have taken a strategic approach toward enhancing system 
resilience. The responses show that agencies are at different levels in terms of resilience 
planning. For example, ABAG has no stated strategic objective, but it’s mission statement, 
“[t]he ABAG Planning and Research Department works with local governments and 
stakeholders to develop and implement innovative solutions for issues involving land use 
planning, housing, transportation, environmental climate change, earthquakes and 
disaster resilience, and economic equity,” alludes to the agency’s commitment to the Bay 
Area’s resilience (ABAG, 2014). There is therefore an opportunity to align the mission 
with strategic goals, objectives, performance measures, decision criteria and other elements 
within the planning and decision-making process to strengthen resilience building capacity. 
On the other hand, the Florida Transportation Plan, which covers all modes of 
transportation, provides a goal and supporting objectives for achieving “agile, resilient and 
quality transportation infrastructure” (FDOT, 2015). The listed objectives are followed by 
emphasis areas for achieving the stated objectives. Lastly, three indicators are selected for 
this objective: bridge, pavement and other infrastructure condition. This plan serves as a 
good example for ways in which resilience thinking can be incorporated into strategic 
planning. That is (1) identifying a clear goal, (2) selecting objectives to follow through 
with, and (3) identifying indicators to measure progress. The first two steps form the 
visioning process of the performance-based planning process, but opportunities also exist 
to improve plan effectiveness and system performance by also incorporating feedback 
mechanisms. This consists of setting targets, tracking progress and reporting successes. 
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Not clearly articulating the three processes (target setting, tracking, and reporting) in the 
FTP or alluding to them could prevent consistent and systematic progress.  
The Caltrans Strategic Management Plan for 2015-2020 is another example of how 
resilience can be considered strategically and also offers evidence of how understanding 
the nature and severity of threats (in this case climate change impacts) influences the 
urgency to action and nature of approach used. The plan lists a strategic objective and 
associated performance measures for assessing resilience at Caltrans (the Resiliency Score 
is still in development) (Caltrans, 2015).  
California and Florida are not the only states working toward a strategic approach to 
transportation system resilience. Agencies like Colorado and Iowa DOT both stated that 
they’ve begun to consider how to incorporate resilience considerations into decision 
making. Colorado DOT is currently developing on a multi-objective decision analysis 
methodology in which resilience will be incorporated as a decision criterion. Similarly, 
MassDOT currently uses flooding information to inform project design and maintenance 
activities. The agency uses a project’s proximity to coast and location in flood prone areas 
as factors in project prioritization.  
In all the latter examples, we see that the agencies are working toward incorporating 
resilience thinking into business processes but have not yet completely achieved it. 
Incorporating resilience efforts into existing structures also promotes institutional learning 
which in turn ensures that agencies maintain and build on past knowledge, preventing 
resource waste from effort duplication and supports consistent progress towards resilience 
capacity. Consequently, long range planning, transportation asset management planning 
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and the Transportation Improvement Program are all established means that can be used in 
this regard. Additionally, as shown by the FTP and Caltrans examples, progress in using 
existing structures seem to be higher in those agencies that have experienced significant 
disasters and associated losses or have developed a sense of urgency from a greater 
understanding system threats and potential consequences. The Caltrans and FTP 
approaches are examples that other agencies can learn from. However, opportunities still 
exist to enhance the resilience planning process.   
 Role of Performance-Based Planning in Planning for Resilience  
As stated earlier, the FTP incorporates resilience considerations in its plan, but does not 
completely adopt performance-based planning process in the approach. Performance based 
planning is “an approach to applying performance management principles to transportation 
system policy and investment decisions” (Middleton and Regan, 2015) and is required by 
law (MAP-21) for MPOs and state DOTs. However, the seven national goals that this 
process is required to feed into do not explicitly include system resilience.  Nonetheless, 
the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST ACT) signed into law in 
December 2015 expands the scope of MPO planning considerations to include 
strategies/projects that improve transportation system resiliency and reliability (FHWA, 
2016b).  Therefore, agencies can assume a proactive posture towards incorporating 
resilience thinking into performance-based planning by building on an approach similar to 
the Caltrans approach. A strategic approach also allows agencies to more intentionally 
align resilience planning efforts with broader efforts such as hazard mitigation planning 
and comprehensive transportation planning. The performance-based planning process is 
summarized below (Middleton and Regan, 2015): 
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 Visioning: The first step of the process will require agencies to define what 
resilience means for their systems. For example, for the MTC, resilience means 
being able to better respond to acute shocks and chronic stresses and to transform 
following a disruption. This should be followed by goals and objectives that will 
help realized the agency’s vision. It is important for this step to capture the needs 
of a diverse group of stakeholders. 
 Performance measures: Agencies should then identify performance measures that 
can be used to assess its progress. Generally, performance measures are 
categorized as input, output, or outcome measures. Performance measures 
selected should be holistic, i.e., cover different types of agency capital and should 
also match the scale of use.   
 Target setting and identifying priorities: Corresponding targets should be set for 
performance objectives. Targets must be prioritized into short, medium and long 
term to enable efficient use of resources. 
 Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms: Mechanisms which require review and 
reporting of progress towards building resilience capacity are essential for 
agencies to achieve desired outcomes. Regular evaluations provide information 
that feeds back into the other elements of performance based planning. This could 
include reviewing performance measures for efficacy, adjusting priorities or 





 Technical Capital 
In this research, technical capital refers to the technical knowledge and expertise an agency 
has and how it uses it to protect its physical assets. From the survey results, we see many 
similarities in the way agencies build this type of capital for resilience capacity. One such 
strategy mostly used in the early stages of exploring resilience at an agency is conducting 
vulnerability or risk analyses. These studies usually follow similar set of steps that end with 
the identification of strategies for enhancing an asset or piece of infrastructure. Now, three 
main opportunities can be identified to enhance this process and are discussed below. 
Firstly, once strategies for enhancing resilience capacity for assets are identified during a 
vulnerability/risk study, further investigation could be conducted into which other capital 
areas would affect those outcomes. That is, identifying which other capital areas that when 
jointly enhanced with the physical adaptation strategy would yield more holistic and 
effective results with lasting impact.  Needless to say, this provides a means of conducting 
a project-level analysis using a sociotechnical approach. Figure 3.10 shows an example 
adaptation strategy using a raised bridge deck and going through some sample questions 
that could be asked as one explores related enhancements in the three other capital areas 
(institutional, organizational and financial). Evidence of this approach is seen in Broward 
County MPO’s vulnerability study. Here, the study results included relative costs for the 
sample adaptation strategies recommended. Therefore, the team could review the 
recommended strategies and include related improvements from additional capital areas 
that will support the physical adaptation. Again, in Oregon’s climate vulnerability study, 
regulatory constraints that would make adapting coastal infrastructure difficult were 
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identified (i.e., standards and permit applications with multiple agencies), albeit solutions 
to the identified constraints were not also identified.  
 
Figure 3.10   Project-level analysis using a sociotechnical approach  
 
Secondly, in selecting metrics for assessing resilience, a cue can be taken from the literature 
on energy resilience. When majority of metrics or the main metrics selected for assessing 
a system’s resilience are outcome or social welfare metrics, social needs of a community 
are taken more into consideration (Sandia, 2015). Accessibility metrics, for example, are 
often able to capture the transport system’s impact on social welfare, as opposed to purely 
system performance measures.  An example of such a metric is the number of people able 
to work “X” number of days after a catastrophic event. This metric can be contrasted to the 
FTP’s resilience metrics of bridge and pavement condition in its effectiveness to put social 
welfare at the forefront of resilience discussions. The outcomes-based approach is seen in 
Oregon’s transport system vulnerability study as shown in the case study (FHWA, 2014). 
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Once such outcome metrics are identified, one can then backtrack to identify the capacities 
necessary to fulfill that outcome. It is important to note that the scale at which outcome 
metrics are most useful is the project-level, as opposed to the system level where the 
unknown variables far exceed the known system variables.   
Finally, another important characteristic observed from MassDOT that promotes 
institutionalization of resilience efforts is the use of asset identifiers consistent with the 
agency’s asset management database. This strategy, among others, is contributed to the 
ongoing change in the agency’s general decision-making approach, and this is what should 
ultimately occur for all agencies. 
 Financial Capital 
With regard to financial capital at transportation agencies for enhancing resilience capacity, 
having separate funding is not the popular approach. This makes sense from the standpoint 
of integrated performance-based planning and decision-making. Even in cases where 
Executive Orders or legislation is present, as is the case for Maryland and Massachusetts, 
agencies are required to work within their current budgets to pursue resilience enhancing 
strategies. When survey respondents were asked about how repairs, renewal and recovery 
of assets affected during disruptions are funded, FHWA/FEMA emergency relief /disaster 
funding was the prevalent answer. For Colorado DOT, a new approach to risk and 
resilience, which is still under development, differentiates between types of treatment for 
assets damaged during extreme events: in-kind versus betterment replacement. According 
to the agency, in-kind replacement is to be paid for with federal funds and any betterment 
will have to be funded using alternative funding. Colorado DOT also recently petitioned 
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the state’s Transportation Commission (an 11-member board of governor appointees) and 
received funding approval to conduct a risk assessment on its I-70 corridor.   
Unlike Colorado DOT that sought state funding for its risk assessment, nine out of the 11 
responding agencies used federal funds, either partially or fully, to fund their vulnerability 
and/or risk assessments. This outcome is not surprising. According to the ABAG 
representative, almost all resilience work is funded by grants. Massachusetts DOT on the 
other hand funds resilience strategies on either a case-by-case basis, i.e., during the design 
stage or when a need arises. Further along in addressing funding is Oregon DOT, which 
stated that the agency has prepared a long-term funding plan and is waiting on approval.  
Due to the funding issue, many agencies find partners with similar interests to collaborate 
with on resilience projects. This approach does not only allow agencies to pool funds, it 
also allows them to bring together nodes of expertise on such projects. Sharing data, 
personnel and other resources results in effective processes and better outcomes as all 
collaborators have a stake in the said outcome. Table 3.7 lists organizations the 
transportation agencies surveyed have partnered with in their resilience enhancing efforts.  
Table 3.7  Agency Collaborations for physical resilience 
Agency Partners  
Bay Area FHWA, Adapting to Rising Tides, BCDC, NOAA Coastal Services 
Center, CalTrans District 4 
FDOT/Broward 
MPO 
Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, Palm Beach County, FHWA 
MDSHA FHWA 
MassDOT FHWA, NOAA, EPA, USGS, ACOE, local agencies & NGOs 
Oregon DOT USCG, Dept. of Aviation, local agencies, consultants, state 
rail/transit division 
NCTCOG FHWA, UTA 
Iowa DOT FHWA 
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 Summary of Survey Findings 
This chapter presented the nine case studies involving 11 transportation related agencies. 
The case studies presented analyses of the various resilience capacity building strategies 
being implemented and showed evidence of how these agencies are evolving toward 
sociotechnical approaches in certain aspects of their efforts. Specifically, the agencies were 
analyzed using a capital-based approach, thus, efforts towards enhancing system resilience 
were categorized under institutional, organizational, technical and financial capital. 
The cases were then synthesized to extract key characteristics and unique attributes that 
promote sociotechnical resilience thinking at agencies across the four capital types. For 
institutional capital, agencies like MDSHA, MassDOT, ABAG and MTC, that have the 
presence of some state or agency policies produced associated benefits in other capital 
areas. For example, MTC’s resilience worked was birthed out of pre-existing efforts on 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction programs, which was in turn directly a result of the 
passage of Senate Bill 375. This momentum eventually resulted in joint efforts among Bay 
Area agencies and Caltrans to conduct vulnerability assessments of transportation 
infrastructure in order to develop strategies for adaptation. Similarly, MDSHA’s capability 
of monitoring and reporting progress towards resilience efforts, which shows maturity in 
organizational capital, is directly linked to the agency’s responsibility to annually report 
such efforts to the state’s Commission on Climate Change (MDCCC) and the passage of 
House Bill 514. Finally, another strategy that contributes towards the development of 
institutional capital identified in the cases was from ABAG. This was the presence of 
efforts to align/coordinate resilience planning across sectors. Now, the difficulty in 
achieving this attribute in certain types of transport agencies does not go unnoticed. For 
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example, as an association of local governments, ABAG is uniquely placed to play the role 
of convener and coordinator. However, this can also be achieved in MPOs and to a lesser 
extent, at DOTs.  
 In terms of organizational capital, agencies considered to be at higher levels of maturity 
are those that showed evidence or progress towards incorporating resilience considerations 
in existing agency structures (e.g., asset management plan, long range plan, etc.). Again, 
agencies at higher levels of maturity had dedicated or designated individuals formally 
recognized by the agency working on resilience programs. This was also related to creating 
buy-in and an understanding of resilience thinking within the agency. This in turn 
contributes to institutionalizing resilience thinking within the agency showed by looking 
at a project’s lifecycle (planning, construction, operation, maintenance, renewal and/or 
decommissioning) and making decisions at each stage that promote the creation of resilient 
outcomes.  
Finally, for technical and financial capital, many of the surveyed agencies had similar 
characteristics in terms of strategies adopted and capabilities possessed. Technical capital 
varied from high-level qualitative vulnerability studies in some agencies, to in-depth and 
risk based analysis of vulnerabilities in other agencies. Agencies such as MassDOT also 
show process integration by actively involving their asset management programs and 
linking asset data to vulnerability and risk information developed. This was however the 
exception and not the rule. Most agencies conducted studies as separate projects (mostly 
because these were pilot studies), outside regular agency business activity and not yet 
impacting their current asset management processes. Similarly, agencies surveyed that 
showed presence of resilience initiatives mostly relied on external grants or volunteer 
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agency hours to fund such activities. Some agencies have also begun to fund initiatives on 
a case by case basis. Nonetheless, a sentiment that resonated through almost all the survey 
responses, was the desire to eventually incorporate resilience considerations in project 
prioritization. Some agencies stated that such prioritization processes were either in 
development (e.g., Broward MPO, Colorado DOT and Iowa DOT) or already existed (e.g., 
MassDOT and NORPC). Incorporating resilience in project prioritization for funding or in 
lifecycle cost analysis for asset management were considered higher levels of maturity than 
other strategies for enhancing financial capital. 
The subsequent chapter presents a framework developed using both key concepts from the 
literature identified in Chapter 2, as well as the agency key attributes identified in this 
chapter. Attributes and strategies identified across the four capital types are presented in 
the subsequent chapter in a form of a maturity scale. The maturity scale orders these 





CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIOTECHNICAL 
TRANSPORTATION RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK (STRF)  
 Introduction  
This chapter describes the second phase of this research.  It presents the development of a 
framework for transportation resilience planning using a sociotechnical approach (i.e., one 
that formally considers human, organizational and institutional factors in addition to 
technical factors in its design). The chapter then proceeds to describe feedback received 
from three transportation agencies asked to apply and review a self-assessment tool 
developed from the framework. The chapter ends by presenting a revised framework and 
tool based on the practitioner input. 
 Conceptual Framework Design   
 Foundational Concepts 
From the literature, this framework adopts the concept of stability at multiple equilibria 
found in ecological resilience, which is founded on the idea of shifting system regimes. 
Therefore, transport system resilience in this context is based on this fundamental criterion: 
the ability of a system to change in order to persist (as per Holling and Gunderson, 2002). 
The inquiry on agency resilience experience was therefore based on the main research 
question exploring whether as agencies mature in their dealings with hazards, they 
naturally move from largely technical to sociotechnical approaches. In other words, do 
agencies located in communities or states that have experienced catastrophic events 
resulting in loss of life or significant damage to property naturally evolve toward 
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sociotechnical approaches as compared to agencies that have not experienced such events 
nor been impacted by teaching moments from others’ disasters? Subsequently, the 
following questions guided the framework development (as discussed in Chapter 2):  
 Do transportation agencies and the systems they oversee have adaptive cycles?  
 Do agencies that have dealt with major natural disasters show some adaptive 
behavior with regime shifts? If so, what do these shifts look like? How can these 
regime shifts be characterized in terms of capital-based regimes? 
Using the concepts of stability and regimes (previously discussed in Chapter 2) in an 
expanded paradigm for an agency’s maturity in resilience capacity building, the survey was 
developed and used to study an agency’s resilience capacity building in order to extract an 
evolving maturity process for handling hazards and building system resilience in a 
sociotechnical manner. The survey results were therefore used to determine the types and 
relative levels of capital (institutional, organization, technical and financial) that can 
constitute maturing regimes for system resilience. These maturity regimes (next attainable 
regime) may be accessed either through forced or deliberate action, where forced actions 
are those initiated reactively because of some external condition or circumstance (e.g., 
natural or man-made intervention). Deliberate actions on the other hand, are those initiated 
proactively by the will of system actors (in this case, transport agencies). Thus, to reach 
the next attainable regime, there is the need for forced or deliberate action.  
 Framework Description 
The sociotechnical resilience framework is presented in two parts: Figure 4.1 and Table 
4.1.  Figure 4.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the concepts presented in the 
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framework and should be viewed for a conceptual understanding, whereas the details of 
the maturity scale are provided in Table 4.1. Both the figure and the table show four types 
of agency capital that affect system resilience (institutional, organizational, financial and 
technical capital). In Figure 4.1, capital types are represented by the first initial of each 
capital type, and maturity stages (regimes) are represented by subscripts. In the table, 
columns represent capital types and the rows represent maturity stages.  The following 
points provide important considerations for using the framework: 
1. The four stages represent a gradual progression in maturity in terms of the resilience 
capacity of agencies, sociotechnically. It is also important to note that the 
framework is not intended to measure or rate an agency’s resilience; rather, it serves 
as a scale which agencies can use to assess the relative maturity of their resiliency-
building endeavors, and systematically work toward enhancing their resilience 
capacity by reaching for the next desirable stage.  
2. The different capital types in each stage do not necessarily occur simultaneously. 
In assessing an agency’s position on the maturity scale, one may find that the 
agency may be at Stage 1 in terms of its Financial Capital, but Stage 2 in terms of 
the development of its Organizational Capital. Thus, an agency can invest in 
progressing within a particular capital type based on its predetermined strategic 
priorities, and based on its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
3. The stages described do not constitute a rigidly prescribed process for enhancing 
system resilience capacity; therefore, while some agencies may mature by 
progressively moving from one stage to the subsequent one, others may leapfrog 
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from one to the next, based on agency priorities, available resources for growth, 
damages from disasters, and other factors.  
4. Lastly, the framework is meant to be a tool that agencies use to assess the maturity 
of resilience capacity building in their agencies; thus, it also doubles as a gap 
analysis and planning tool, that may be used to assess growth opportunities in the 
different capital areas and develop guidance on next-level objectives for resilience 
capacity building. on what attributes to aspire to. 
 
 




Table 4.1 STRF Review Table 
 
 Organizational  
Technical Financial Institutional 
Human capital 











- Sustainability policies 
may be present at 
agency. E.g., NORPC 
- No external state 
policies present that 
impact transport 
agency 
- Champion efforts 




- Plans that address aspects of 
resilience may be present. 
E.g., initial climate action 
plans such as Broward 
County Climate Action Plan, 
2010  
- High level resilience 
planning, e.g., general 
impacts study, general state-
wide resilience planning 
- Emergency response and 
recovery processes present 
- Awareness of hazards (e.g., 
climate impacts) and taking 
initial steps to mitigate. 
E.g., travel demand 
management (TDM), 
developing and instituting 
green /sustainability design 













- Some hazard specific 
policies that enhance 
resilience 
- External state action 
influences agency 
posture and actions. 
E.g., executive order, 
legislation, state 
resilience committee 
or other external 
requirements.   
- Champion efforts 
still critical 
- Political will 




- Resilience priorities 
identified; however, may not 
be explicitly stated in agency 
planning documents, e.g., 
MassDOT  
- Hazard specific plan(s) or 
program(s) developed with 
detailed impacts analysis and 
adaptation strategies 
identified, e.g., ABAG- 
earthquakes, CDOT – 
Geohazard mgnt. Program. 
- May include some level of 
external collaboration with 
strategic partners 
- Resilience focus on 
infrastructure hardening 
- May have conducted or 
planning to conduct pilot 
study on risk or 
vulnerability for certain 
assets  
- Active asset management 
program, but does not 
explicitly incorporate 
resilience considerations  
 
- Initiatives still rely on 
grants 
- May secure some state 
legislature funds for 





Table 4.2 STRF Review Table (continued) 






- Guidance developed 
for changes in current 
plans, regulation or 
policies to support 
resilience thinking at 
agency (or state) (e.g. 
EO 569, MA) 




barriers) that may be 




- Raised employee 
awareness 





or initiatives., e.g., 
Formal team- 
ABAG & Iowa 
DOT, designated 
person – MassDOT, 
Broward MPO 
 
- Resilience considerations 
incorporated into project 
planning, e.g., hazard 
mapping 
- Monitoring and reporting of 
initiatives adopted, e.g., 
MassDOT 
- Coordination and/or 
unification of efforts with 
external agencies, e.g., 
ABAG  
- Concrete steps taken to 
incorporate resilience 
considerations into existing 
asset management program, 
e.g., results of 
risk/vulnerability studies 
 
- Case by case 
consideration of 









Alignment of transport 
resilience planning and 
resilience planning in 
other sectors (e.g., land-
use, housing, etc.) to 
streamline efforts and 
realize co-benefits. 
- Champion effort no 
longer needed 




throughout agency  







- Strategic goals and objectives 
for resilience capacity clearly 
identified 
- Resilience thinking 
institutionalized at agency, 
i.e., resilience considerations 
incorporated into project 




- Resilience thinking reflected 
in main agency plans: 
o Asset Management Plan 
(TAMP) 
o Long Range Plan (LRTP) 
o Transport Improvement 
Plan (TIP) 
- Resilience considerations 
go beyond direct transport 
assets, i.e., supporting 
infrastructure, (e.g., IT, 
ancillary assets) and 
subsystems/interdependent 
systems (power, water, 
etc.) 
- Resilience considered 




in project prioritization 
in addition to other 
priorities such as 







 Linking Capital Types to Resilience Attributes 
From the resilience literature discussed, many characteristics of resilient systems were 
identified including robustness, redundancy, flexibility, rapidity, resourcefulness, 
preparedness, etc. It was also discussed that the many characteristics can be traced to 
three main attributes: persistence, adaptability and transformability. In reviewing the 
maturity scale presented in the previous section, we can draw inferences about the various 
capital types and maturity stages, and their relationships to these resilience attributes and 
characteristics. Figure 4.2 shows a tree diagram of the four agency capital types 
investigated in this research and their relationships to various resilience attributes 
discussed in the literature.  




The rate at which uncertainty overwhelms an organization is related more to its 
internal structure than to the amount of environmental uncertainty” (Carvajal, 1983). 
 
Firstly, intuitional capital that enhances system resilience provides the regulatory 
environment that enables transformability, which ultimately shows a system’s possession 
of flexibility, preparedness and survivability. Flexibility in the sense that, an agency’s 
institutional capital supports the enactment of changes that allow for movement from one 
stage (regime) to another when existing conditions are no longer desirable. This also 
ultimately ensures survivability of the system. Lastly, transformability promotes 
preparedness by means requiring the necessary regulatory structures to support deliberate 
and forced transformations. 
Secondly, adaptability, a core principle in both socio-technical systems theory and 
resilience theory, is enhanced by building organizational and financial capacity. Carvajal 
(1983) puts it this way: “the rate at which uncertainty overwhelms an organization is 
related more to its internal structure than to the amount of environmental uncertainty.” 
Organizational and financial capital translate into many of the main attributes of system 
resilience, including resourcefulness, rapidity, fault tolerance and flexibility.  
Lastly, technical capital builds resilience capacity by promoting system persistence. That 
is, ensuring that the system can absorb a certain level of baseline stress. Working towards 
persistence means, system actors ensure robustness, redundancy, efficiency, and diversity 
among others. Thus, persistence is about maintaining what you have despite external 
forces; adaptability is about maintaining service provision despite internal and external 
change; and transformability is about ensuring survival by enacting change.  
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 Agency Capital and Resilience Maturity  
 Institutional Capital  
At the early stages of resilience maturity, institutional capital does not explicitly address 
system resilience. However, existing policies, e.g., sustainability, may be present that 
contribute to resilience capacity. For example, although the New Orleans Regional 
Planning Commission (NORPC) does not explicitly address resilience in this way, there 
is a heavy focus on green practices and sustainability initiatives, which can contribute to 
resilience capacity. Colorado DOT is also another example of stage 1 institutional capital 
with no mention of resilience related policies at the agency level.  
As the agency progresses in building institutional capital (stage 2), some hazard specific 
policies may be put in place that contribute to resilience capital (e.g., Oregon’s seismic 
functional design criteria). However, these policies may not be multidimensional and only 
address certain needs. Keeping in line with sociotechnical system theory that advocates 
for joint optimization of system components for organizational performance, policies 
designed to build resilience through institutional capital should address the technical and 
organizational sides of the issues they seek to address. Stage 2 also includes agencies 
located in states or regions with regulatory structures that influence agency posture (such 
regulatory environments do not necessarily mean a top-down impact, as we are cognizant 
of the fact that many state and federal policies are the result of efforts at lower levels). 
Although such transportation agencies may not have explicit policies, they are affected 
by legislation, executive orders or other external factors, which lead them to take action 
in building resilience capacity. Examples include Iowa’s Flood Mitigation Program 
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created in 2012, as well as executive orders passed in California EO in 2008 and Maryland 
in 2012.  
As the agency continues to mature (i.e., Stage 3), explicit guidance that supports 
resilience thinking in the agency is developed. Such guidance provides direction for the 
necessary changes in current plans or policies that need to occur. Massachusetts’ EO 569 
signed in 2016 by Governor Baker directs state agencies (including the DOT) to provide 
such guidance for its current plans, by-laws, regulations and policies (EO 569, 2016). 
Although full implementation of this has not yet occurred at MassDOT, once completed, 
will have a relatively higher level of institutional capital. Lastly, stage 4 describes what 
many communities aspire to – aligning inter-sectoral resilience initiatives and planning 
to streamline efforts and achieve co-benefits.  
 Organizational Capital  
Based on the data collected in this research, the initial stage of resilience maturity at 
transportation agencies is characterized by a general awareness of infrastructure 
resilience propagated by a champion. This individual’s work may not necessarily be a 
delegated role; however, interest in the area and understanding the needs of the 
organization causes this individual to start to work on resilience building initiatives at the 
agency. Such agencies in the early stages also generally have emergency response and 
recovery procedures already in place, as is necessary for most public agencies. Mostly 
notably, agencies at stage 1 will have an initial plan that addresses aspects of system 
resilience. The most common is the climate action plan. Such plans are usually the first 
step for many agencies and may contain information on possible hazards that could 
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impact the transport system and potential consequences of such events. An example is 
the Broward County Climate Action Plan published in 2008. The Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission (MTC) in the Bay area was also at stage 1 about three to four 
years ago when its primary focus was on meeting greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
targets. The MTC instituted mitigation initiatives such as travel demand management 
programs, car sharing and shuttle services.  
Over time, the MTC’s organizational capital matured to stage 2 with the identification of 
resilience priorities. Shifting from only mitigation to include adaptation, the agency began 
to work on addressing the threats of sea level rise in the region. Colorado DOT (CDOT) 
is another example of a stage 2 agency. Although the agency does not have an explicit 
resiliency plan with associated goals and objectives, it has an active geohazard 
management program. CDOT does possess stage 1 attributes having a high-level, state-
produced climate action plan and a resiliency framework (both published in 2015). 
However, these documents only give a high-level view of climate change impacts on 
transportation. A detailed transportation resiliency study has not yet been conducted. By 
stage 2, political will at the agency is usually garnered with support from its senior 
leadership. Champion efforts still critical here.  
By stage 3, agencies have started to incorporate resilience considerations into project 
planning. MassDOT, for example, does this by mapping hazards in its asset management 
program. MassDOT has also identified resilience priorities, although these are not 
documented in its planning documents. The MDSHA has also began to use sea level rise 
mapping for project review and some decision making at the planning and design stage. 
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In terms of human capital, MassDOT has a designated person, i.e., supervisor for the 
Environmental Management and Sustainability Office. 
By stage 4, champion efforts are no longer needed as such roles will have become 
formalized, e.g., ABAG, or in the process of being formalized (e.g., Iowa DOT). There 
is also buy-in and an understanding of resilience thinking throughout the agency. 
Employees no longer view resilience efforts as separate initiatives outside their work, but 
as an integral part of the way the agency plans, operates and maintains its system. 
Strategic goals and objectives are also clearly identified and articulated in the agency’s 
main planning documents. There is also evidence of resilience thinking in the project 
development process (i.e., planning, construction, operation, maintenance and 
renewal/decommissioning). 
 Technical Capital  
From the literature and case studies reviewed, technical capital seemed to be the most 
common entry point for agencies starting to build up resilience capacity. The initial stage, 
stage 1, is characterized by an awareness of potential system threats and taking initial 
steps to mitigate them. As the agency matures, there is a shift from solely focusing on 
sustainable/green design practices to an inclusion of infrastructure hardening to common 
threats (stage 2). Agencies at stage 2 may have also conducted or planning to conduct 
vulnerability or risk assessments for parts of their infrastructure. The focus here is solely 
on ensuring that infrastructure can withstand the impacts of known threats when they 
occur. Agencies at stage 2 may also have active asset management programs, but do not 
explicitly incorporate resilience considerations. Many of the DOTs reviewed fall into this 
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category. These are agencies that have perhaps conducted some risk assessments through 
pilot projects and are working towards translating the study results into strategies that can 
be implemented in their asset management programs. Examples include Maryland State 
Highway Authority (MDSHA), Oregon DOT and Iowa DOT. 
MassDOT is shows the characteristics of a stage 3 agency in terms of technical capital. 
The agency is taking concrete steps to incorporate resilience considerations into its asset 
management program. The agency also exhibits attributes of good institutionalization. In 
conducting its risk assessment, the agency used asset identifiers that are consistent with 
its current asset management system, making it easier to integrate results from the study 
into the current system.  
Finally, by stage 4, resilience considerations go beyond direct transportation assets. The 
agency starts to incorporate supporting infrastructure (e.g., IT and ancillary assets), 
subsystems and interdependent systems (e.g., power, water, etc.). Resilience 
considerations at this stage are also incorporated throughout the infrastructure lifecycle. 
It is important to note that although the four capital areas may develop at different paces 
over time, developing technical capital simultaneously with institutional, organizational 
and financial capital is necessary to achieve the benefits of joint capital optimization. A 
comparable amount of growth in the other capital areas will further strengthen and 





 Financial capital 
Financial capital mainly deals with an agency’s ability to use its financial resources to 
build resilience capacity. During the early stages of developing this type of capital, an 
agency typically has not identified an approach or process of considering the financial 
implications of resilience capacity building. As the agency becomes more aware of 
potential system threats, efforts to secure external funds through grant programs or other 
means may begin to take place. At stage 2, the agency still relies almost entirely on grants 
(e.g. ABAG), but may also work toward securing state funds (e.g., Colorado DOT). Over 
time, and as other capital areas grow (e.g., technical capital), the agency may move to 
stage 3 where it begins to use some internal funds towards resilience initiatives. This 
could be a case by case approach where the agency considers funding for individual 
projects based on some critical identified needs (e.g., MassDOT). Eventually, the agency 
starts to incorporate resilience considerations in lifecycle cost analysis of projects and 
would then be at stage 4. Also at stage 4, the agency may develop a systematic and 
integrated decision-making process for prioritizing projects that includes resilience 
considerations where necessary. 
It is important to note that although movement from one stage to another within a capital 
type is not exclusively tied to movement in other capital types, some cases would require 
progress in closely related areas in order to progress from one stage to another. For 
example, movement from stage 3 to stage 4 of financial capital would require an agency 
to assess lifecycle costs of projects and assess any resilience implications. However, for 
this to be possible, an agency would need to have a mature asset management program 
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since a lifecycle approach to managing assets/infrastructure is a characteristic of good 
asset management. 
 Generalizability versus Transferability 
Generalizability refers to the “extension of research findings and conclusions from a 
study conducted on a sample population to the population at large” (Barnes et al., 1994-
2012). That is to say, generalizability of research findings allows predictions to be made 
based on the outcomes that particular research. Thus, generalizability requires large 
amounts of data, which quantitative research enables, to produce sound predictions. 
Transferability, on the other hand, is not related to making predictions or conclusions 
about certain populations, rather, it describes “the process of applying the results of 
research in one situation to other similar situations” (Barnes et al., 1994-2012). 
Transferability is a process performed by the readers of research. Readers compare the 
contexts of research their situations and determine whether enough similarities exist to 
infer from the findings. The survey on which the framework was based utilized a non-
probabilistic sampling technique and therefore, generalizations cannot be make from its 
results. However, the MVS technique adopted allowed agency selection to cover different 
contexts including geographic locations, threats faced, and agency type. The variations 
present in the survey participants allow for transferability of survey findings from agency 
to the other. Additionally, because of the diversity in agencies selected, strategies and 
attributes catalogued in the maturity scale cover different approaches used for resilience 
enhancements. In situations where certain attributes do not apply, such as in the case of 
an MPO that does not own any physical transport assets, value can still be obtained from 
assessing attributes across other capital categories. 
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 Summary  
This chapter presented the development of a planning framework for enhancing 
transportation system resilience using sociotechnical approaches. Foundational concepts 
underpinning the framework and a detailed description of the framework were also 
presented. Finally, a discussion of how organizational, institutional, technical and 
financial capital affect system resilience at difference stages of development was 
presented, providing examples from the experiences of actual transportation agencies in 
the U.S. 
The next chapter provides an account of the framework application to another set of 
transportation agencies as well as a discussion of practitioner feedback on the 




CHAPTER 5. FRAMEWORK DEMONSTRATION & REVIEW 
 Introduction  
This chapter presents the demonstration and review of the Sociotechnical Transportation 
Resilience Framework (STRF) by practitioners from three transportation agencies. The 
STRF table was presented in the form of a self-assessment tool and required reviewers to 
indicate which attributes in the different stages and capital areas that applied to their 
agencies. After conducting the exercise, the reviewers were asked following questions: 
1) How useful is this tool to you/your agency as a guide for resiliency planning? 
a. In the near term 
b. In the long term 
2) What attributes/factors can be added or removed to strengthen the tool’s 
usefulness? 
3) In your opinion, what additional stages should be included to improve the tool? 
4) Please provide any additional comments you think will be useful for finalizing 
this tool 
The subsequent sections in this chapter present a discussion of the STRF output and 
feedback from each of the three agencies, as well as a revised STRF table that takes the 





 Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) 
 Overview 
The Arizona Department of Transportation’s (ADOT), assets are required to function 
from sea level to about 6000 feet above sea level, and also withstand temperatures of 
below zero degrees Fahrenheit to over 120 degrees Fahrenheit. In addition to extreme 
heat and freeze-thaw cycles, ADOT’s assets are exposed to flooding, rockfall and wildfire 
threats (Tao and Leary, 2013).  
The review for ADOT was conducted by Steve Olmstead, the Innovative Programs 
Manager in ADOT’s Environmental Planning Section. In addition to assisting ADOT’s 
construction program, Mr. Olmstead administers project teams for resilience. This 
includes extreme weather and climate adaptation, sustainable transportation and 
partnerships between ADOT and USGS focused on developing risk-based assessment 
mechanisms for asset management, hydrologic modelling and hydraulic engineering 
design.  
 Self-Assessment    
Figure 5.1 shows a summary of the output obtained from ADOT’s self-assessment using 
the STRF table (Table output shown in Appendix B). It shows that ADOT identified as 
being at Stage 3 for institutional capital. This means that ADOT has developed guidance 
for changes to be implemented in current plans, regulation or policies to support resilience 
thinking at the agency.  
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Stage 3 for institutional capital also means that ADOT has identified possible institutional 
barriers that may be faced in implementing resilience strategies and has either developed 
or is working toward the development of a set of solutions to address them.  
 
Figure 5.1  Relative capital levels for resilience capacity at ADOT 
 
ADOT’s organizational capital can be described as Stage 4 since it meets all but two 
attributes for stages 3 and 4. These were (1) coordination and/or unification of efforts 
with external transportation or non-transportation agencies, and (2) champion efforts no 
longer needed. Thus, although not fully not fully realized, ADOT’s organizational capital 
is well into Stage 4. It also means that resilience thinking has been institutionalized at the 
agency. The agency has taken a lifecycle approach to building resilience capacity and has 
incorporated resilience considerations into existing structure at the agency (i.e., Asset 
Management Plan, Long Range Transportation Plan, etc.). ADOT established a formal 
















the resiliency of ADOT’s transportation system and help the agency cope with the ever-
increasing cost of threats. The program was tasked with incorporating resilience 
considerations into existing criteria used throughout the infrastructure lifecycle (i.e., 
planning, design, construction, operations, and maintenance), identifying or developing 
a decision-making resilience framework, and building on past climate adaptation efforts 
from 2014 and 2015. ADOT’s Resilience Program therefore set out to achieve the 
following initial goals: 
 “Centralize the concerns encompassing the unknown, erratic and abrupt incidents 
of storm water and its contributors of flooding, overtopping, system hotspots and 
hydraulic-related failures under one managing entity to hone efforts 
 Introduce extreme weather adaptation into agency and engineering design 
processes, as well as, establish current transportation asset sensitivity to extreme 
weather incidents  
 Identify scientifically informed climate data downscaling as it relates to 
transportation systems” (Olmstead and Lester, n.d.) 
At stage 3 in terms of technical capital, the agency has taken concrete steps to incorporate 
resilience considerations into its existing asset management program. Progress in this area 
can be traced back to 2013, when ADOT submitted problem statement (research idea) to 
AASHTO’s Center for Environmental Excellence. The document was titled “Integrating 
Climate Change and Extreme Weather Uncertainty into a State DOT Transportation Asset 
Management Plan – An Initial Process Development.” Since then, ADOT has consistently 
worked on developing technical capital using asset management principles. For example, 
ADOT worked with consultants (Cambridge Systematics) in 2015 to develop a batch-
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processing technique for downscaling climate data more efficiently and incorporate 
identified risks into decision models (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015). In 2015, ADOT 
also participated in the National Cooperative Research Program (NCHRP) Project 25-25, 
titled Integrating Extreme Weather and Adaptation into Transportation Asset 
Management Plans (Meyer and Flood, 2015). This contributed to the agency’s efforts in 
using asset management for resilience capacity. 
Lastly, in terms of financial capital, ADOT is described as being at Stage 3, working 
towards Stage 4. At ADOT, resilience is considered in the lifecycle cost analysis of 
projects; however, it is yet to be fully incorporated in project prioritization process along 
with other traditional priorities (e.g., mobility). 
 Practitioner Feedback  
Feedback from review process was positive and suggestions for improvements were also 
provided. With regard to the tool’s usefulness for resiliency planning, the reviewer 
described the different levels/thresholds of participation, assessment, implementation and 
institutionalization as well disseminated and beneficial for executive decision makers to 
be used for long-term planning. He also expressed that the framework and tool is a good 
foundational discussion piece for resilience interdependency amongst different 
industries.  
In terms of factors/attributes that can be removed or added, the reviewer commented 
about the practicality or extent that interdependent infrastructure systems (power, water, 
transportation, etc.) would coordinate at the state level. He did note that analyzing 
cascading and interdependent systems is useful but that would require the governor’s 
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office to catalyze such an effort. Secondly, the reviewer suggested including attributes 
that account for efforts towards developing scientifically downscaled climate data for 
asset management out to years 2050/2100. Furthermore, an additional stage, Stage 5, was 
suggested to recognize progressive work at the global scale. This would recognize 
adoption of European Union (EU) resilience building strategies, for example, as presented 
at the 2016 US/EU transcontinental symposium on adapting transportation to climate 
change impacts.  
Lastly, the following statement was provided as closing comments from the ADOT 
reviewer: “ADOT is a leading practitioner of these activities nationwide and recognized 
globally for our specific area of expertise – that of blending risk, science, technology, and 
engineering. To respond to you, projects focus on ‘human and organizational factors in 
addition to technical factors’ ADOT has progressed to the point of incorporating national 
partners, statewide partners, senior administration, planning, design, construction, 
maintenance, and operations. But we have more room to grow in the use of two areas – 
organizational and financial.” (Olstead, 2017). This statement captures ADOT’s progress 
with using sociotechnical factors and shows that the agency has recognized the capital 
areas, financial and organizational, where opportunities to enhance are present.  
 Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) 
 Overview 
The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) owns and manages over 
7,000 centerline miles of roadway, over 8,500 bridges, 22 ferry terminals, four freight rail 
lines and 16 airports. Some of these assets are exposed to earthquakes, tsunamis, 
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wildfires, drought, storms and flooding. The review for WSDOT was conducted by Carol 
Lee Roalkvam, the Environmental Policy Branch Manager. 
 Self-Assessment 
Figure 5.2 shows a summary of the output results obtained from WSDOT. The completed 
table showing details of capital levels can be found in Appendix B. From the tool’s output, 
WSDOT’s institutional capital is best described as stage 3, although the agency check off 
only one of the two stage attributes. Stage 3 for WSDOT means that the agency has hazard 
specific policies for resilience and guidance has been developed for changes to current 
plans or policies. This includes a seismic risk reduction policy and program. Between 
1991 and 2013, WSDOT invested approximately $150 million in bridge retrofits to 
withstand earthquake hazards (WSDOT, 2015). 
There is also external action that influences the agency’s posture and actions toward 
resilience, an example of which is the Resilient Washington State Initiative, developed to 
develop a framework for statewide earthquake resilience (EMC, 2010). The state also 
convened the Resilient Washington Subcabinet with the intent to better prepare for 
disasters. The subcabinet’s tasks include among others, to identify data and information 
for better preparedness and response, and also to “develop actions that can be coordinated 
across state agencies, local jurisdictions and federal partners to reduce risk and improve 
response in the event of an earthquake or tsunami” (“Resilient Washington” n.d.).  
To continue to develop institutional capital at WSDOT, the agency can begin to align its 
resilience planning with efforts in other sectors, identifying possible institutional barriers 




Figure 5.2  Relative capital levels for resilience capacity at WSDOT 
 
WSDOT’s organizational capital is at Stage 4. WSDOT has identified a clear resilience 
goal in its 2014-2017 strategic plan. This goal, listed as a strategy that contributes to 
overall environmental stewardship, is to ensure that plans and major capital projects 
developed during the 2013-2015 biennium and undergoing environmental review (i.e., 
NEPA EIS and EA level) consider climate change and extreme weather vulnerability. 
The goal also requires that strategies to improve resilience for the identified 
vulnerabilities be documented (WSDOT, 2016). This is a key attribute as it directly 
ensures that all major projects and plans are reviewed for resilience. The results also show 
that resilience thinking is institutionalized at the agency, that is, resilience considerations 
are incorporated into project development. This attribute is evident from the resilience 
goal discussed. Lastly, the agency has formal positions (partial/full) dedicated to building 
resilience capacity. Again, although organizational capital is at stage 4, areas of growth 
















initiatives, nor coordination of efforts with external agencies; both of which are stage 3 
attributes.  
For technical capital, WSDOT efforts align with stage 4. Here, the reviewer indicated the 
presence of an integrated state strategy; however, the extent of detail and coordination 
between state agencies unclear. The agency also has an active asset management program 
with concrete steps taken to incorporate resilience considerations. In fact, WSDOT is 
considered an industry shining star in terms of efforts in this area. In WSDOT’s first 
vulnerability assessment, which was partly funded by FHWA, the agency followed a sort 
of “decentralized” model based on going to all districts and interacting with maintenance 
staff about asset vulnerabilities for the entire system. The stakeholder-based qualitative 
model has since been replicated by other agencies (M. Culp, personal communication, 
June 14, 2017; FHWA, 2014). WSDOT’s second resilience project with FHWA resulted 
in the development of a process for considering extreme events (specifically hydraulic 
data) in transport planning (Climate Change, 2017).    
Moving on to financial capital, WSDOT is at stage 3. An institutionalized process or 
approach for considering financial implications of resilience has not yet been developed. 
Notwithstanding this, the agency is able to fund resilience enhancing strategies on a case 
by case basis, although some initiatives still rely on external grants.   
 Practitioner Feedback 
The reviewer from WSDOT provided insightful feedback about the tool’s ease of use. In 
her opinion, the instructions attached to the tool did not provide enough information 
making it difficult to understand the tool itself. Additional comments provided suggest 
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that tool needs to be improved to ensure that it can be used without an in-depth 
understanding of the concepts employed in the tool’s development by clearly defining the 
main terms used. 
The reviewer also did think there was much added value in providing a snapshot of a prior 
year’s efforts by filling out a second table as was suggested by the tool’s instructions. Her 
experience, the work to promote climate resilience since 2008 is ongoing. This means 
being constantly educated and re-educated. Also, in her experience, the key factor at her 
agency has been leadership support. Executive leadership from the state or federal level 
(i.e., governor/president) is less consequential.  
Furthermore, the reviewer from WSDOT’s response suggest removing the attribute 
“champion efforts no longer needed” from stage 4 because such efforts are required at all 
times. This comment suggests that even with formal agency positions dedicated to 
resilience capacity building, champion efforts could still be needed and an individual in 
this position may still need to act as a champion to promote efforts. This also highlights 
a need to provide a clear definition of the term institutionalization to potential tool users. 
Finally, the framework could be modified to reflect the progressive nature of developing 
employee awareness on resilience issues. According to Ms. Roalkvam, such awareness 






 Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) 
 Overview  
The Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) is the metropolitan planning organization for 
the Atlanta region and develops the long-range transportation plan for the 20-county 
Atlanta region. The agency also conducts regional planning and intergovernmental 
coordination for the smaller 10-county region, which includes community development, 
water resources management, and service provision for the elderly and disabled (ARC, 
n.d.). David D’Onofrio, the Air Quality and Climate Change Principal Planner at ARC, 
provided the last review for the STRF. 
 Self-Assessment  
Figure 5.3 shows a summary of the relative capital levels for ARC (actual output may be 
found in Appendix A). The output from ARC provides an interesting insight into 
resilience capacity building at an MPO that does not own assets. For institutional capital, 
the agency has sustainability policies as well as formal agency policies that explicitly 
address system resilience. Possession of the latter attribute indicates Stage 4 growth 
(having 50% of attributes in Stage 4), however, there is significant leapfrogging from 
Stage 1 to Stage 4, which may be accompanied by some disadvantages. Stages 2 and 3 of 
institutional capital show two things: (1) an understanding of system-specific 
vulnerabilities and the consequent changes needed to be implemented, and (2) an enabling 
external regulatory environment that also promotes resilience thinking. By not 
systematically growing from one stage to the next in institutional capital, there is a risk 
of existing institutional capital not being fully effective. Ultimately, institutional capital 
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is meant to provide the foundation on which other capital types can develop sustainably. 
Therefore, the full benefits of Stage 4 institutional capital may not be realized.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Relative capital levels for resilience capacity at ARC 
 
In terms of organizational capital, the ARC’s maturity can be described as Stage 1 since 
this is the only stage at which the agency possesses 50 percent of attributes. At this stage, 
the agency has existing champion efforts at the agency and plans that address aspects of 
system resilience, e.g., climate action plan. It is worth noting that resilience priorities 
have also been identified at the agency but have not been stated in official planning 
documents. The agency also has a formal, dedicated or designated person responsible for 
















Similar to institutional capital, ARC exhibits significant leapfrogging for technical 
capital. The self-assessment results indicate that ARC is at Stage 4 for technical capital. 
Given that the agency does not own any assets, not all the attributes apply. However, 
certain attributes not related to assets must still be developed (e.g., possession of detailed 
hazard information). Finally, the STRF output shows that ARC is in the early stages of 
financial capital development and therefore at Stage 1.  
In summary, the STRF output for ARC indicates higher levels of institutional and 
technical capital, and lower levels of organizational and financial capital maturity. The 
disproportionate nature of growth is a likely indicator of the risks of leapfrogging. 
Systematic growth from one stage to the next is therefore preferable.  
 Practitioner Feedback 
Mr. D’Onofrio is an at the ARC. In his opinion, providing tasks to help agencies move 
towards resilience is important and a checklist is an effective means of letting agencies 
know what they should be doing or working towards. However, the STRF can still be 
improved in a number of ways. First, the introduction to the tool should be refined to 
better communicate what the different stages represent and why an end user should be 
interested in developing the four types of capital. Also, certain terms like “champion 
efforts” need to be defined to ensure a baseline of understanding before undertaking the 
assessment. Lastly, a consistent sentence structure within each box would reduce 




 State of New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) 
The final STRF reviewer, Michael Salvato, is from the State of New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (NY MTA). The MTA is the largest transportation provider in 
North America, covering a region of approximately 15.3 million people and an average 
weekday passenger ridership of 8.8 million. The agency manages a wide range of assets 
including bridges, tunnels, railroads, railcars and buses, among others. 
Mr. Salvato is the Director and Program Executive for Enterprise Information, Asset 
Management and Strategic Innovation at the State of NY MTA. He also serves as Vice 
President for the Institute of Asset Management, an organization that aims to advance the 
interests of asset managers in the US and beyond. According to Mr. Salvato, the MTA 
uses a sociotechnical approach for its risk-based asset management program. They focus 
on practices, processes, human capital, and technological capital which includes data, 
information, IT and engineering systems. 
The representative from NYMTA provided a review without applying the STRF tool. 
Concerning resilience planning, Mr. Salvato suggests that a good approach is to be top-
down without being too descriptive. That is, guidance such as standards and knowledge 
should flow from upper management down to the field, but still allow enough flexibility 
in actual implementation to create buy-in and promote innovation. Thus, a capabilities 
approach or assessing the capacity to act, which is the structure of the STRF, is a good 
approach.  
For organizational capital, the STRF needs to assess organizational capability to manage 
risk, the resources to manage risk and information available for managing risk. Thus, the 
184 
 
first point of improvement for the tool is to increase the focus on data and information – 
both availability and management—for technical capital. Secondly, with regard to 
administering the tool, assessments should be carried out by multiple individuals within 
an agency to ensure a holistic picture. In many cases, the general knowledge of one person 
only extends to the boundary of his or her sphere of influence. By having multiple people 
fill out the tool, knowledge lacking from one person’s account may still be captured. 
Therefore, Mr. Salvato suggests the following three points of view to be captured at each 
agency:  
i. A high-level contact with a good understanding of the agency’s 
capabilities, 
ii. A planning department representative, and  
iii. A representative from either engineering or operations departments, or 
from both. 
Mr. Salvato also shared information on the Hitchin Framework for Systems Engineering 
(shown in Figure 5.3), and on an MTA organizational culture assessment on assessing 
risk as it relates to safety, reliability and resilience (Hitchins, 2000). He hoped this 




Figure 5.4  Hitchen Framework for Systems Engineering. (Source: Salvato and 
Glecker, 2017)  
 
 Summary of Practitioner Feedback  
Feedback from the four reviewers suggest that the STRF could be a useful tool for 
resilience planning within transportation agencies upon refinement. Given the timeframe 
of this research not all the feedback received was integrated into the finalized tool (e.g., 
concepts from the Hitchin framework). The following revisions were therefore made to 
the STRF tool in order to realize its full potential: 
i. Definition of terms 
ii. Expansion of technical capital attributes to highlight possession and use of data 




iii. Inclusion of attributes from an international perspective 
iv. Revision of introduction to better describe maturity stages, capital types and 
articulate tool benefits 
v. Revision of assessment process (i.e., use of multiple personnel versus one 
individual)  
vi. Revision of sentence structure within boxes 
The finalized STRF table is shown below in Table 5.1 and the revised tool is found in 







Table 5.1 Revised STRF Table 
  





☐ Agency policies for 




☐  Champion efforts present to raise awareness in 
agency 
 
☐Plans that address aspects of resilience may be 
present. e.g., initial climate action plans  
 
☐ High level resilience planning present, e.g., 
qualitative/general impacts study, general state-wide 
resilience planning 
 
☐ Emergency response and recovery processes 
present 
☐ Awareness of hazards (e.g., 
climate impacts) and taking 
initial steps to mitigate 







☐ Some hazard specific 
policies that enhance 
resilience present 
 
☐ Mitigation policies 
present at agency, e.g., 
greenhouse gas mitigation 
 
 
☐ External state action 
influences agency posture 
and actions. E.g., executive 
order, legislation, state 
resilience committee or 
other external 
requirements.   
☐  Champion efforts still critical 
 
☐  Political will garnered at agency, i.e., senior 
leadership support 
 
☐  Resilience priorities identified; however, may not be 
explicitly stated in official agency planning documents  
 
☐ Hazard specific plan(s) or program(s) developed with 
detailed impacts analysis and adaptation strategies 
identified 
 
☐  Some level of external collaboration with strategic 
partners present 
☐ Resilience focus on 
infrastructure hardening 
 
☐ May have conducted or 
planning to conduct pilot study 
on risk or vulnerability for 
certain assets  
 
☐ Active asset management 




☐ Initiatives still rely 
on grants 
 
☐ May secure some 
state legislature 









☐ Guidance developed for 
changes in current plans, 
regulation or policies to 
support resilience thinking at 
agency (or state)  
 




barriers) that may be faced 
in implementing resilience 
building strategies  
☐  Raised employee awareness on resilience issues at 
agency 
 ☐  Formal, dedicated or designated person/team 
responsible for resilience planning or initiatives 
☐  Resilience considerations incorporated into project 
planning, e.g., hazard mapping 
☐  Monitoring and reporting of resilience capacity 
building initiatives/activities adopted 
☐  Coordination and/or unification of efforts with 
external transportation or non-transportation 
agencies  
☐  Information on system 
vulnerabilities collected and 
documented e.g., downscaled 
climate data 
☐ Detailed data and 
information on hazards present 
☐  Concrete steps taken to 
incorporate resilience 
considerations into existing 
asset management program, 
e.g., results of risk/vulnerability 
studies 
☐  Case by case 
consideration of 
funding for adaptation 






☐ Formal agency policies 





☐  Alignment of transport 
resilience planning and 
resilience planning in other 
sectors (e.g., land-use, 
housing, etc.) to streamline 
efforts and realize co-
benefits. 
☐  Formal agency positions (partial/full) dedicated to 
building resilience capacity within agency 
 
☐  Strategic goals and objectives for resilience 
capacity clearly identified  
 
☐  Adoption of adaptive strategies outlined to achieve 
resilience goals 
 
☐  Resilience thinking institutionalized. i.e., resilience 
considerations incorporated into project development 
process (i.e., planning, construction, operation, 
maintenance, renewal/decommissioning) 
 
☐  Resilience thinking reflected in main agency plans: 
Asset Management Plan (TAMP), Long Range Plan 
(LRTP), Transport Improvement Plan (TIP) 
☐  Resilience considerations go 
beyond direct transport assets, 
i.e., supporting infrastructure, 
(e.g., IT, ancillary assets) and 
subsystems/interdependent 
systems (power, water, etc.) 
☐  Resilience 
considered in lifecycle 





included in project 
prioritization process 
where necessary in 
addition to other 
priorities such as 







Table 5.2 Revised STRF Table (continued) 
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CHAPTER 6. CLOSING DISCUSSION 
 
 Summary of Research Findings 
Transportation systems are faced with a plethora of threats that continue to evolve and 
grow over time. Natural threats such as those posed by the impacts of climate change and 
extreme weather are also increasing in intensity and extent of damages as indicated by data 
from NOAA (2017). These threats combined with the probable occurrences of catastrophic 
disruptions from terrorist events or infrastructure failure due to aging and structurally 
deficient infrastructure has spurred great attention to the area of system resilience and how 
to achieve it. Resilience, the ability of a system to maintain critical functions and prevent 
catastrophic failure during a disruption, and then recover rapidly, is now at the forefront of 
most critical infrastructure discussions. Different types of transportation agencies are also 
interested in the resilience discussion because of its implications to the systems they plan, 
operate and manage, and the capabilities for service provision after major disruptive events.  
To bridge this gap, the transportation field in both research and practice, has worked 
towards realizing more resilient outcomes by developing various methodologies, 
frameworks and approaches. In transportation research, graph theory based models such as 
those by Ash and Newth (2007), Ip and Wang (2009), Rosenkratz et al., (2005), and Taylor 
and Susilawati (2012) assess transport resilience using various optimization techniques to 
assess network properties based on the topological properties of networks (e.g., weighted 
or unweighted nodes and links/ intersections and streets). Other process based models (e.g., 
Croope et al., 2010, Cox et al., 2010, Serulle, 2010, etc.) seek to assess system resilience 
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by attempting to capture both demand and supply sides of transportation. Consequently, 
resilient transportation systems have been characterized as having redundancy, robustness, 
modularity, efficiency, rapidity, diversity, resourcefulness, etc. The literature also shows 
that the implementation of some of these frameworks are largely focused on the physical 
highway system and how it can be built better to withstand the impacts of major 
disruptions, both in research and in practice. Additionally, although some of the literature 
reviewed also incorporates some broader factors (such as organizational and institutional 
considerations), the current experiences of transportation agencies with resilience capacity 
building is evidence that unidentified opportunities exist and are yet to be recognized and 
capitalized upon. 
The literature on resilience applications in ecological, socioecological, and economic 
systems provide such opportunities. Specifically, the concepts of system stability at a single 
equilibrium, and system resilience at multiple equilibria through regime changes are 
pivotal for the current conceptualization of transportation system resilience. Stability, 
represents a system’s ability to return to a state of equilibrium after a disturbance and can 
therefore be characterized by the rapidity with which it returns to equilibrium. Resilient 
ecological systems, on the other hand, have multiple points of equilibria, and thus, a 
fluctuation in system conditions simply causes a shift from one equilibrium state (regime) 
to another. These two types of ecological behavior described by Holling (1973) form the 
main difference between ecological resilience and engineering resilience in the sense of 




This research therefore sought to shift the current conceptualization of transportation 
system resilience by developing a framework based on the foundational concepts of system 
resilience at multiple equilibria accessed via regime changes. A transportation resilience 
survey was therefore developed and deployed to a purposive sample to obtain information 
on transportation agency experience with developing resilience capacity with the premise 
that agencies with more experience in dealing with hazards and/or major disruptive events, 
evolve towards more sociotechnical approaches over time.  
The survey results show evidence of sociotechnical approaches at agencies that have 
experienced major system disruptions such as ABAG/MTC (technical and organizational 
capital), Iowa DOT (organizational and technical capital), and FDOT/Broward MPO 
(organizational and technical capital). The results also show similar changes in resilience 
approaches in agencies that may not have experienced major system disruptions, but have 
developed a greater understanding of system threats and potential consequences for their 
systems. These agencies can be described as having a proactive posture and include 
agencies such as MassDOT (institutional, organizational, technical and financial capital) 
and MDSHA (institutional, organizational and technical capital). Thus, although agency 
experience is a factor in evolving resilience efforts towards sociotechnical approaches, a 
greater awareness and understanding of system threats may also be a factor. We also 
observe that agencies described as proactive also have some sort of state level policy, law 
or regulation that promotes that behavior.  
In addition to these insights, the survey showed different levels of organizational capital 
for resilience building at transport agencies. This includes staffing, strategic planning, 
monitoring and reporting, coordination and collaboration, and a reflection of resilience 
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thinking in main planning documents. Similarly, institutional capital development was 
distributed between agency-level efforts and state-level efforts (discussed in preceding 
paragraph). At the agency-level, few agencies reflected this in their survey responses 
(ODOT and ABAG). Technical capital development at the agencies surveyed was 
characterized by initial maturity stages of general threat awareness and non-risk-based 
asset management, to higher maturity levels of collection of (or possession of) detailed data 
and information on system assets and potential threats for the purposes of risk/vulnerability 
analyses. In some cases, agencies had either incorporated this data (to various extents) to 
their asset management systems, as in the case of MassDOT, or were planning to do so. 
Lastly, similar to institutional capital, few resilience strategies were identified for financial 
capital. Agencies mostly rely on grants to fund initiatives, which is not unexpected 
considering the nascent nature of resilience efforts at most agencies. Agency responses also 
showed a desire to develop decision-making and project prioritization processes that 
incorporate resilience.  
These strategies and system attributes identified across the different capital types were 
combined with the concept of system resilience at multiple equilibria to develop a 
framework and maturity scale for developing institutional, organizational, technical and 
financial capital for transport resilience capacity building. The maturity scale, which 
doubles as a self-assessment and resilience planning tool, was verified by means of 
demonstration and practitioner reviews from Arizona DOT, Washington State DOT, New 
York MTA and the ARC. The verification process revealed certain enhancements, which 
were consequently incorporated to the tool, were needed to ensure an easier understanding 
of the tool’s use and benefits.  
193 
 
 Recommendations  
Transportation agencies at any stage in the resilience development capacity process may 
use the framework as a planning tool to outline both short and long term targets and goals 
for enhancing transportation system resilience. It is recommended that agencies plan 
towards systematically progressing along the maturity scale rather than leapfrogging to 
effective accrue the benefits of joint capital optimization. Additionally, it is recommended 
that agencies engage multiple employees at different levels and divisions within the agency 
when conducting the self-assessment to provide a holistic picture of the agency’s 
capabilities. Obtaining employee buy-in is therefore crucial to the success of this process. 
Creating a business case for resilience within an agency by linking resilience 
considerations to improvements in some day-to-day agency activities presents the case for 
resilience in terms of what matters most the agency. 
Finally, after the STRF output is obtained from a self-assessment, the agency must 
prioritize its resilience goals and targets based on the agency’s strategic priorities, available 
resources, and the potential co-benefits to be accrued across capital areas.  
 Research Contributions 
This research makes three main contributions to the knowledge and understanding of 
transportation resilience. Firstly, while the literature on transport system resilience as it 
relates to conceptualization and measurement is vast, this research presents a novel 
conceptualization of resilience in transport systems by extending the current paradigm from 
that of a single equilibrium conceptualization to a multiple equilibria conceptualization. 
This conceptualization shifts the current thinking from a concentration of resources on 
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physical system hardening and a focus on returning to pre-disruption state, to one that seeks 
change in order to persist.  
Secondly, the research combines the concepts of stability regimes, capital asset 
management and sociotechnical systems theory to explicitly conceptualize different 
developmental stages of building resilience capacity in transport systems through joint 
optimization of institutional, organizational, technical and financial capital within an 
agency. The approach therefore emphasizes the interdependence of the four capital types 
for organizational performance and achieving resilient outcomes. This is important because 
the common approach for transportation agencies interested in building resilience capacity 
is to focus mostly on improving robustness of physical infrastructure, offering less attention 
to organizational aspects of resilience building.  
Finally, the STRF provides a means for transport agencies to assess progress towards 
building resilience capacity. It is potentially beneficial for decision makers involved in 
strategic or long-term resilience planning to assess gaps and growth areas, strategically 
plan for the next attainable regime, and allocate the needed resources to systematically 
achieve the desired capabilities.  
  
 Limitations and Future Research 
The framework developed has a number of limitations that ought to be discussed. These 
limitations, however, do not detract from the benefits of the framework and some 
limitations are also directly linked to future research. As stated earlier, the transportation 
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resilience survey used Maximum Variation Sampling (MVS), a type of purposive sampling 
technique in the selection of agencies to survey. This non-probabilistic method of sampling 
means that broad generalizations cannot be made about the results of the survey, and by 
extension, about transportation agency resilience efforts. However, the strength of MVS is 
its ability to allow the researcher to capture a variation in perspectives on a topic and 
present different angles of an issue. By creating variation of the types of agencies selected 
(DOTs, MPOs, and local governments), as well as geographic locations and hazards faced, 
the survey was able to capture the experiences of transportation-related agencies across a 
broad spectrum. Therefore, the survey output fed into the development of a framework that 
captures a wide range of agency experiences and can thus be utilized by various agencies 
in their efforts to build resilience capacity.  
Next, the process of using check boxes in the STRF tool may present slight ambiguities 
when interpreting results for agencies that possess attributes scattered across the different 
stages. Here, there may be difficulty in determining which stage they fall in. However, 
when the original intent of the tool is revisited, one realizes that the purpose is not to rank 
or score agencies, but to provide information on opportunities for building capacity. Thus, 
in such cases, an agency may identify with the highest stage in which it possesses 50 
percent or more of attributes. This can point the agency to what other opportunities exist 
for improvement. 
This potential challenge also poses an opportunity for future research into the tool’s design 
and administration process. The current tool can be developed into a web-based tool with 
an improved user interface that automatically indicates which stage an agency is in and 
lists the strategies for improvement. Another closely related area for further research is 
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identifying and cataloguing detailed strategies that agencies can implement to achieve the 
capacities indicated by each capital attribute. The improved web-based tool can then 
include a list of possible strategies for implementation with the tool results.  
Another area of further research is investigating the correlations between the four agency 
capital areas. Research into the correlations between capital types and the extents to which 
increasing one input affects other capital types would create value for strategic planning. 
This can be done over time as more data is collected from continued use of the framework 
by agencies. Subsequently, validation studies can be conducted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed tool in providing guidance for enhancing resilience capacity 
for transportation systems.   
Finally, further research into other types of institutional capital in enhancing resilience can 
be investigated. This includes defining institutional capital to include social institutions 
(e.g., community capital) in addition to laws and regulations and investigating the 







STRF Outputs from Framework Verification
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☒ Agency policies for 




☒  Champion efforts present to raise awareness in agency 
 
☒Plans that address aspects of resilience may be present. 
e.g., initial climate action plans  
 
☐ High level resilience planning present, e.g., 
qualitative/general impacts study, general state-wide 
resilience planning 
 
☐ Emergency response and recovery processes present 
☒ Awareness of hazards 
(e.g., climate impacts) and 
taking initial steps to mitigate 







☐ Some hazard specific 
policies that enhance 
resilience present 
 
☐ Mitigation policies 




☐ External state action 
influences agency 
posture and actions. 
E.g., executive order, 
legislation, state 
resilience committee or 
other external 
requirements.   
☒  Champion efforts still critical 
 
☐  Political will garnered at agency, i.e., senior leadership 
support 
 
☒  Resilience priorities identified; however, may not be 
explicitly stated in official agency planning documents  
 
☐ Hazard specific plan(s) or program(s) developed with 
detailed impacts analysis and adaptation strategies 
identified 
 
☐  Some level of external collaboration with strategic 
partners present 
☐ Resilience focus on 
infrastructure hardening 
 
☒ May have conducted or 
planning to conduct pilot 
study on risk or vulnerability 
for certain assets  
 
☐ Active asset management 
program, but does not 
explicitly incorporate 
resilience considerations  
 
☐ Initiatives still 
rely on grants 
 






Table A.3 ARC STRF Output (Continued) 





☐ Guidance developed for 
changes in current plans, 
regulation or policies to 
support resilience thinking 
at agency (or state)  
 
☐  Framework provided 
for addressing possible 
institutional barriers 
(including inter-agency 
barriers) that may be faced 
in implementing resilience 
building strategies  
☒  Raised employee awareness on resilience issues 
at agency 
   
☒  Formal, dedicated or designated person/team 
responsible for resilience planning or initiatives 
 
☐  Resilience considerations incorporated into 
project planning, e.g., hazard mapping 
 
☐  Monitoring and reporting of resilience capacity 
building initiatives/activities adopted 
☐  Coordination and/or unification of efforts with 
external transportation or non-transportation 
agencies  
☒  Information on system 
vulnerabilities collected and 
documented e.g., downscaled 
climate data 
 
☐ Detailed data and 
information on hazards present 
 
☐  Concrete steps taken to 
incorporate resilience 
considerations into existing 
asset management program, 
e.g., results of risk/vulnerability 
studies 
 
☐  Case by case 
consideration of 
funding for adaptation 






☒ Formal agency policies 





☐  Alignment of transport 
resilience planning and 
resilience planning in 
other sectors (e.g., land-
use, housing, etc.) to 
streamline efforts and 
realize co-benefits. 
☐  Formal agency positions (partial/full) dedicated 
to building resilience capacity within agency 
 
☐  Buy-in and understanding of resilience thinking 
established throughout agency 
 
☐  Strategic goals and objectives for resilience 
capacity clearly identified  
☐  Adoption of adaptive strategies outlined to 
achieve resilience goals 
☐  Resilience thinking institutionalized. i.e., 
resilience considerations incorporated into project 
development process (i.e., planning, construction, 
operation, maintenance, renewal/decommissioning) 
☐  Resilience thinking reflected in main agency 
plans: Asset Management Plan (TAMP), Long Range 
Plan (LRTP), Transport Improvement Plan (TIP) 
☒  Resilience considerations go 
beyond direct transport assets, 
i.e., supporting infrastructure, 
(e.g., IT, ancillary assets) and 
subsystems/interdependent 
systems (power, water, etc.) 
☐  Resilience 
considered in lifecycle 





in project prioritization 
process where 
necessary in addition to 
other priorities such as 
















Transportation Resilience Self-Assessment and Planning Tool 
Introduction  
The STRF framework for resilience planning in transportation agencies uses a 
sociotechnical approach, that is, those that consider human and organizational factors in 
addition to technical factors, for resilience planning. The framework is based on 
foundational concepts from the resilience of ecological systems; specifically, defining and 
adopting a multi-stage approach to building resilience capacity. The framework is also 
structured by using a capital asset management approach and therefore focuses on 
enhancing a transport agency’s institutional, organizational, technical and financial capital 
for building resilience capacity. 
Furthermore, development of the Sociotechnical Resilience Framework was premised on 
the notion that as transport agencies mature in their dealings with hazards, they naturally 
move from largely technical to more sociotechnical approaches. The various capital 
attributes for each capital type were therefore extracted from both resilience literature and 
the relative experiences of U.S. transportation agencies involved in building resilience 
capacity.  
Tool Description and Use 
1. The four stages represent a gradual progression in maturity in terms of the 
resilience capacity of agencies. It is important to note that the framework is not 
intended to measure or rate an agency’s resilience; rather, it serves as a scale that 
agencies can use to assess the progress of their resiliency building endeavors, and 
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systematically work toward enhancing their resilience capacity by reaching for the 
next desirable stage on the maturity scale.  
2. The different capital types in each stage do not necessarily occur simultaneously. 
In assessing an agency’s position on the maturity scale, one may find that the 
agency may be at Stage 1 in terms of Financial Capital, but Stage 2 in terms of the 
development of its Organizational Capital. Thus, an agency can invest in 
progressing within a capital type based on its predetermined priorities. 
3. The stages described do not constitute a rigidly prescribed process for enhancing 
system resilience capacity; therefore, while some agencies may mature by 
progressively moving from one stage to next subsequent one, others may leapfrog 
from one to the next, based on agency priorities and available resources for 
growth.  
4. Lastly, the framework is meant to be a tool that agencies can use to assess their 
progress in building resilience capacity within their agencies and identify growth 
opportunities in terms of what attributes to aspire to or will constitute appropriate 
strategic goals in different timeframes. 
What to do for this exercise 
Identify the current resilience capacity building stages for your agency by placing 
checkmarks on each attribute that best describes your agency’s efforts. To collect the best 
type of information, it is advised that the exercise be carried out by persons from the 
following three categories: 
 High level position with a good understanding of agency capabilities 
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 Planning division 
 Operations or Engineering division  
 
Table B.1 Definitions 
Concept Definition 
Resilience  
The ability of a system to maintain critical functions and 
prevent catastrophic failure during a disruption, and 
then recover rapidly, is now at the forefront of most 
critical infrastructure discussions 
Organizational 
capital 
Resourcefulness of the managing agencies in the case of 
infrastructure systems. It includes plans, processes, 
procedures or practices that increase an organization's 
resilience capacity 
Institutional capital Comprises laws, policies and regulations that determine what 
can be done in a particular system 
Financial capital This refers to the amount of financial resources available to 
an agency. This is reflected in budgets and impacts the 
prioritization of activities and projects 
Technical capital  Comprises the portfolio of assets an agency owns, including 
their individual and combined performance, as well as the 
technical knowledge and expertise required to enhance the 
resilience of an agency’s portfolio of physical assets 
Resilience 
champion 
Individual at an agency that advocates for resilience 
awareness and promotes the adoption behaviors that 




Table B.2  STRF Planning Tool 
 





☐ Agency policies for 




☐  Champion efforts present to raise awareness in 
agency 
 
☐Plans that address aspects of resilience may be 
present. e.g., initial climate action plans  
 
☐ High level resilience planning present, e.g., 
qualitative/general impacts study, general state-wide 
resilience planning 
 
☐ Emergency response and recovery processes 
present 
☐ Awareness of hazards 
(e.g., climate impacts) and 
taking initial steps to 
mitigate 







☐ Some hazard specific 
policies that enhance 
resilience present 
 
☐ Mitigation policies 
present at agency, e.g., 
greenhouse gas mitigation 
 
 
☐ External state action 
influences agency posture 
and actions. E.g., executive 
order, legislation, state 
resilience committee or 
other external 
requirements.   
☐  Champion efforts still critical 
 
☐  Political will garnered at agency, i.e., senior 
leadership support 
 
☐  Resilience priorities identified; however, may not be 
explicitly stated in official agency planning documents  
 
☐ Hazard specific plan(s) or program(s) developed with 
detailed impacts analysis and adaptation strategies 
identified 
 
☐  Some level of external collaboration with strategic 
partners present 
☐ Resilience focus on 
infrastructure hardening 
 
☐ May have conducted or 
planning to conduct pilot 
study on risk or 
vulnerability for certain 
assets  
 
☐ Active asset 
management program, but 




☐ Initiatives still rely on 
grants 
 
☐ May secure some 











☐ Guidance developed for 
changes in current plans, 
regulation or policies to 
support resilience thinking at 
agency (or state)  
 




barriers) that may be faced 
in implementing resilience 
building strategies  
☐  Raised employee awareness on resilience issues 
at agency 
  ☐  Formal, dedicated or designated person/team 
responsible for resilience planning or initiatives 
☐  Resilience considerations incorporated into 
project planning, e.g., hazard mapping 
☐  Monitoring and reporting of resilience capacity 
building initiatives/activities adopted 
☐  Coordination and/or unification of efforts with 
external transportation or non-transportation 
agencies  
☐  Information on system 
vulnerabilities collected and 
documented e.g., 
downscaled climate data 
☐ Detailed data and 
information on hazards 
present 
☐  Concrete steps taken to 
incorporate resilience 
considerations into existing 
asset management program, 
e.g., results of 
risk/vulnerability studies 
☐  Case by case 
consideration of funding 







☐ Formal agency policies 





☐  Alignment of transport 
resilience planning and 
resilience planning in other 
sectors (e.g., land-use, 
housing, etc.) to streamline 
efforts and realize co-
benefits. 
☐  Formal agency positions (partial/full) dedicated 
to building resilience capacity within agency 
 
☐  Strategic goals and objectives for resilience 
capacity clearly identified  
 
☐  Adoption of adaptive strategies outlined to 
achieve resilience goals 
 
☐  Resilience thinking institutionalized. i.e., 
resilience considerations incorporated into project 
development process (i.e., planning, construction, 
operation, maintenance, renewal/decommissioning) 
 
☐  Resilience thinking reflected in main agency 
plans: Asset Management Plan (TAMP), Long Range 
Plan (LRTP), Transport Improvement Plan (TIP) 
☐  Resilience considerations 
go beyond direct transport 
assets, i.e., supporting 
infrastructure, (e.g., IT, 
ancillary assets) and 
subsystems/interdependent 
systems (power, water, etc.) 
☐  Resilience considered 




in project prioritization 
process where necessary 
in addition to other 
priorities such as safety, 
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